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Summary 
 
The realisation of socio-economic rights for the poorest and most vulnerable 
members of society is of critical importance if South Africa’s project of transformative 
constitutionalism is to succeed. It is thus important that courts grant effective relief  in 
cases where socio-economic rights have been found to be violated. This thesis sets 
out to determine whether the structural interdict in South African constitutional law can 
constitute such effective relief for socio-economic rights violations.  
This thesis firstly aims to determine what the judicially recognised concept of 
effective relief entails. This is done by developing an evaluative framework that should 
be used to both design and evaluate remedies granted in cases where human rights 
have been violated. This evaluative framework consists of certain remedial norms, 
drawn from Susan Sturm’s scholarship, to which public law remedies should adhere 
and also of more concrete factors that should be considered by courts during the 
remedial design phase. The remedial norms include participation, respect for the 
separation of powers doctrine, impartiality, reasoned decision making and 
remediation. The factors which should be considered include the nature of the right 
and nature of the violation, diverse interests, reason for the violation, practicability 
concerns, and the deterrent effect of the remedy. 
The second part of this thesis aims to determine if structural interdicts can constitute 
effective relief. This thesis argues that structural interdicts can constitute such relief, 
and that it holds specific potential to remedy systemic violations. However, structural 
interdicts will only constitute effective relief if diverse stakeholders participate in the 
remedial design phase and if the court sufficiently retains supervisory jurisdiction over 
the case.  
This thesis lastly proposes a participatory structural interdict model for socio-
economic rights violations. This model is specifically designed to adhere to the 
remedial norms for public law remedies and to mitigate against concerns relating to 
the separation of powers doctrine, democratic legitimacy of the judiciary and 
institutional capacity of the courts – concerns traditionally associated with socio-
economic rights adjudication. 
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Opsomming 
 
Die verwesenliking van sosio-ekonomiese regte vir die armste en mees weerlose 
lede van ons samelewing is van kardinale belang vir die sukses van Suid-Afrika se 
transformatiewe grondwetlikheidsprojek. Dit is dus belangrik dat howe effektiewe 
regshulp verleen in gevalle waar menseregte geskend word. Hierdie tesis poog om 
vas te stel of die strukturele interdik as remedie in die Suid-Afrikaanse konstitusionele 
reg as effektiewe regshulp vir die skending van sosio-ekonomiese regte beskou kan 
word. 
Hierdie tesis sal eerstens vasstel wat met die geregtelik erkende konsep van 
effektiewe regshulp bedoel word. Dit sal gedoen word deur die ontwikkeling van ŉ 
evalueringsraamwerk wat gebruik moet word om beide remedies te ontwerp en te 
evalueer in gevalle waar menseregte geskend is. Hierdie raamwerk bestaan uit sekere 
remediërende norme waaraan publiekregtelike remedies moet voldoen, soos 
geïdentifiseer in Susan Sturm se uitsonderlike akademiese bydrae, sowel as meer 
konkrete faktore wat oorweeg moet word tydens die remediërende ontwerpsfase. Die 
norme sluit in deelname, respek vir die skeiding van magte leerstuk, onpartydigheid, 
beredeneerde besluitneming en remediëring. Die faktore wat oorweeg moet word sluit 
in die aard van die betrokke reg en die aard van die skending, uiteenlopende belange, 
die rede vir die skending, praktiese bekommernisse, en die voorkomende effek van 
die regshulp. 
Die tweede gedeelte van hierdie tesis poog om vas te stel of die strukturele interdik 
as effektiewe regshulp geag kan word. Hierdie tesis argumenteer dat dit wel as 
sodanig geag kan word, en dat hierdie remedie veral potensiaal inhou om sistemiese 
regskendings te remediëer. Die strukturele interdik sal egter net as ‘n effektiewe 
regshulp geag kan word indien uiteenlopende belanghebbendes tydens die 
remediërende ontwerpsfase deelgeneem het en indien die hof toesighoudende 
jurisdiksie oor die saak behou het. 
Hierdie tesis stel laastens ‘n deelnemende strukturele interdik model voor wat 
verleen kan word in sake waar sosio-ekonomiese regte geskend is. Hierdie model is 
spesifiek ontwerp om te voldoen aan die remediërende norme vir publiekregtelike 
remedies en ook om die bekommernisse wat tradisioneel geassosieer word met die 
beregting van sosio-ekonomiese regte te versag. Hierdie bekommernisse sluit in die 
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skeiding van magte leerstuk, die demokratiese legitimiteit van die regsbank, en die 
institusionele vermoëns van die howe. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction to research problem 
 
1 1 1 Transformative constitutionalism 
 
This thesis aims to investigate the question as to whether the structural interdict 
remedy can be designed so as to constitute effective relief in cases where the socio-
economic rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“Constitution”) have been violated.1 In order to understand the need for effective relief 
in socio-economic rights cases, the transformative potential of socio-economic rights 
should be viewed against the backdrop of South Africa’s project of transformative 
constitutionalism.  
Klare describes the concept of transformative constitutionalism as “[a] long-term 
project of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed to… 
transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction”.2 Liebenberg explains with 
reference to transformative constitutionalism that the Constitution is both forward-
looking and backward-looking. It is backward-looking because of its aim to address 
the wrongs and injustices of the past.3 The forward-looking aspect of our Constitution 
is encapsulated in its Preamble where it is stated that the Constitution aims to establish 
a society “based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”. 
Pieterse elaborates on this understanding of transformative constitutionalism by 
arguing that the value of substantive equality underlies the transformative project of 
our Constitution.4 He further argues that a society based on substantive equality 
cannot be achieved while the majority of South Africans are denied basic socio-
                                            
1 Socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution includes the right to adequate housing 
(s26) and the right to adequate health care, food, water and social security (s27). See chapter 
three part 3 2 1 where the nature of socio-economic rights is discussed. 
2 K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
3 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 25. 
4 M Pieterse “What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism?” 
(2005) 20 SA Public Law 155 156. 
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economic conditions.5 It is thus clear that the realisation of socio-economic rights is 
vital for the Constitution’s transformative project to succeed.6 
 
1 1 2 Socio-economic conditions in South Africa 
 
Many of the prevailing social and economic injustices in South Africa are a direct 
legacy of apartheid and colonial rule. Before the advent of democracy in 1994, the 
majority of South Africans were systemically excluded from participating in social and 
economic activities because of their race, and the consequences of this can still be 
seen today in the form of structural poverty and inequality.7 A significant number of 
people are still living in inhumane conditions and severe poverty.8 The constitutional 
vision of a democratic and equal South Africa has thus not yet been realised and is 
                                            
5 160. 
6 160. See also P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 352 where 
the author similarly states that socio-economic rights are central to the transformative project. 
7 Systemic human rights violations which leads to structural poverty and inequality are defined 
as cases where a large number of people are affected by way of rights violations because of 
pervasive public policy failures by multiple governmental agencies and other institutional 
deficiencies. C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism 
on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2010) 89 Tex L Rev 89 1669 1671. Evidence of 
structural inequality is the fact that a very small percentage (0,6%) of previously advantaged 
white people qualify as poor compared to the previously disadvantaged black people of whom 
66,8% qualify as living under the upper-bound poverty line. Statistics South Africa Poverty 
Trends in South Africa An Examination of Absolute Poverty between 2006 and 2011 Report 
No. 03-10-06 (2014) 27. 
8 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) 
para 191. More than half of the population is classified as poor and over 20% is classified as 
living in “extreme poverty”. Statistics South Africa Methodological Report on Rebasing of 
National Poverty Lines and Development of Pilot Provincial Poverty Lines Report No. 03-10-
11 (2015) 13. This is also illustrated by the fact that many South African households are food 
insecure even though South Africa is classified as a food secure country. This is due to the 
gross inequality in South Africa where more than half of the country qualified as poor at the 
end of apartheid, despite the fact that South Africa ranked as a middle income country. S 
Altman, T G B Hart & P T Jacobs “Household Food Security Status in South Africa” (2009) 48 
Agrekon 345 345. 
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hampered by the on-going failure to fulfil various socio-economic rights.9 It can 
accordingly be argued that the inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution has not yet reached its full transformative potential since socio-economic 
rights related to housing, education, social security and health care have not yet been 
realised for the majority of South Africa’s population. 
 
1 1 2 1 Housing 
 
Spatial and other injustices, which are a legacy of apartheid, are still prevalent in 
modern South African society,10 despite the Constitution’s transformative ideals. The 
enormous housing shortage currently faced by government can be directly attributed 
to apartheid-era housing policies, in terms of which millions of people were forcibly 
removed from their homes and moved to informal settlements.11 Today, those who 
were forcibly removed often still live in deplorable circumstances and have no title 
security to the land they live on. The many evictions that still take place under the new 
democratic government is evidence of the lack of title security and continuing effects 
of historical land dispossession.12 
                                            
9 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 ZACC 13 (CC) para 22 where Madlanga J states that South 
Africa’s racially discriminatory past is not yet history for many South Africans, since the brutal 
consequences of apartheid and colonialism are still present. 
10 The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 was introduced by the National Party after an election 
victory. The aim of this Act was to make residential separation compulsory. The effects of such 
legislation can still be seen today in South Africa where white farmers continue to own the 
majority of the 67% agricultural land. C Walker & A Dubb “The Distribution of Land in South 
Africa: An Overview” (2016) Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies 
<http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/No1%20Fact%20check%20web.pdf> (accessed 15-06-2016). See Daniels v Scribante 
2017 ZACC 13 (CC) para 14 where Madlanga J states that “[d]ispossession of land was 
central to colonialism and apartheid” and M Strauss A Right to the City for South Africa’s Urban 
Poor LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2017) 34-53 where the author discusses land 
dispossession of black South Africans under colonial and apartheid rule. 
11 Z Skweyiya “Towards a Solution to the Land Question in Post-Apartheid South Africa: 
Problems and Models” (1989) 21 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 211 212. See also Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 191 where Ngcobo J 
recognises apartheid as the cause of the housing shortage in South Africa. 
12 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) is an 
example of one such case. The Court described the eviction in this case as “reminiscent of 
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1 1 2 2 Education 
 
Everyone has a right to education as guaranteed in section 29 of the Constitution. 
This right is of paramount importance given its instrumental value in “freeing and 
unlocking the potential of each person” in South Africa.13 Education should not be 
viewed as a stand-alone right, but rather as a right which holds the potential, if realised, 
to help individuals who are socially and economically marginalised to create dignified 
lives for themselves.14 There is still a great disparity between the quality of education 
received by white students (who mostly attend former model C schools)15 compared 
to black students (who often attend no-fee schools in rural areas with very limited 
resources).16 The Constitutional Court has stated in this regard that the “lasting effects 
of the educational segregation of apartheid are discernible in the systemic problems 
of inadequate facilities and the discrepancy in the level of basic education for the 
majority of learners” in South Africa.17 Spaull echoes the Constitutional Court in this 
regard, stating that many of the schools that were dysfunctional under the apartheid 
government, remain so to this day.18 It is clear that unequal resource distribution, 
                                            
apartheid-style evictions” since most of the occupiers’ possessions were destroyed during the 
eviction process (which took place a day earlier than scheduled) and they were subsequently 
left to fend for themselves in the cold Cape winter (para 10). See also Hadibeng Local 
Municipality v Unlawful Occupiers of Portions 33 And 37 of the Farm 448 Bokfontein 
(27481/15) 2015 ZAGPPHC 367 and Khauhelo v Mosupa (A252/2014) 2015 ZAFSHC 69. 
13 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2012 3 All SA 579 (GNP) para 3. 
14 Para 4. 
15 Former model C schools are schools which were previously reserved for white pupils only 
under the apartheid government. The segregated education system of the apartheid regime 
was introduced by the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953. These former “white” schools typically 
still benefit from better facilities, human and financial resources. 
16 S van der Berg “Apartheid’s Enduring Legacy” (2007) 16 J Afr Econ 849 851. 
17 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC) 
para 42. See also Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool 
Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 2 where the Constitutional Court described this “continuing 
deep inequality” as “a painful legacy of our apartheid history”. 
18 N Spaull “Poverty and Privilege: Primary School Inequality in South Africa” (01-07-2012) 
Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 13/12 
<www.ekon.sun.ac.za/wpapers/2012/wp132012/wp-13-2012.pdf> (accessed 14-04-2016) 3. 
In Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education for All (20793/2014) 2015 ZASCA 198 para 
3 the Court stated per Navsa JA that the issue of providing textbooks to students is one which 
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which took place on a structural scale during apartheid, has not yet been rectified.19 
Former “white only” schools are still better resourced than former black schools and 
can thus provide a better educational experience to its learners.20 Yamauchi further 
suggests that the geographical positioning of schools is a factor that should be 
considered when evaluating inequality in education. Previously white schools, which 
are well resourced, are mostly situated in rich urban areas. These schools are 
therefore not accessible to the majority of poor black South Africans.21 The spatial 
injustices of the past thus also affect other socio-economic issues, such as education. 
Moreover, the no-fee schools attended by mostly poor black students are more 
vulnerable to be adversely affected by recalcitrant or incompetent educational 
departments, thereby leading to further inequalities.22 
  
                                            
almost exclusively affects black children in rural communities and thus not white students who 
mostly attend former model C schools. 
19 F Veriava & F Coomans “The Right to Education” in D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 57 61. 
20 See N Ally & D McLaren “Education Funding Formula Needs to be Fixed” (29-07-2016) 
Groundup <http://www.groundup.org.za/article/education-funding-formula-needs-be-fixed/> 
(accessed 13-06-2017) where the authors state that the equitable share formula according to 
which national government allocates money to the different provinces for education does not 
take into account the fact that some schools were historically underfunded. The effect is thus 
that the historically unequal resource distribution is perpetuated. 
21 F Yamauchi “School Quality, Clustering and Government Subsidy in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa” (2011) 30 Econ Edu Rev 146 146. See also Federation of Governing Bodies for South 
African Schools (FEDSAS) v Member of the Executive Council for Education, Gauteng (CCT 
209/15) 2016 ZACC 14 paras 38–39 where the Court considered the argument espoused by 
the amici curiae. The latter argued that the default feeder zones of schools, based on their 
geographical positioning, led to unfair discrimination. The Court stated that this argument held 
“traction” (para 39).  
22 See chapter four part 4 3 2 1 where Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 
(GNP) is discussed. The severe incompetence of both the Limpopo Department of Education 
and the National Department of Basic Education led to the systemic violation of a right to a 
basic education of thousands of learners who did not receive textbooks timeously. 
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1 1 2 3 Social security 
 
Another socio-economic right which is often systemically violated in South Africa is 
the right to social assistance.23 Social assistance can be defined as “needs-based 
assistance financed from public funds” for the poorest and most vulnerable members 
of our society.24 The realisation of this right is extremely important due to the high rate 
of poverty and inequality in South Africa. There are, however, many reported cases of 
government recalcitrance in respect of grant payment and administration, especially 
in the Eastern Cape Province.25 
 
1 1 2 4 Health care 
 
There is a great disparity between the quality of health care received by poor people 
when compared to the middle and upper income class. This is because those who can 
afford medical aid are able to access private institutions, which possess ample 
resources.26 The first socio-economic rights case to reach the Constitutional Court was 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health.27 This case serves as a stark reminder of the 
consequences of unequal health care. The Court found that the KwaZulu-Natal Health 
                                            
23 S27(1)(c) of the Constitution states that “everyone has the right to have access to social 
security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate 
social assistance.” 
24 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 592. 
25 The Court stated in Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare 2005 1 All SA 745 (SE) para 
5 per Froneman J that “there has been a persistent and huge problem with the administration 
of social grants” in the Eastern Cape Province. See also chapter four part 4 3 3 2 for a 
discussion of Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) in which 
the recalcitrant attitude of the Minister of Social Development and the South African Social 
Security Agency almost led to the breakdown of the social grants payment system in South 
Africa. 
26 There are 83 medical schemes in the private medical sector which serves only 16,2% of the 
South African population, thereby demonstrating that very few people have access to the 
quality of care offered by the private sector. This disparity in the health care services received 
by the poor and the wealthy, respectively, is also visible when one considers the fact that the 
wealthiest 20% of the country enjoys 36% of the total health benefits compared to the poorest 
20% who receive 12,5% of the total health benefits. Department of Health White Paper on 
National Health Insurance No. 1230 (2015) 28. 
27 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
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Department was unable to provide the applicant with ongoing dialysis treatment due 
to severe resource constraints. Notably, the Court stated that “the hard and 
unpalatable fact is that if the appellant were a wealthy man he would be able to procure 
such treatment from private sources; he is not and has to look to the State to provide 
him with the treatment”.28 It is thus clear that there are great inequalities, largely 
caused by unequal resource distribution, between the quality of health care services 
received by patients who are treated at public health care centres when compared to 
the quality of care offered by the private health care sector.29 
 
1 1 3 The need for effective relief  
 
Human rights litigation can meaningfully contribute to the alleviation of the socio-
economic inequalities highlighted above – and thus the transformative vision of the 
Constitution – if courts grant relief that is effective where it is found that a socio-
economic right has been infringed.30 South African courts have a constitutional 
obligation to grant relief that is “appropriate”,31 “just”, and “equitable”.32 The judiciary 
has further recognised that appropriate, just and equitable relief must constitute 
“effective relief” for the infringement of the rights set out in the South African Bill of 
Rights.33 However, it is unclear when a remedy will constitute effective relief since 
South African courts have not yet provided an explicit definition or set of criteria for 
this judicial requirement, and academic literature on this topic is likewise inconclusive.  
  
                                            
28 Para 31. 
29 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) para 95. 
30 It is important to note that courts are merely one of many stakeholders in what must be a 
concerted effort to combat poverty and inequality in South Africa. See S Budlender, G Marcus 
& N Ferreira Public Interest Litigation and Social Change in South Africa: Strategies, Tactics 
and Lessons (2014) 95-107 where the authors discuss different strategies involving diverse 
stakeholders that must be employed in combination with human rights litigation in order to 
effect positive social change. 
31 S38 of the Constitution. 
32 S172(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
33 See chapter two part 2 2 2 where the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of “appropriate”, 
“just” and “equitable” relief as “effective” relief is discussed.  
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1 1 4 The structural interdict remedy 
 
The structural interdict as constitutional remedy in diverse jurisdictions has attracted 
widespread attention from academic commentators.34 On the one hand, this remedy 
holds enormous potential to vindicate claimants’ rights effectively in cases of socio-
economic rights violations, in that this remedy has the ability to facilitate structural 
changes.35 On the other hand, it has the perceived potential to encroach upon the 
separation of powers doctrine by blurring the lines between judicial, executive, 
administrative and legislative functions while over-burdening the courts with 
supervisory functions.36 The nature of this remedy, the challenges presented by its 
utilisation and its potential efficacy to remediate socio-economic rights violations in 
South Africa thus fall to be further scrutinised.  
 
1 2 Research aims and hypotheses 
 
This study aims to address two overarching research questions. The first question 
relates to precisely what the notion of effective relief entails. The second question asks 
how the structural interdict can be best designed and applied in socio-economic rights 
cases whilst remaining sensitive to concerns relating to the separation of powers 
doctrine, the democratic legitimacy of courts and the institutional capacity of the 
judiciary. This study has five research aims aimed at answering the above-mentioned 
research questions. 
The first research aim is to determine what constitutes “effective relief” for human 
rights violations in general by analysing relevant jurisprudence and literature. The 
corresponding hypothesis posits that in addition to vindicating the infringed right, relief 
                                            
34 M Ebadolahi "Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission 
to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa" (2008) 83 
NYU L Rev 1565 1590. 
35 W Trengrove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 4 ESR 
Review 8 9. 
36 Two other concerns which arise when courts grant structural interdict remedies in socio-
economic rights cases are the democratic legitimacy of the courts and institutional capacity of 
the judiciary. See chapter five part 5 2 where these concerns are discussed. 
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will be effective if it is deemed as legitimate by those affected by it and those 
responsible for the implementation thereof.  
The second research aim of this study is to determine how the notion of effective 
relief will operate in the specific context of socio-economic rights. These rights are 
often perceived as different and peculiar in relation to civil and political rights. It thus 
falls to be investigated whether this is indeed the case, and whether or not this affects 
the requirements for effective relief. The hypothesis from which this enquiry proceeds 
is that non-compliance with positive rights obligations will often be systemic in nature. 
It is furthermore hypothesised that these systemic violations will be particularly difficult 
to remedy in the specific context of socio-economic rights since the mechanisms 
needed to give effect to positive socio-economic rights obligations are, unlike positive 
obligations flowing from civil and political rights, historically underfunded and 
neglected. 
This study will thirdly aim to establish under what circumstances the granting of 
structural interdicts will constitute appropriate and effective relief where a socio-
economic right has been infringed. The analysis in this section will be guided by the 
hypothesis that structural interdicts are especially suited to remedy cases where socio-
economic rights have been systemically violated and that the reason for non-
compliance with constitutional obligations will be one of the factors which will indicate 
the appropriateness of the remedy. 
This study will lastly aim to determine how structural interdicts can be best designed 
and applied by South African courts so as to constitute appropriate and effective relief 
for socio-economic rights violations. The hypothesis underlying this discussion is that 
courts need to firstly incorporate a substantial participatory element into the remedy in 
order to mitigate the concerns which arise when structural interdicts are granted in 
socio-economic rights cases.37 Courts must secondly maintain a significant role in this 
participatory remedial process in order to ensure the efficacy of the remedial outcome. 
  
                                            
37 These concerns relate to the separation of powers doctrine, the democratic legitimacy of 
the judiciary, and the institutional capacity of courts. See chapter five part 5 2 for a discussion 
of these concerns. 
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1 3 Methodology 
 
This study will make use of both primary and secondary sources. South African 
jurisprudence as a primary source will firstly be analysed and evaluated in order to 
establish the need for and contours of effective and appropriate relief. The second aim 
of this analysis will be to determine in what kinds of cases the courts are willing to 
grant the structural interdict as remedy. The selection of appropriate cases is 
inevitable, and those cases that are systemic in nature,38 and involved a direct impact 
on a large number of people, will be focused on. Illustrative jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights in which structural interdicts have been granted will be analysed and 
evaluated. However, this study will not only consider cases in which structural 
interdicts were granted, but also certain other cases dealing with socio-economic 
rights violations in which structural interdicts were not granted.39 A comparison of 
these cases will help identify concerns relating to the structural interdict as well as 
circumstances which warrant the granting of the structural interdict. Many of the 
remedial developments relating to structural interdicts in South African constitutional 
law have taken place at the High Court level. This study will thus not only focus on 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, but also 
judgments of the High Courts.  
Secondary sources such as academic commentary will also be used in this study. 
Secondary sources will assist with the analyses of primary sources and will contribute 
to the research aims relating to the concerns raised in respect of this remedy. 
Secondary sources will also aid the formulation of proposals pertaining to the design 
of structural interdicts. None of these secondary sources provides an up-to-date 
account of the use of structural interdict remedies in socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence. This study will thus aim to offer an updated account of the use of 
structural interdict remedies by South African courts in socio-economic rights disputes. 
It will further investigate the potential of participatory structural interdicts to alleviate 
some of the concerns ordinarily associated with the granting of this type of remedy. 
                                            
38 See chapter two part 2 3 2 1 2 (b) where systemic rights violations are discussed. 
39 Such cases include the Constitutional Court judgments in Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
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This study will also make use of some foreign sources as structural interdict type 
remedies are controversial in many other jurisdictions.40 Most foreign sources used in 
this study will consist of academic commentary which will help analyse and understand 
the South African position with regard to the structural interdict as constitutional 
remedy. Certain foreign sources will also be crucial in making recommendations with 
regard to the design of structural interdicts.41  
 
1 4 Outline of chapters 
 
1 4 1  Chapter 2: Appropriate and effective relief for human rights violations 
 
This chapter will analyse the broad remedial powers of South African courts as 
provided for in the Constitution. It will further consider the judicial interpretation of 
these remedial provisions as requiring “effective relief”, and attempt to determine when 
a remedy will qualify as effective relief with reference to jurisprudence and academic 
literature. This discussion will consider whether effective relief must be perfect in the 
sense that it fully vindicates the infringed right, or whether it can be less than perfect 
while still constituting effective relief. 
                                            
40 S39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution state that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum, must consider international law; and may consider foreign law.” O’Regan J 
stated in K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 35 that a “[c]onsideration 
of the responses of other legal systems may enlighten us in analysing our own law, and assist 
us in developing it further”. See the well-known American case of Brown v Board of Education 
349 US 294 (1955) in which the first structural interdict type remedy was granted. See also 
chapter five part 5 4 4 3 2 where this case is relied upon to make recommendations with regard 
to the design of structural interdict remedies. 
41 This study relies heavily on the seminal scholarship of Sturm, in which the author develops 
a normative framework for public law remedies. Sturm’s work is crucial in considering all of 
the research aims of this study since she addresses the need for effective relief and the nature 
of structural remedies in the public law context, while simultaneously making 
recommendations as to how public law remedies should be designed in order to be effective. 
See S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
 
This chapter will thereafter consider the overarching remedial norms for public law 
remedies, as identified by Sturm, which should be observed throughout the remedial 
process for the resultant remedy to be legitimate and effective.42  
The last part of the chapter will analyse case law and academic literature in order 
to determine what factors should be considered by a court when choosing a remedy 
in order to ensure that the remedy will be appropriate and effective.43 These factors 
will be analysed in the context of human rights violations in general, whereas the focus 
of chapter three turns to socio-economic rights cases, in particular. 
 
1 4 2 Chapter 3: Effective relief for socio-economic rights violations  
 
This chapter will consider the judicially recognised requirement for effective relief 
within the specific context of socio-economic rights violations. The nature of socio-
economic rights and the nature of the infringements of these rights will firstly be 
considered in order to determine what relief will be most effective. It will be argued that 
violations arising from non-compliance with positive obligations flowing from socio-
economic rights will often be systemic in nature due to historical and political choices 
and concomitant resource allocation.44 The focus of the study will thus shift to the 
specific context of systemic socio-economic rights violations.  
This chapter will secondly consider various types of constitutional remedies in order 
to determine whether remedies besides the structural interdict can be effective in 
systemic socio-economic rights cases. The remedies considered include declaratory 
orders, prohibitory and mandatory interdicts, constitutional damages, reading in and 
contempt of court proceedings. 
 
1 4 3 Chapter 4: The structural interdict 
 
Having analysed various types of constitutional remedies for socio-economic rights 
violations in chapter three, chapter four proceeds to consider the structural interdict in 
                                            
42 See chapter two part 2 3 1 for a discussion of these norms. See also S P Sturm “A Normative 
Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
43 See chapter two part 2 3 2. 
44 See chapter three part 3 2 2. 
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particular. This chapter will discuss the potential of the structural interdict to constitute 
effective and appropriate relief in cases dealing with systemic socio-economic rights 
violations. It will commence by briefly considering the remedial powers of South 
African courts to grant structural interdicts specifically, and will then continue to 
discuss the nature and main characteristics of the structural interdict. 
This chapter aims to identify the circumstances under which the granting of a 
structural interdict will constitute effective and appropriate relief. This chapter will 
critically analyse and evaluate cases which are the most illustrative of the different 
circumstances under which structural interdicts have been granted, with reference to 
Sturm’s overarching norms for public law remedies and the factors that should be 
considered by courts when choosing a remedy, as identified in chapter two. The aim 
of these evaluations is to determine whether structural interdicts as granted by South 
African courts are effective in cases where socio-economic rights have been violated 
and if not, what the shortcomings of the remedy may be. 
 
1 4 4  Chapter 5: Designing structural interdict remedies to provide effective relief in 
socio-economic rights cases 
 
This chapter will make proposals regarding the design of structural interdicts. The 
discussion will commence with the identification and analysis of the concerns relating 
to the adjudication of socio-economic rights, which is perceived as being exacerbated 
when these rights are enforced by way of a structural interdict remedy. These 
concerns relate to the separation of powers doctrine, the democratic legitimacy of the 
courts, and the institutional capacity of the judiciary.45 This discussion will be followed 
by a brief analysis and evaluation of the existing structural interdict models as 
identified by Sturm.46 
The second part of this chapter aims to propose a participatory structural interdict 
model in which the court plays a central role.47 The meaningful engagement 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court will be considered as a participatory model, 
                                            
45 See chapter five part 5 2 for an analysis of these concerns. 
46 See chapter five part 5 3 for this analysis and evaluation. See also S P Sturm “A Normative 
Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1365. 
47 See chapter five part 5 4 4 in this regard. 
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and this will be supplemented with Sturm’s deliberative model in order to propose a 
structural interdict model which adheres to the overarching norms for public law 
remedies. This discussion will conclude with several proposals for how courts can 
effectively retain supervisory jurisdiction over cases. These proposals will aim to shed 
light on how the practical concern regarding the insufficient resources at the disposal 
of apex courts can be alleviated. 
This chapter will thus propose ways of designing the structural interdict in a manner 
that renders it “effective” in the sense of constituting a viable mechanism for redressing 
relevant socio-economic rights violations. Simultaneously, this remedy must be 
designed so as to remain responsive to the separation of powers doctrine, and to 
concerns regarding the democratic legitimacy and the institutional capacity of the 
judiciary to grant this type of remedy. 
 
1 4 5 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Chapter six concludes the study by setting out its main findings and 
recommendations, and by summarising the answers to the overarching research 
questions which this study aimed to address. 
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Chapter 2: Appropriate and effective relief for human rights violations 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will commence by considering the meaning of “effective relief” as a 
legal concept in South African constitutional law. The origins of this concept will be 
explored, and relevant constitutional provisions will be considered in order to establish 
what remedial powers South African courts possess. Thereafter, the content of the 
concept of effective relief will be explored in greater depth. This will be done by 
considering the overarching remedial norms which must be observed by courts when 
designing remedies in human rights cases. This discussion will be followed by the 
identification and analysis of more concrete factors which must be taken into account 
during the remedial phase of constitutional adjudication. It is important to note that 
effective relief as used in this study refers to the judicially recognised requirement for 
remedies in cases dealing with human rights violations, and not to empirical data 
pointing to efficacy or otherwise of judicial remedies. This chapter will thus aim to 
establish when a remedy will satisfy the judicial requirement for effective relief. 
 
2 2 Effective relief 
 
This section will firstly consider the constitutional provisions dealing with the 
remedial powers of the courts and the judicial interpretation of these provisions as 
requiring effective relief. Case law and academic literature will thereafter be analysed 
in order to confirm whether courts have the constitutional responsibility and power to 
grant effective relief. This section will conclude with a discussion of the different 
conceptualisations of the concept of effective relief in the South African context. 
 
2 2 1 Constitutional provisions 
 
The South African judiciary enjoys a wide discretion when issuing remedies for 
rights violations.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
                                            
1 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 380.  
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(“Constitution”) requires that courts declare any unconstitutional law or conduct 
invalid.2 However, the only further constitutional requirement when exercising this 
discretion is that any ensuing order must be just, equitable and appropriate.3  
The first relevant constitutional provision in respect of issuing relief is that regulating 
standing, enshrined in section 38 of the Constitution. According to section 38, any 
person with standing “has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right 
in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights”. Section 172 of the Constitution is 
equally important in the remedial context since it sets out the obligations and powers 
of courts when deciding constitutional matters.4 Significantly, section 172(1)(b) of the 
Constitution emphasises the broad remedial discretion afforded to courts in that it 
states that a court “may make any order that is just and equitable” when deciding on 
a constitutional matter. 
These two remedial provisions should be read together as complementary or 
mutually supporting provisions. The Constitutional Court has stated in this regard that 
section 38 should be interpreted in the light of section 172(1)(b).5 ”Appropriate relief” 
in terms of section 38 must thus also be relief that is “just and equitable” in accordance 
with section 172(1)(b). The Court has explained this by stating that “appropriate relief” 
must be relief that is “fair and just in the circumstances of the particular case”.6 
                                            
2 S172(1)(a) of the Constitution states that courts “must declare that any law or conduct that 
is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid” (emphasis added). 
3 S38 read with s172(1)(b) of the Constitution. See also W Trengove “Judicial Remedies for 
Violations of Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 4 ESR Review 8. 
4 Section 172: “Powers of courts in constitutional matters 
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court- 
(a) Must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) May make any order that is just and equitable, including- 
(i) An order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) And order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, 
to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.” 
5 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 42. 
6 Para 42. See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) in which 
the Court stated (para 101) that it would grant “appropriate relief” in terms of s38 and that this 
may include any order that is “just and equitable” in terms of s172(1)(b). In discussing the 
relationship between these two remedial provisions, the Court stated (para 38) that s38 of the 
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2 2 2 Appropriate, just and equitable relief as effective relief 
 
This section will explore the interpretation of “appropriate, just and equitable relief” 
in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence dealing with violations of the rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, and will further attempt to show how the Court 
conceptualises the concept of “effective relief”.  
In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (“Fose”), the Constitutional Court grappled 
with the issue of what would constitute appropriate, just and equitable relief for the 
violation of the plaintiff’s right to human dignity, freedom and security of his person, 
privacy and his rights relating to lawful arrest and detention.7 In issuing a remedy, the 
Court held that “an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without 
effective remedies for breach, the values underlying the rights entrenched in the 
Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced”.8 Thus, in order to constitute 
appropriate and effective relief, relief must give effect to the values of human dignity, 
equality, freedom, accountability, openness, responsiveness and supremacy of the 
Constitution and the rule of law.9 The Court held that such an interpretation is 
especially important within the South African context, given its nascent Constitution 
which seeks to redress an unjust past characterised by gross human rights 
violations.10 The Court stated that courts must, when exercising their remedial 
discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy, aim to “strike effectively at [the 
constitutional infringement’s] source”.11 The Court further stated that appropriate relief 
will be relief that is “specially fitted or suitable” to the circumstances.12 According to 
the Court, the appropriateness and efficacy of a remedy in the context of rights 
violations will be measured, firstly, by the extent to which it vindicates the infringed 
                                            
Constitution is “mirrored” in s172, indicating that there is indeed a close relationship between 
these two remedial provisions. 
7 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 12. 
8 Para 69. This case was adjudicated in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993, which contained a comparable locus standi provision in s7(4)(a). This 
interpretation of appropriate relief has been confirmed in Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106 which was decided under the final Constitution. 
9 S1 of the Constitution. 
10 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. 
11 Para 96. 
12 Para 97. 
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right13 and, secondly, by the extent to which it deters future violations of rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights.14  
It is clear from the above discussion that courts do indeed have a duty to grant 
effective relief. This constitutional mandate further enables courts to grant a particular 
remedy even if that specific remedy was not asked for by the applicants or if it differs 
from the remedy that was originally asked for.15 
 
2 2 3 Determining what will constitute effective relief 
 
One can distil from case law and academic literature that there are two main 
conceptualisations of what will constitute effective relief in cases where constitutional 
rights have been violated.16 These two approaches can be explained with reference 
to Gerwitz’s theories for choosing remedies, namely the rights maximising approach 
and the interests balancing approach.17 
The rights maximising approach requires the court to grant a perfect remedy which 
will fully vindicate the infringed right. The victim of the violation must, according to this 
approach, be put in the position he or she would have been in but for the violation.18 
A less than perfect remedy will only be acceptable under this approach if there are 
unavoidable limits which will have a direct, negative impact on the remedy’s ability to 
                                            
13 See part 2 2 3 below where it is argued that the full vindication of an infringed right will not 
always be possible. See also chapter four part 4 3 3 2 1 for an analysis of Allpay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) which is a good example of where the relief granted by 
the Court did not fully vindicate the infringed right to just administrative action (s33 of the 
Constitution) since diverse interests had to be accommodated.  
14 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 97. 
15 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 54. 
16 See C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between 
Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 138 where the author acknowledges the different 
conceptualisations. He states that “appropriate, just and equitable” relief can either be defined 
as relief which fully vindicates the infringed right or it can be defined as relief that takes into 
account all of the different interests implicated in the case. 
17 P Gerwitz “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 591. 
18 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-29. Bishop describes this approach to choosing a remedy as 
“entirely victim-focused”. 
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vindicate the infringed right. Unavoidable limits can include multiple remedial goals, 
conflicting rights and implementation concerns.19 This approach is congruent with 
Bishop’s definition of effective relief. He defines effective relief as relief that will close 
the gap between the reality (in which the right has been violated) and the constitutional 
ideal (where rights are respected and protected).20 
The other approach is known as the interest balancing approach.21 This approach 
requires a balancing process between vindicating the infringed right, on the one hand, 
and the societal costs implicated by the remedy, on the other.22 The interest of the 
victim in having his or her rights vindicated is thus but one of the factors that should 
be considered when designing a remedy. Gerwitz states: 
 
“However strong remedial effectiveness [in the sense of vindicating the infringed right] is 
as a value, it is not society’s only value. Where effective remedies conflict with interests 
that were not considered at the rights stage - interests that are not relevant to the question 
of whether a right has been violated - those interests press to be considered at the remedy 
stage and, on occasion, to override the value of remedying violations of the right.”23 
 
Other societal interests that should be balanced against the victim’s interest include 
factors like the separation of powers doctrine and the monetary impact on the public 
purse of enforcing the remedy.24 A less than perfect remedy can thus be granted if it 
can be justified by way of the balancing process.25 This approach is wholly congruent 
                                            
19 P Gerwitz “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 593–598. See also M Bishop 
“Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(RS 6 2014) 9-67. 
20 Bishop explains this by stating that there must be “no gap between right and remedy”. M 
Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-67. This understanding of what “effective relief” entails is congruent 
with Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19 in which the Court 
stated that appropriate relief must protect and enforce the Constitution. 
21 P Gerwitz “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 591. 
22 592. These costs include all interests in the remedy other than that of the victim.  
23 604. 
24 See part 2 3 2 2 below in this chapter where the balancing of diverse interests during the 
remedial enquiry is discussed. 
25 P Gerwitz “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 591. See Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) which serves as an example of where an “imperfect” 
remedy for the violation of a constitutional right still amounted to effective relief in terms of the 
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with Sturm’s conceptualisation of effective relief, in that an imperfect remedy can 
constitute appropriate and effective relief as long as there is adherence to the 
legitimacy norms of public remedial decision-making.26  
The latter approach to choosing a remedy is furthermore congruent with the 
complementary and mutually dependent relationship, as noted above, between 
sections 38 and 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. It is also congruent with the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has stated in this regard that diverse 
interests should be considered when determining what the most effective relief in a 
specific case will be and that the corrective principle aimed at vindicating the infringed 
right will sometimes have to yield to other interests.27 This might result in a less than 
perfect remedy. 
                                            
interest balancing approach. In casu, the Court found that the common-law definition of 
marriage and the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 were unconstitutional to the extent that same-sex 
couples were prevented from celebrating their unions legally. The Court suspended its order 
to allow the legislature to enact legislation which would rectify the constitutional infringement. 
This led to the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, in terms of which same-sex partners can form a 
union. The Court decided against a perfect remedy such as reading in (which would have 
enabled the victims to immediately form same sex unions in terms of the same legislation as 
heterosexual couples), since interests pertaining to the separation of powers doctrine and 
society’s recognition of the same sex unions had to be balanced against the interests of the 
victims. See also Gory v Kolver NO 2007 3 BCLR 249 (CC) for another example of where an 
imperfect remedy was granted as the most effective relief in the circumstances. This case 
concerned the constitutionality of s1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 which 
conferred certain benefits only to heterosexual spouses and not also to same-sex life partners. 
The Court granted a remedy in the form of a declaration of invalidity to rectify the 
discrimination, but with limited retrospective effect, which made the remedy imperfect. The 
Court justified this, stating that the interests of the victims had to be balanced against the 
“potentially disruptive effects of an order of retrospective invalidity” (para 42). 
26 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1411. 
See part 2 3 1 below in this chapter for a discussion of the different norms for public law 
remedies as identified by Sturm. These norms are participation, respect for the separation of 
powers doctrine, impartiality, reasoned decision making and remediation 
27 See also AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) para 56 where the Court stated: 
“The interests of those most closely associated with the benefits of that contract must be 
given due weight. Here it will be the imperative interests of grant beneficiaries and 
particularly child grant recipients in an uninterrupted grant system that will play a major role. 
The rights or expectations of an unsuccessful bidder [who was the victim in this case] will 
have to be assessed in that context.” 
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2 2 4 Conclusion 
 
Courts have wide remedial powers to grant effective relief in cases where 
constitutional rights have been violated. It is clear that the Constitution envisages a 
wide, interest balancing approach to remedying rights violations according to which 
both perfect and imperfect remedies can constitute effective relief. It is thus not 
possible, or even desirable, to formulate one single, all-encompassing definition for 
effective relief since different cases will implicate different interests which would have 
to be considered and balanced against each other. The next section of this chapter 
will instead aim to formulate an evaluative framework which can be used to both design 
and evaluate remedies in order to ensure that it constitutes effective relief. 
 
2 3 Evaluative framework for remedies in human rights cases 
 
One can conclude from the foregoing discussions that what will constitute effective 
relief will depend on the circumstances of the specific case.28 The evaluative 
framework proposed by this study consists of different remedial norms to which 
remedies should adhere and factors that should be considered when determining what 
the most effective relief will be in any case where human rights have been violated.  
 
2 3 1 Overarching norms that should be observed at the remedial stage of adjudication 
 
Sturm acknowledges that the traditional adversary model of litigation is not 
appropriate for designing remedies that aim to bring about institutional or structural 
reform in the public law sphere. She suggests that it is the systemic and on-going 
nature of many public law rights violations which makes traditional remedial 
approaches inappropriate and ineffective.29 She further argues that the liability stage 
of adjudication provides little guidance as to how these remedies can be appropriately 
designed, since the design of these remedies should be based on norms such as 
efficacy and practicability, which are not relevant to the liability stage.30 According to 
                                            
28 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19. 
29 See part 2 3 2 1 2 (b) below for a discussion of systemic rights violations. 
30 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1364. 
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Sturm, a normative theory for public law remedies, in particular, is thus merited. 
Although the theory that Sturm goes on to espouse is firmly rooted in the context of 
large-scale, institutional and structural violations of public law rights, certain elements 
are equally applicable in the context of constitutional rights infringements that may not 
be structural in nature. For example, Sturm addresses certain norms that should be 
observed during both the liability determination and remedial stages of adjudication 
for the judicial process to be regarded as legitimate. These norms will be manifested 
differently depending on whether a traditional adversary process is followed for 
isolated violations, or innovative procedures are developed for remedial decision-
making in cases of systemic violations of rights.31 These norms should be present for 
the resultant remedy to be appropriate and effective.32 These norms are participation, 
impartiality, respect for the separation of powers doctrine, reasoned decision making 
and remediation.33 
 
2 3 1 1 Participation 
 
Sturm states that parties who are affected by or responsible for the implementation 
of a remedy should be granted a “meaningful opportunity to participate” in the design 
of the remedy.34 The model used to facilitate participation amongst different 
stakeholders will depend on the type of case that is before the court. Structural cases 
will require large-scale participation which would include diverse stakeholders who 
might not be parties before the court35 whereas non-structural cases will mostly only 
                                            
31 For a discussion of systemic socio-economic rights violations, see chapter three part 3 2 2 
2. 
32 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
Sturm argues that adherence to the norms as discussed in this section will result in a remedy 
that is legitimate, and that this in turn makes the remedy more effective. She explains this by 
stating that the “court’s capacity to bring about compliance with [violated] substantive norms” 
is increased when its orders are perceived as being legitimate (1403).  
33 1390. 
34 1410. See also S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in 
Education Rights Disputes” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 6. 
35 See chapter five part 5 4 1 where the advantages of participation during the remedial stage 
of adjudication are discussed. 
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require the participation of the parties before the court as is required by the audi 
alteram partem principle.36  
Participation within the remedial context has two main purposes. Firstly, it protects 
and enhances the dignity of parties who are affected by the remedy since they will be 
able to participate in the remedial decision.37 Sturm explains that participation 
contributes to the “perceived fairness” of the remedial process.38 Secondly, Sturm 
argues that the participation of different parties in the remedial decision-making 
process will contribute to effective compliance with the remedy. There are also a range 
of other benefits to the participation norm. Participation can, according to the author, 
further help to define the group of people who will be involved in the implementation 
of the remedy.39 Participation will also serve an educational purpose since parties will 
be made aware of any potential difficulties that might arise during the implementation 
of the remedy as well as possible solutions to these difficulties.40 
The participation by parties must, however, occur in such a way as to mitigate the 
effects of the possible unequal bargaining power of the different parties.41 Sturm notes 
in this regard: 
 
“The plaintiffs frequently are poor, politically powerless, and unorganized, and thus may be 
less able to influence the remedial decision. Yet, the values served by participation at the 
remedial stage depend on some direct involvement by those who must live with the results. 
                                            
36 See L M du Plessis “Just Legal Institutions in an Optimally Just South Africa under the 1996 
Constitution” (1998) 9 Stell LR 239 241 where the author discusses how the audi alteram 
partem principle is present in the Bill of Rights. 
37 See also Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 12 BCLR 
1399 (CC) para 15 where the Court stated that participatory democracy is significant for 
individuals who are poor and marginalised. 
38 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1392. 
39 1393. 
40 1394. See chapter five part 5 4 3 below for a discussion on the meaningful engagement 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. 
41 This concern is exacerbated in cases dealing with socio-economic rights since the 
applicants in these cases “are usually poor and politically and socially weak”. W Trengove 
“Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 1 ESR Review 8 9. See 
chapter five part 5 4 4 2 for a discussion of the significant role of the court in mitigating unequal 
bargaining concerns during remedial engagement processes. 
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An important criteria of remedial participation, therefore, is the capacity of a particular form 
of remedial practice to control for unequal power, resources and sophistication.”42 
 
Diverse participation during the remedial stage is furthermore congruent with the 
notion of transformative constitutionalism.43 The Constitutional Court stated in Doctors 
for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly, referring to participation in 
the legislative process, that our constitutional order “envisages an active, participatory 
democracy”.44 The Court further stated that participation by interested parties will 
contribute to the “deliberative character” of the Constitution and directly contribute to 
the transformation of South African society.45 
 
2 3 1 2 Respect for the separation of powers doctrine 
 
Sturm states that the public law remedial process must “respect the integrity of… 
governmental institutions”.46 She states that critics perceive the role of the courts in 
cases dealing with the violation of public law rights as exceeding “the boundaries of 
judicial authority”.47 This, she argues, can have a negative effect on the legitimacy of 
the remedial process and thus in turn affect the efficacy of the remedy. Courts must 
thus be conscious of this concern when designing a remedy in cases dealing with 
rights violations. Effective participation processes can, however, potentially help to 
democratise the remedial stage of adjudication and thus be a mitigating factor against 
separation of powers-based concerns.48  
  
                                            
42 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1396. 
43 K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
See also chapter one part 1 1 1 above. 
44 2006 12 BCLR 1399 (CC) para 235. 
45 Para 235. 
46 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
47 1403. 
48 See chapter five part 5 4 1 where participation as a crucial element of the remedial design 
stage is discussed as a mitigating factor against democratic concerns relating to socio-
economic rights adjudication and structural interdicts. 
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2 3 1 3 Impartiality 
 
Sturm argues that an effective remedy must be the result of an impartial and 
objective decision-making process.49 Judges must be careful not to let their own 
politics influence their remedial decisions. A biased judge might choose a remedy 
which unfairly favours one of the parties.50 Such a remedy would be inappropriate and 
could thus not be regarded as effective relief.  
Sturm notes that the participation norm can be a perceived threat to the impartiality 
norm since parties can possibly unduly influence the judge. However, she does not 
view this as an insurmountable obstacle to impartiality. Instead, the author argues that 
challenging and developing our ideas about the role of remedies in the public law 
context will enable us to assign remedial responsibility in new and innovative ways.51 
This will make it possible to maintain both participation and impartiality as norms in the 
remedial decision-making process.52  
 
2 3 1 4 Reasoned decision making 
 
Sturm argues that an appropriate and effective remedy should be based on 
reasoned decision making.53 This requires a court to give reasons for why a specific 
remedy was chosen as the most appropriate and effective relief in the circumstances. 
This reasoning must be based on “reliable factual foundations” and “identified, 
persuasive norms”.54 The court would thus have to consider all the possible factors 
that could render a remedy less than perfect. This principle will also help ensure that 
the court remains impartial, as it would have to provide reasons for its decisions.55 
                                            
49 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
50 1398. 
51 This is congruent with Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69 
where the Constitutional Court stated that courts must “shape innovative remedies” if this is 
needed to grant effective relief. 
52 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1399. 
53 1410. 
54 1411. 
55 1411. 
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Liebenberg similarly states that the notion of substantive reasoning is equally 
important during the liability and the remedial stages of adjudication.56 She argues that 
such reasoning will require an explanation of the link between the violated right and 
the chosen remedy. Such reasoning should further explain why the particular remedy 
was deemed to be more appropriate than other available constitutional remedies.57  
Moreover, the norm of reasoned decision making is congruent with a “culture of 
justification” as advocated by Mureinik.58 He defines this as “a culture in which every 
exercise of power is expected to be justified”.59 He argues that judicial decisions taken 
with regard to rights violations must be justified with reference to the rights 
themselves.60 Langa similarly argues, with reference to Mureinik, that the Constitution 
requires that any decision must be based on substantive reasoning.61 He further states 
that transformative constitutionalism requires that judicial decisions must be justified 
“by reference to ideas and values”.62 Sturm’s espousal of reasoned decision making 
as a norm that must be observed throughout the remedial process is thus wholly 
congruent with South Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism.63 
 
2 3 1 5 Remediation 
 
Another important norm for remedial processes dealing with the violation of public 
law rights is that of remediation.64 Sturm states that the remedial process will only be 
legitimate if it “is reasonably calculated to produce compliance with [the] basic 
constitutional principles” which had been violated.65 However, Sturm acknowledges 
that certain norms such as remediation will not always be completely satisfied since 
                                            
56 S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in Education Rights 
Disputes” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 7. 
57 7. 
58 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where - Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. 
59 32. 
60 33. 
61 P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 353. 
62 353.  
63 See chapter one part 1 1 1 for a discussion of transformative constitutionalism. 
64 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1411. 
65 1399. 
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the “demands and constraints of the particular remedial problem” that needs to be 
solved will require these norms to be balanced against each other.66  
 
2 3 2 Factors to consider when designing effective remedies 
 
The crafting of a remedy which is “appropriate, just and equitable” while 
simultaneously constituting effective relief requires the consideration of a wide range 
of factors. Gerwitz describes constitutional law as a mediating process between the 
ideal and what would be effective in practice.67 This section will consider the relevant 
factors which should be considered by courts when dealing with this mediating process 
in order to determine what the most effective relief will be in a specific case. 
These factors are: the nature of the right and the nature of the violation; balancing 
of diverse interests; the reason for the rights violation; the practicability of the remedy 
and, lastly, the deterrent effect of the remedy. These factors must be explicitly 
considered by courts when dealing with rights violations in order to meet Sturm’s 
requirement for reasoned decision making while simultaneously adhering to the tenets 
of a culture of justification under a transformative Constitution. 
 
2 3 2 1 The nature of the infringed right and the nature of the violation 
 
The Constitutional Court has stated that there are two main factors that should be 
considered as a point of departure during the remedial phase in order to design a 
remedy which is suitable and aimed at rectifying the source of the infringement. A court 
must firstly consider the nature of the right and the obligations accompanying it, which 
will in turn enable it to secondly consider the nature of the violation.68  
  
                                            
66 1411. See chapter four part 4 3 3 2 1 where Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 
179 (CC) is analysed, and in which case the remediation norm was not completely satisfied. 
67 P Gerwitz “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 587. 
68 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45. The Court reiterated this in 
the later judgment of Minster of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 
para 106. 
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2 3 2 1 1 Nature of the right 
 
(a) Underlying constitutional values 
 
Courts should consider the underlying constitutional values which are threatened in 
a specific case where constitutionally protected rights are infringed upon. Considering 
the specific context of the case will aid the court in identifying the relevant values and 
this will in turn help the court to identify and understand the nature of the violated right. 
With regard to the context of the case, the Court stated in Fose that South Africa 
has a long history characterised by grave human rights abuses.69 The Court thus 
placed this case, which was heard only three years after the advent of democracy, 
within a context where the injustices of the past were not yet resolved and where a 
constitutional culture was not yet firmly established. It is this context which led the 
Court to state that a constitutional remedy must aim to promote values such as 
freedom, equality and respect for human rights - values which are fundamental to 
establishing and maintaining a constitutional democracy.70 Remedies must thus not 
merely vindicate the infringed right, but must be tailored in such a way that will ensure 
that the underlying constitutional values are promoted.71 
Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa is another example of where 
the Court considered relevant underlying constitutional values in designing an 
appropriate and effective remedy.72 This case came before the Constitutional Court 
after the applicant was arrested by the South African authorities and subsequently 
extradited to New York to stand trial where a guilty conviction was punishable by 
                                            
69 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. 
70 Para 17. See also s1(a) of the Constitution which states that South Africa is founded on 
values such as “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms.” These values should always be promoted during the remedial phase of 
human rights adjudication in order to maintain South Africa’s constitutional democracy. See 
Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 135 where the Constitutional Court 
stated that an effective remedy must be designed in a way that will best promote constitutional 
values.  
71 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. 
72 2001 3 SA 893 (CC). 
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death.73 The applicant alleged that, in addition to certain statutory provisions, his rights 
relating to life, dignity and freedom and security of the person were violated.74 
The State argued that it would not be appropriate for the Court to grant any 
declaratory or mandatory order with regard to the interrogation and extradition of the 
applicant since that would violate the separation of powers doctrine and be futile since 
the applicant had been “irreversibly surrendered” to the United States.75 However, the 
Court rejected these arguments by, inter alia, stating that the underlying constitutional 
values in this case necessitated the granting of a remedy.76 The values implicated by 
the rights violation in this case were the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of 
law.77 The Court further stated, in deciding whether a remedy must be granted, that all 
organs of State must adhere to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights contained therein 
and that the Court thus had a duty to grant appropriate relief in this case.78  
The Court further referred to the context of the case as a factor which necessitated 
the Court to grant a remedy. The Court stated in this regard that “South Africa is a 
young democracy still finding its way to full compliance with the values and ideals 
enshrined in the Constitution”.79 This context, similarly to the context described in Fose 
above, forced the Court to declare the State’s conduct, which was inconsistent with 
the Constitution, invalid, even though it stood to have little or no practical effect for the 
victim of the rights violation. The Court stated that the State is responsible for creating 
a culture where the Constitution and its values are respected and complied with.80  
Context is thus crucial in any given case in order to determine which underlying 
constitutional values are implicated by a particular rights-infringement. The 
identification of relevant values will, in turn, help a court to understand the nature of 
the right in order to tailor appropriate and effective relief.  
  
                                            
73 Para 2. 
74 The relevant constitutional provisions are ss10, 11 and 12 respectively. 
75 Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa 2001 3 SA 893 (CC) para 70. 
76 Para 72. 
77 Para 72. 
78 Para 72. 
79 Para 69. 
80 Para 69. 
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(b) Urgency with which underlying interests should be protected 
 
The nature of the right and the interests that underlie it might further determine the 
urgency with which its violation should be remedied. Minister of Home Affairs v 
National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (“NICRO”) 
serves as an example of where the Court took the urgency with which the underlying 
interests had to protected, into account.81 This case concerned the right to vote as 
enshrined in section 19(3) of the Constitution, which was threatened by the Electoral 
Laws Amendment Act 34 of 2003 (“Amendment Act”). This Act effectively prevented 
convicted and imprisoned criminals from participating in elections.82  
The underlying interest in this case was that which the prisoners had in exercising 
their right to vote in the impending election. This interest was of an exceptionally urgent 
nature, since the Amendment Act was promulgated just four months before the next 
elections were to be held. The applicants’ right to vote would thus have been 
irreversibly violated if the impugned legislation was not declared unconstitutional with 
consequential relief granted in order to enable the prisoners to vote.83 The Court 
justified the consequential relief granted in this case by stating that the notion of 
effective relief requires that the rights violation must be rectified and that the urgent 
nature of the interests in this case required this to be accomplished quickly and without 
delay.84 The Court accordingly granted a report-back-to-court order declaring the 
relevant legislative provisions unconstitutional.85 Qualifying prisoners had to be 
registered on the voters’ role according to the mandatory interdict component of the 
remedy.86 It is important to note that the Court emphasised the fact that the urgency 
                                            
81 2005 3 SA 280 (CC). 
82 Ss8(2)(f), 24B(1) and 24B(2) of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 as introduced by the 
Amendment Act limited the right to vote of prisoners who were “serving a sentence of 
imprisonment without the option of a fine”. 
83 See Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration 
of Offenders 2005 3 SA 280 (CC) para 1 where Chaskalson CJ describes this case as an 
urgent matter since it concerns the right to vote and was heard on the “eve of the elections”. 
84 Para 79. 
85 See chapter five part 5 3 1 where this model of the structural interdict is discussed. 
86 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of 
Offenders 2005 3 SA 280 (CC) para 80. 
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in this case was not due to the conduct of the applicants.87 Chaskalson CJ stated that 
the applicants acted as swiftly as possible and that they were thus entitled to effective 
relief,88 thus suggesting that the urgency of underlying interests will be a less weighty 
consideration in cases where the urgency was self-created.89 
 
2 3 2 1 2 Nature of the violation 
 
Sturm argues that cases dealing with structural rights violations which take place in 
“complex organizational settings” will require a different remedial approach as 
opposed to cases which are not of a systemic nature.90 Bishop similarly argues that 
the court would have to consider whether the violation is “isolated or systemic; 
complete or ongoing; serious or trivial; individual or widespread”.91 The remedy 
granted by a court in any case dealing with the violation of a constitutional right would 
have to be able to deal with the nature of the infringement in order to effectively rectify 
the infringement.92  
 
(a) Isolated violations 
 
Rights violations can be isolated or discrete in cases where there is no “systemic 
wrong” which led to the infringement, but rather where the violation was caused by the 
conduct of an identifiable individual or individuals.93 An isolated or discrete violation 
can further be defined as a once-off violation which affects only an individual or a 
“small identifiable group of individuals”.94 
                                            
87 Para 79. 
88 Para 79. 
89 See para 5 where the Court discusses the directions of the Chief Justice which stated that 
“[t]he delay in this matter is due to the delay on the part of the respondents”. 
90 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1357. 
91 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-34. 
92 See chapter three part 3 2 2 below for a more in-depth discussion of the nature of socio-
economic rights violations. 
93 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-10. 
94 1. 
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One case in which an isolated violation occurred is that of NM v Smith.95 This case 
concerned the alleged violation of the applicants’ right to privacy after their names and 
positive HIV status’ were published in a politician’s biography.96 The Court stated that 
this case had to be adjudicated in terms of the law of delict.97 However, it was 
established that this case did in fact raise constitutional issues “since it involve[d] a 
nuanced and sensitive approach to balancing… freedom of expression” against the 
“privacy and dignity of the applicants”.98 The Court found that there was a violation of 
the applicants’ right to privacy.99 The Court further found that their dignity and 
psychological integrity were also violated.100 These violations were isolated or discrete 
since the affected individuals were an easily identifiable group consisting of three 
women. The individuals who were liable for the violation were also an easily 
identifiable group which further points to the isolated nature of the violation. Damages 
coupled with a mandatory order requiring the removal of the applicants’ names from 
all of the unsold books were sufficient to remedy the violation in this case since there 
were no structural issues at play.101 
Isolated violations are relatively easy to remedy, as seen from this case, and usually 
require remedies that are more simple in nature than those required to constitute 
effective relief for systemic violations.  
 
(b) Systemic violations 
 
Mbazira defines systemic rights violations as violations “that establish themselves 
and endure in a sustained manner as part of an institution’s behaviour”.102 These types 
of violations cannot be attributed to the fault of any one specific person, because of 
                                            
95 2007 7 BCLR 751 (CC). See NM v Smith 2005 3 All SA 457 (W) for the High Court judgment 
in which the application for damages against the first two respondents was dismissed with 
costs. 
96 NM v Smith 2007 7 BCLR 751 (CC) para 1. 
97 Para 27. 
98 Para 31. 
99 Para 47. 
100 Para 54. 
101 Para 90. 
102 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 110. 
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the simple fact that no single identifiable person’s actions led to the infringement.103 
The infringement is rather a result of firmly established institutional practices which are 
difficult to change and are created over long periods of time. The rights violation is 
thus a mere symptom of a bigger, structural problem that needs to be addressed in a 
systemic manner in order to effect institutional reform which would effectively ensure 
that the institution (or potentially multiple institutions) do not continue to violate human 
rights.104 
Rail Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail is a case in which the 
infringement was systemic in nature.105 This case concerned the safety of train 
commuters who were at risk because of violent attacks which took place on trains in 
the Western Cape. This case was not about a single isolated incident which was the 
result of one specific official’s conduct, but rather “a result of systemic deficiencies in 
the security apparatus on all trains”, which made certain remedies such as damages 
inappropriate and ineffective.106 The High Court instead granted a structural interdict 
to ensure that the necessary steps were taken to ensure the safety of train commuters. 
If, hypothetically, this case concerned a violent attack on a passenger because a 
security official did not guard a train carriage as he or she was instructed to do, then it 
would have been an isolated rights infringement. Constitutional damages could then 
have constituted an appropriate and effective remedy.107 
The case was eventually heard by the Constitutional Court after also being before 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.108 The Constitutional Court agreed that there was in 
fact a systemic safety risk on trains, citing the history of deteriorating safety services 
available on trains since 1994. However, the Court replaced the structural interdict 
remedy granted by the High Court with a simple declaratory order in terms of section 
                                            
103 110. 
104 111. 
105 2003 3 BCLR 288 (C). 
106 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-35. 
107 35. 
108 The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal brought by the respondents in Transnet 
Ltd t/a Metrorail v Rail Commuters Action Group 2003 4 All SA 228 (SCA) para 35, holding 
that the applicants were justified in their concern regarding the safety of train passengers, but 
that they had not made a proper case before the court. 
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38 of the Constitution. The declaratory order was deemed as appropriate and effective 
relief since Metrorail and the Commuter Corporation “denied, in error, that they bore 
obligations to protect the security of rail commuters”.109 The respondents were thus 
merely inattentive in this case and therefor a stronger, more managerial remedy would 
not have been appropriate.110  
In Sonke Gender Justice v Government of the Republic of South Africa, a 
malfunctioning system also led to the systemic violation of numerous rights.111 This 
case concerned the inhumane living conditions which were plaguing the Pollsmoor 
Remand Detention Facility (“RDF”) in Cape Town. The conditions had been described 
as “appalling” by Justice Edward Cameron of the Constitutional Court in 2015.112 After 
Justice Cameron’s inspection and subsequent recommendations, the Public Services 
Commission similarly described the conditions in 2016 as “alarming and not fit for 
human habitation”.113 Sonke Gender Justice applied to the Cape Town High Court for 
an order declaring that the State was in breach of its constitutional and statutory 
obligations and an order in the form of a structural interdict directing the State to rectify 
the rights infringements that had been taking place on a structural level.114 The Court 
granted a remedy in the form of a strong structural interdict requiring immediate action 
by the respondents, with stringent reporting back requirements.115 
The Court first alluded to the systemic nature of the violations when it stated that 
the “notoriously overcrowded and inhumane conditions that prevailed in… correctional 
facilities” were an issue inherited by the new democratic government in 1994.116 The 
                                            
109 Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 109. 
110 See part 2 3 2 3 in this chapter where different reasons for government non-compliance 
are discussed and how the reason for non-compliance should be a factor considered by courts 
during the remedial stage of adjudication. Note that strong or managerial remedies in the 
context of this study refers to remedies that are perceived as intrusive since they contain 
detailed instructions which can be accompanied by judicial oversight mechanisms. 
111 WCD 23-02-2017 case no 34087/15. 
112 Para 2. Justice Cameron visited the Pollsmoor RDF in terms of s99(1) of the Correctional 
Services Act 111 of 1998 which states that “[a] judge of the Constitutional Court, Supreme 
Court of Appeal or High Court… may visit a prison at any time.” 
113 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of the Republic of South Africa WCD 23-02-2017 
case no 34087/15 para 2. 
114 Paras 150–151. 
115 Para 160. 
116 Para 1. 
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Court cited “inadequate infrastructure” and “over-crowding” as the key problems.117 
The Court discussed evidence which indicated that overcrowding in the RDF was a 
systemic issue since it persisted, and in fact worsened, over an extended period of 
time.118  
The Court continued to discuss the violations relating to health care,119 lack of 
exercise,120 nutrition,121 and horrendous sanitation facilities.122 The respondents 
claimed that insufficient capacity was one of the major contributors to their inability to 
comply with their statutory and constitutional obligations.123 They further claimed that 
overcrowding in the RDF was a symptom of an ineffective justice system.124 These 
issues were not caused by any one or group of identifiable individuals, but rather by 
various people and departments over an extended period of time. The resultant 
violations were thus systemic in nature.125  
The above case discussions indicate the complexity of systemic violations. These 
violations do not have one single cause and this makes remedying these violations 
extremely difficult since an effective remedy would have to be capable of addressing 
multiple issues. 
 
2 3 2 2 Balancing diverse interests  
 
Sturm argues that a balancing of diverse interests is of utmost importance when 
choosing an effective remedy for constitutional rights infringements, especially if these 
infringements are structural in nature. She explains this by stating that the greatest 
challenge in respect of designing a remedy for public law violations is the acceptance 
                                            
117 Para 22. 
118 Paras 27–33. The RDF was 186% occupied in 1995, 236% in 2003, 246% in 2005, 255% 
in 2011 and 249% in 2014. 
119 Para 84. 
120 Para 81. 
121 Para 83.  
122 Para 80. 
123 Para 110. Capacity problems included staff shortages and poor infrastructure (para 119). 
124 See paras 119–128. 
125 See para 139 where the Court discusses the respondents’ contentions that the issues are 
a result of a malfunctioning justice system and that several different departments and 
institutions share responsibility for the infringements. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
 
and understanding of the remedy “by those who must live with it”.126 She therefore 
argues that participation by a diverse group of stakeholders is essential when 
designing an effective remedy.127 Mbazira similarly argues that an “appropriate, just 
and equitable” remedy could be a remedy that balances “all interests implicated by the 
case” against the individual interests of the victim.128 The Constitutional Court has 
likewise interpreted the phrase “just and equitable” as requiring a balancing of the 
interests of all parties who might be affected by the remedy.129  
 
2 3 2 2 1 Interests of the parties before the court 
 
Parties before the court will often have competing interests. It is the duty of the court 
to balance these interests against each other in order to grant a remedy which will be 
appropriate and effective in the circumstances. 
Hoffmann v South African Airways serves as a good example of where the 
Constitutional Court had to consider diverse interests in designing an effective 
remedy.130 In casu, the applicant alleged that the respondent airline had unfairly 
discriminated against him by refusing him employment based on his HIV status. The 
Court found that Hoffmann had in fact been unfairly discriminated against.131 The 
Court paid special attention to the interests of the parties before the court during the 
remedial enquiry, stating that “the interests of the prospective employee” as well as 
“the interests of the employer” had to be considered.132 The Court continued to 
consider the different interests when evaluating the appropriateness of instatement as 
remedy. It stated in this regard that instatement is “the fullest redress obtainable” and 
will thus fully respond to the interest of the prospective employee in having his right 
                                            
126 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1365. 
127 1410. 
128 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 138. 
129 See Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) para 
130 where the Court said that the interest of both the stockowners and the landowners had to 
be taken into account. See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 94. 
130 2001 1 SA 1 (CC). 
131 Para 40. 
132 Para 43. 
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vindicated.133 The Court furthermore stated that instatement as remedy could be 
denied if it is unfair or unjust in the circumstances, indicating that the interests of the 
employer also need to be considered during the remedial enquiry.134 It concluded that 
instatement as remedy would not be impractical and that there were no valid medical 
reasons against it, thus indicating that this remedy would be fair and appropriate.135 
The Court also considered the interests of the employer with regard to the effective 
date of the order.136 It concluded in this regard that an order backdating the date of 
instatement to the date of the High Court order would be unfair to the employer who 
was not given a fair opportunity to prepare for opposing such a claim.137 A balancing 
of interests during the remedial enquiry thus resulted in instatement from the date of 
the Constitutional Court’s order as the most appropriate and effective relief in the 
circumstances.138 
 
2 3 2 2 2 Interests of stakeholders not before court 
 
Stakeholders who are not before the court can include the wider society, those 
responsible for implementing the remedy, those who are in a position to hinder the 
effective implementation of the remedy and those who are affected by the remedy.139 
The Constitutional Court has stated in this regard that “the interests of both the 
complainant and society as a whole ought, as far as possible, to be served”, thus 
indicating that a diverse set of interests should be considered and balanced if relief 
granted by the Court is to constitute appropriate and effective relief.140  
                                            
133 Para 52. 
134 Para 53. 
135 Para 54.  
136 Paras 58-61. 
137 Para 59. See Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 2 SA 628 (W) for the High Court 
order. 
138 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 64. 
139 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
140 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 38. See also chapter four 
part 4 3 3 2 1 where Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive 
Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) is analysed, 
in which case the amicus curiae brought the unrepresented grant beneficiaries’ interests 
squarely before the court. 
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Mbazira similarly argues that diverse interests, including that of parties who are not 
before the court, should be considered for the resultant remedy to be effective. He 
argues in this regard that litigation brought against the State arising from human rights 
violations will almost always affect stakeholders who are not parties to the specific 
case. He states that a remedy granted in such cases will necessarily be less effective 
if the court neglects to consider all of the different interests since polycentric 
consequences might ensue.141 
 
2 3 2 2 3 Interests of those similarly situated  
 
Another set of interests that should be considered when designing an effective 
remedy is the interests of other persons similarly situated to the victim of the rights 
infringement.142 The Constitutional Court has stated in numerous judgments that a 
remedy only qualifies as effective and appropriate if it provides relief to all similarly 
situated people.143 A remedy which provides relief solely to the litigant cannot be 
regarded as being appropriate and effective.144 This interest has mostly been 
considered in cases where the constitutionality of legislation has been contested.145  
A relevant case in this regard is National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs.146 This case concerned the constitutionality of section 25(5) 
of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 which facilitated the immigration of spouses of 
permanent South African residents. This Act did not confer the same benefits upon 
homosexual people who were in a permanent relationship with a permanent South 
                                            
141 See chapter five part 5 2 3 for a discussion of polycentricity.  
142 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-35. 
143 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 1 SA 388 (CC) para 32. See also Van der Merwe v Road 
Accident Fund (The Women’s Legal Centre Trust as amicus curiae) 2006 4 SA 230 (CC) para 
71 and Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration 
of Offenders 2005 3 SA 280 (CC) para 74. 
144 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-35. 
145 See Da Silva v Road Accident Fund (1349/2008) 2013 ZAFSHC 188 and Ramuhovhi v 
President of the Republic of South Africa (412/2015) 2016 ZALMPTHC 18. 
146 2000 2 SA 1 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
African resident.147 The Court confirmed the unconstitutionality of this provision and 
considered diverse interests in designing an effective remedy.148 Importantly, the 
Court stated that an effective remedy in this case would “also [have to] be seen to be 
effective” to the applicants and to “people similarly placed within the context of” the 
impugned provision.149 The Court furthermore stated that effective relief must give 
effect to a “wider public dimension” and that “[t]he bell tolls for everyone”, thus 
emphasising the need for relief to extend to all similarly situated people.150 The Court 
concluded that reading in was the most effective remedy in the circumstances since 
this would grant immediate relief to both the applicants and other people in permanent 
same sex relationships.151 The Court accordingly ordered the words “or partner, in a 
permanent same-sex life partnership” to be included after “spouse” in section 25(5) of 
the Act.152 
It is thus crucial for a court to consider a wide range of both represented and 
unrepresented interests when designing effective remedies. Where structural 
violations are at issue, relief should be tailored so as to ensure that structural benefits 
ensue not only for those before the court, but to all those similarly placed.  
 
2 3 2 3 The reason for the rights violation 
 
Different remedies will constitute effective relief depending on the reason for non-
compliance with the constitutional standard.153 According to Roach and Budlender, 
there are three main reasons for government’s non-compliance with its constitutional 
obligations, namely: government inattentiveness, government incompetence or lack 
of capacity and, lastly, government intransigence.154  
                                            
147 Para 1. 
148 Para 87. 
149 Para 81. 
150 Para 82. 
151 Para 86. 
152 Para 86. 
153 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-35. 
154 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 345. 
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Roach and Budlender have devised a pyramid of escalating remedies with regard 
to human rights violations.155 According to this pyramid, weak remedies such as a 
declaration of rights might constitute effective relief in cases where a violation is 
caused because of the mere inattentiveness of the government towards its 
constitutional obligations. Government can thus be made aware of its obligations and 
proceed to fulfil them.156 However, violations of human rights which occur in cases 
where the government does not have the political will to fulfil its constitutional 
obligations or where it does not have the necessary capacity to fulfil its obligations 
might require stronger, more managerial type remedies to effectively rectify the 
situation.157 Courts will thus have to closely scrutinise the evidence presented by 
government in order to determine the reason for the rights violation.  
 
2 3 2 4 Practicability of the remedy 
 
Constitutional remedies will only constitute appropriate and effective relief if there 
is a reasonable prospect that they will be successfully implemented.158 The 
Constitutional Court has thus recognised that courts must grant orders that can be 
successfully complied with.159 
Remedies which are too vague or which require compliance within an unreasonable 
timeframe will not be appropriate and effective. Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v 
President van die RSA illustrates this point.160 This case dealt with a difficult situation 
where a previous eviction order required substantial resources in order to be complied 
                                            
155 345. 
156 346. 
157 349–350. 
158 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 183. Swart suggests that the 
implementation of a remedy should be considered when evaluating the efficacy of the remedy. 
See M Swart “Left Out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the Poorest of the 
Poor” (2005) 21 SAJHR 215 217. See also S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law 
Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1382 where the author argues that there are “critical issues 
of implementation that arise in the public remedial context” in support of the development of a 
distinct normative theory for the remediation of public law violations. 
159 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45.  
160 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T). 
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with.161 The High Court as court of first instance had granted a structural interdict 
ordering the State to give effect to Modderklip’s constitutional right to property by 
enforcing the eviction order. The High Court’s order further instructed the government 
to make housing provisions for those who stood to be evicted in order to protect their 
section 26 housing rights. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal criticised the 
structural interdict for being too vague and stated that an order that merely requires 
the State to comply with its constitutional obligations will not be appropriate.162 More 
specific steps and guidance from the courts were thus needed. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal further criticised the structural interdict for imposing “unrealistic” time limits with 
which the State could not be expected to comply.163 
Currie and De Waal state that another concern when granting a remedy is the 
“ability and capacity” of the remedial target.164 Relief granted by a court will not 
constitute appropriate and effective relief if the person or institution who is supposed 
to comply with it does not have the necessary resources or skills to do so.165  
 
2 3 2 5 The deterrent effect of a remedy 
 
Constitutional remedies must have a deterrent effect in order to discourage future 
violations if the remedy is to constitute appropriate and effective relief.166 Most 
academic literature on deterrence as an aim for constitutional remedies focuses 
                                            
161 The original eviction order was granted in Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East 
Squatters 2001 4 SA 385 (W). 
162 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) 
para 38. 
163 Para 38. 
164 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 183. 
165 See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 BCLR 150 (CC) para 69 where the Court stated that it would be inappropriate for 
a court to order “an organ of state to do something that is impossible, the more so in a young 
constitutional democracy”. 
166 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 17. See also S Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 380. 
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specifically on damages as remedy.167 An award of damages is often seen as a 
deterring remedy since a violator will resist from infringing on another’s right in future 
since he or she will associate the unlawful action with economic harm. Damages will, 
however, only have a deterrent effect if it is directed against an identifiable individual 
or group of individuals. It will not have such an effect if it is directed against a whole 
government department in cases of systemic violations since the employees might 
see it as a necessary operational cost.168 
Other stronger remedies such as a structural interdict directing a government 
department to report back to the court might have more of a deterrent effect in cases 
concerning structural violations, since recalcitrant officials can be called back to court 
to explain their non-compliance. 
 
2 3 3 Correlation between public law norms and factors which should be considered 
 
There is a clear correlation between the norms for public law remedies as identified 
by Sturm and the factors that should be considered during the remedial phase as 
espoused above. For example, a remedy will adhere to the norm of reasoned decision 
making if the court explicitly considered all of the factors identified above during the 
remedial phase. There is also a clear correlation between the norms of participation 
and respect for the separation of powers doctrine and the balancing of diverse 
interests factor. This balancing process will have to include the consideration of the 
interests of the other branches of government, thus allowing the remedy to adhere to 
                                            
167 See I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 182 and M E Gilles “In 
Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies” 
(2000) 35 Ga L Rev 845. 
168 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 103. The Court stated that 
the people who commit the violations will not be personally liable which will lessen the 
deterrent effect of damages. See also Vumazonke v MEC for Social Development and Welfare 
for Eastern Cape Province (ECJ 050/2004) 2004 ZAECHC 40 para 5 where the Court noted 
that the respondents in this case were more willing to pay legal costs than to try and solve the 
systemic issues at hand. This issue is also addressed in C Plasket “Protecting the Public 
Purse: Appropriate Relief and Cost Orders against Officials” (2000) 117 SALJ 151 where the 
author proposes punitive cost orders against individual government officials as appropriate 
relief in human rights cases since it will serve a deterrent function. 
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the separation of powers norm. When conducting the balancing process, the court 
might further have to rely on representations by all relevant parties, which will mean 
that the remedy will also adhere to the participation norm.169 There is also a clear 
correlation between the norm of remediation and the practicability factor, since a 
remedy will not vindicate the infringed right if it cannot be successfully implemented. 
 
2 4 Conclusion 
 
Courts have a duty to grant relief that is appropriate and effective in cases where a 
constitutional right has been infringed.170 What relief will constitute appropriate and 
effective relief is, however, not as simple as just vindicating the infringed right and 
realising the substantive norm underlying a judicial determination of liability.171 Section 
38 read together with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution require judges to take 
multiple interests into consideration when designing a remedy that will constitute 
appropriate and effective relief. It is clear from the above discussions and the relevant 
constitutional provisions that our Constitution envisions an approach to remedial 
decision making that is congruent with Gerwitz’s interest balancing approach. It was 
further argued that a remedy does not have to be perfect in order for it to qualify as 
effective relief. 
The question thus arose as to what will constitute an effective remedy in cases 
dealing with human rights violations. This chapter did not propose a single definition 
for effective relief, but rather established that there are certain overarching norms that 
must be complied with during the remedial enquiry in order for the resultant remedy to 
be legitimate and thus effective. It was further established that there are certain factors 
that should be considered by courts during the remedial phase of adjudication. The 
first factor that should be considered is the nature of the right and the nature of the 
violation. Courts should secondly consider diverse interests when designing a remedy. 
The third factor that must be considered is the reason for the rights violation. The fourth 
                                            
169 See chapter five part 5 4 1 where it is argued that adherence to the participation norm will 
contribute to the alleviation of concerns relating to the separation of powers doctrine. 
170 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 42. 
171 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1393. 
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factor that the court should consider is the practicability of the remedy. Furthermore, 
appropriate and effective relief must also act as a deterrent for future infringements of 
the same nature. 
This chapter explored the concept of effective relief within the broad context of 
human rights cases. The following chapter will investigate the contours of effective 
relief in the specific context of socio-economic rights cases. 
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Chapter 3: Effective relief for socio-economic rights violations 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter investigated the concept of effective relief within the context 
of human rights violations in general. This chapter will focus on effective relief within 
the specific context of socio-economic rights violations.  
This chapter consists of two main parts. The first part will consider the factors which 
need to be considered when designing an effective remedy as identified in chapter two 
within the specific context of socio-economic rights. Special attention will be paid to 
the nature of socio-economic rights and the nature of socio-economic rights violations, 
since these two considerations should be the starting point of the remedial enquiry.  
The second part of this chapter will briefly consider various constitutional remedies 
available to South African courts. The aim is to determine whether or not these 
remedies have the potential to effectively remedy socio-economic rights violations. 
The remedies which will be considered include declaratory orders; interdicts; 
constitutional damages; reading in; and, lastly, contempt of court proceedings. 
 
3 2 Effective relief for socio-economic rights violations 
 
This section will analyse the factors that should be considered by courts during the 
remedial design phase in socio-economic rights adjudication. The aim is thus to 
determine how these factors should guide the remedial enquiry where courts have 
found socio-economic rights to have been violated. This section will furthermore 
indicate that the norms of participation, respect for the separation of powers doctrine, 
impartiality, reasoned decision making and remediation will remain the same 
regardless of the nature of the right at issue.1 
  
                                            
1 See chapter two part 2 3 1 for a discussion of the overarching norms for public law remedies. 
See also S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 
1390. 
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3 2 1 The nature of the socio-economic right 
 
When designing an effective remedy for the violation of a socio-economic right, a 
court’s point of departure will be to consider the nature of the socio-economic right at 
issue and the nature of the obligations flowing from the right.2 Liebenberg divides the 
socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“Constitution”) into three categories. First, qualified socio-economic rights are 
enshrined in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution.3 These rights include the right to 
health care, adequate housing, sufficient food, water and social security,4 and are 
qualified in that the State has a duty to “take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each 
of these rights”.5 The second category consists of unqualified socio-economic rights.6 
These include children’s socio-economic rights,7 the right to a basic education,8 and 
the socio-economic rights of detained persons.9 The third category of socio-economic 
rights are negative in nature in that the State and other actors are prohibited from 
interfering with existing access to socio-economic rights.10  
This section will firstly consider the values and urgency underlying socio-economic 
rights since courts must take this into account when designing effective relief. The 
section will thereafter consider the different obligations imposed by socio-economic 
rights since this will have a direct influence on the remedial design phase. 
  
                                            
2 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106. 
3 S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2003) 13–2. 
4 Ss26(1) and 27(1) of the Constitution.  
5 Ss26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution.  
6 S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2003) 13–2. 
7 S28(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
8 S29(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
9 S35(2)(e) of the Constitution. 
10 See part 3 2 1 3 1 in this chapter where the negative obligations relating to socio-economic 
rights are discussed. 
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3 2 1 1 Values underlying socio-economic rights 
 
The underlying constitutional values in cases dealing with the violation of socio-
economic rights must be considered when designing effective relief.11 Chaskalson P 
stated in the first socio-economic rights case to have come before the Constitutional 
Court that: 
 
“We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are 
living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, 
inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate 
health services. These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and 
a commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be 
human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For 
as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.”12 
 
The close relationship referred to in the above statement between socio-economic 
rights and the values of human dignity, equality and freedom have been confirmed in 
many subsequent cases.13 These values are always implicated in cases where socio-
economic rights have been violated and courts should thus aim to promote them 
during the remedial design phase.14 
There are also other foundational constitutional values which are implicated in 
socio-economic rights cases. The Constitutional Court stated in Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg that the constitutional values of transparency, responsiveness and 
accountability are also typically present in socio-economic rights cases.15 These 
values underlie socio-economic rights cases in that the State must explain and justify 
                                            
11 See chapter two part 2 3 2 1 1 (a) for a discussion of the underlying values as remedial 
consideration within the context of general human rights violations. 
12 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8.  
13 See Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 
2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 40 and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 23. 
14 See Jaftha v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 21 where the 
Constitutional Court stated that these values are always implicated in socio-economic rights 
cases. 
15 2010 3 BCLR 239 (CC) para 161. 
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its policies relating to socio-economic rights whenever its policy decisions are 
challenged in court.16  
 
3 2 1 2 Urgency underlying interests in socio-economic rights cases 
 
An analysis of the nature of the right will furthermore point to the urgency with which 
the underlying interests must be vindicated.17 The underlying interests in socio-
economic rights cases will often be urgent in nature since these rights provide for the 
most basic necessities needed to live a dignified life and people affected by the 
violation of these rights are often amongst the most vulnerable members of society. 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (“TAC”) constitutes a prime example 
of where the interest underlying a socio-economic right rendered the case urgent.18 
This case concerned government policy which restricted the provision of Nevirapine, 
an HIV anti-retroviral drug, to limited test sites. This limitation on the availability of the 
drug meant that pregnant women outside of the test sites could not guard their unborn 
babies against HIV infection and potential death, thus rendering the need for effective 
relief exceptionally urgent.19. The Court stated: 
 
“We do not underestimate the nature and extent of the problem facing government in its 
fight to combat HIV/AIDS and, in particular, to reduce the transmission of HIV from mother 
to child. We also understand the need to exercise caution when dealing with a potent and 
a relatively unknown drug. But the nature of the problem is such that it demands urgent 
attention.”20 
 
                                            
16 Para 161. 
17 See chapter four part 4 3 3 where urgency is discussed as a factor justifying the 
incorporation of detailed and immediate relief into structural interdict remedies in systemic 
socio-economic rights cases. 
18 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). Section 27 v Minister of Education 2012 3 All SA 579 (GNP) serves 
as another good example of where the underlying interests had to be urgently vindicated. See 
chapter four part 4 3 2 1 1 for a critical analysis of this case. 
19 Minster of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 19. See further 
paras 130–131 where the Court stated that there is an urgent need for Nevirapine to be 
distributed widely, citing the deadly nature of HIV and also para 9 where the Court described 
this case as important and urgent. 
20 Para 131 (emphasis added). 
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3 2 1 3 Different obligations imposed by socio-economic rights 
 
The specific obligations accompanying a socio-economic right that has allegedly 
been violated are not only relevant when determining liability,21 but also when 
designing effective relief.22 Mbazira states in this regard that courts must distinguish 
between positive and negative obligations during the remedial phase of adjudication 
since different obligations require different remedies to be effectively enforced.23 This 
section will thus consider the nature of both positive and negative socio-economic 
rights obligations and the effect these will have on the remedial design phase. 
 
3 2 1 3 1 Negative obligations 
 
Socio-economic rights, as noted above, impose negative obligations that must be 
adhered to by both the State and private parties.24 Section 7(2) of the Constitution is 
relevant in this regard since it requires the State to, inter alia, “respect” the rights 
                                            
21 South African courts use different models of review for different types of obligations during 
the liability stage of socio-economic rights adjudication. The Constitutional Court has 
developed the reasonableness review model to test State policy in respect of qualified socio-
economic rights in order to determine whether or not the State is fulfilling its positive 
obligations to progressively realise these rights within its available resources. See 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) paras 
39–44 where the Court discusses the criteria for the reasonableness review test. See also 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 34–38 and B Ray 
Engaging with Social Rights: Procedure, Participation, and Democracy in South Africa’s 
Second Wave (2016) 54. Compliance with the negative obligations imposed by socio-
economic rights is subject to a stricter standard of review since non-compliance must be 
justifiable in terms of the general limitations clause contained in s36 of the Constitution. Jaftha 
v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 34. See also L Chenwi “Socio-
Economic Gains and Losses: The South African Constitutional Court and Social Change” 
(2011) 41 Social Change 427 439 and S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication 
under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 57. 
22 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 18. 
23 18. See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 76. 
24 S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2003) 33–58. 
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contained in the Bill of Rights. This means that the State must “refrain from law or 
conduct that directly or indirectly interferes with people’s enjoyment” of the rights as 
contained in the Constitution.25 Violations occurring due to non-compliance with these 
obligations can be remedied with negative remedies such as prohibitory interdicts.26 
 
(a) Normative content of negative obligations imposed by socio-economic rights 
 
The normative content of negative obligations imposed by socio-economic rights is 
clear since it merely requires parties to refrain from interfering with another’s existing 
enjoyment of their socio-economic rights.27 Liebenberg states that the “universal 
application” of negative obligations to both the State and private parties contributes to 
the easy enforcement of these obligations.28  
 
(b) Negative obligations imposed by socio-economic rights ordinarily not resource 
intensive 
 
The State would ordinarily not require significant resources to fulfil its negative 
constitutional obligations, since the party who is allegedly violating the right must 
merely refrain from doing something in order to end the violation.29 The Constitutional 
Court has stated with regard to the negative obligations related to socio-economic 
                                            
25 6. 
26 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 18. Bishop defines negative remedies as remedies “that tell 
people not to do something”. M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9–1.  
27 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 38. 
28 38. 
29 The conclusion that negative obligations are not resource-intensive to fulfil is congruent with 
the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: 
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 
78 where it accepted that socio-economic rights are justiciable since the negative obligations 
arising from these rights can, at the very least, be enforced. The fact that the Court was more 
willing to accept the negative obligations as legitimate and enforceable indicates that these 
obligations are easier and less resource-intensive to fulfil. 
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rights that “[t]he availability of state resources [is] not an issue”.30 Liebenberg agrees 
with the Court when she argues that the negative obligations arising from socio-
economic rights usually do not require significant resources or positive conduct by the 
State in order to be complied with.31  
However, it is important to note that remedying negative violations do sometimes 
require the State to comply with far-reaching positive obligations.32 This can be 
explained with reference to eviction cases. The Constitutional Court has stated in this 
regard that an eviction can only take place if the State provides alternative 
accommodation.33 This requirement places a positive duty on the State which will 
necessarily require substantial resources. This means that remedying the non-
compliance with the negative obligation to not deprive someone of their existing 
access to housing contained in section 26(1) of the Constitution34 – even where a 
lawful eviction order is obtained in terms of section 26(3) – could be resource intensive. 
  
                                            
30 Jaftha v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 31. 
31 S Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2003) 33–18. See also C Mbazira 
Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective and 
Distributive Justice (2009) 230 where the author states that budgetary consequences relating 
to the enforcement of negative obligations will be “more occasional” than when positive 
obligations are enforced. This argument should be distinguished from the argument made that 
socio-economic rights are more resource-intensive than civil and political rights, as these 
differences in resource allocation relate to historical political choices and investment in 
infrastructure. See S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive 
Duties Dichotomy” (2011) 26 SAPL 37 48-52 where the author argues this by referring to S v 
Jaipal 2005 4 SA 581 (CC) which illustrates how civil and political rights are also resource 
intensive. 
32 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 229. 
33 See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 BCLR 150 (CC) para 96 and Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 
BCLR 388 (CC) para 49. 
34 Both ss26(1) and 27(1) contains a negative obligation, see Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 88 and Minster of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 46 in this regard. 
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(c) Impact on remedial design 
 
The clear normative content of negative obligations imposed by socio-economic 
rights and limited resource implications mean that concerns relating to the separation 
of powers doctrine and polycentricity will be less pressing where these obligations are 
enforced by courts. These obligations can thus easily be enforced “through clear and 
immediate judicial remedies”.35  
However, those cases where positive obligations must be complied with in order to 
remedy the violation occurring because of non-compliance with a negative obligation, 
will have a bigger impact on the remedial design stage. Compliance with the positive 
obligations triggered in these cases will give rise to concerns relating to polycentricity 
and the separation of powers doctrine because of the positive conduct and resources 
needed.36 These concerns will have to be considered by the court in order for the 
resultant remedy to be effective. 
 
3 2 1 3 2 Positive obligations  
 
It is primarily – but not exclusively – the State that is bound by the positive duties 
imposed by socio-economic rights.37 These obligations can be defined as obligations 
requiring the person or entity who bears the duty to act positively in order to comply 
therewith. Mbazira accordingly argues that a court must grant a positive remedy in a 
case where the violation was caused by non-compliance with a positive obligation.38 
Positive remedies include mandatory interdicts and structural interdicts. 
                                            
35 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 38. 
36 See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 BCLR 150 (CC) paras 68-75 where the Constitutional Court considered the 
resource implications of the positive duty to provide alternative temporary accommodation in 
eviction cases. See also part 3 2 1 3 2 directly below where positive obligations flowing from 
socio-economic rights and the impact these have on the remedial design stage are discussed. 
37 See Daniels v Scribante 2017 ZACC 13 (CC) para 39 where the Constitutional Court stated 
that positive obligations can also in appropriate circumstances be imposed on private parties. 
38 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 18. A positive remedy can be defined as a remedy which 
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(a) Normative content of positive obligations imposed by socio-economic rights 
 
An important aspect of positive obligations imposed by socio-economic rights, 
which must be considered by courts when designing effective relief, is the undefined 
nature of these obligations. Liebenberg states in this regard that the “normative 
content of the duties that [positive socio-economic rights] impose are unclear”.39 She 
elaborates that it is unclear as to who is bound by positive obligations and what will 
constitute adequate fulfilment of these obligations.40 The undefined aspects of these 
obligations will to some extent be clarified during the liability stage of adjudication, but 
will still bear an impact on the remedial stage. This is due to the fact that mechanisms 
must be designed during the remedial stage which are aimed at giving effect to the 
rights as interpreted in the liability stage. This is an important consideration for a court 
when designing relief in a case where there is non-compliance with a positive socio-
economic rights obligation, since relief that goes beyond the judicial boundaries will 
be perceived as illegitimate and might consequently not be effective.41  
 
(b) Resource intensive nature of positive obligations imposed by socio-economic 
rights 
 
Another key difference between positive obligations vis-à-vis negative obligations 
imposed by socio-economic rights that is relevant for the remedial design stage of 
adjudication is the enforcement costs involved. In explaining the resource intensive 
nature of socio-economic rights, Liebenberg acknowledges that the “realisation of 
socio-economic rights in many liberal, market based democracies requires far greater 
                                            
instructs a person to do something. M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9–1. 
39 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 39. See also C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: 
A Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 230 and A Neier “Social and 
Economic Rights: A Critique” (2006) 13 Human Rights Brief 1 3. 
40 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 39. 
41 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1403. 
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resources and positive measures than civil and political rights”.42 This is true in the 
South African context, not because these rights are inherently different in nature, but 
because of our history. The State has historically invested a vast amount of resources 
in the “institutional infrastructure and mechanisms” necessary for the realisation and 
maintenance of civil and political rights.43 However, the same is not true for socio-
economic rights, as one of the results of the apartheid regime was the systemic 
deprivation of the socio-economic rights for the majority of the population, based on 
race. Underdeveloped institutional mechanisms that are supposed to enforce and 
protect people’s socio-economic rights in post-apartheid South Africa are thus a result 
of historical underfunding at a structural level.44 The result of this is that, today, 
compliance with positive obligations imposed by socio-economic rights will require 
substantial resources. 
 
(c) Impact on remedial design 
 
The resource intensive nature of the positive obligations imposed by socio-
economic rights, coupled with the uncertain normative content of these obligations, 
raise concerns relating to the separation of powers doctrine and polycentricity. This 
explains the deferent approach of South African courts in adjudicating these rights.45 
                                            
42 She makes this statement in arguing that the dichotomy between positive and negative 
obligations is untenable. S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ 
Positive Duties Dichotomy” (2011) 26 SAPL 37 51. See also C Mbazira Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 
228 and part 3 2 1 3 1 (b) above. 
43 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 51. 
44 51. 
45 Davis argues that South African courts have adopted a deferent approach to adjudicating 
socio-economic rights cases where positive obligations have not been complied with, referring 
to the relatively weak reasonableness review model used to establish liability and the weak 
remedies granted by courts in these cases. D M Davis “Adjudicating the Socio-Economic 
Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards ‘Deference Lite’?” (2006) 22 SAJHR 301 
312. See also B Ray “Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg: Enforcing the Right 
to Adequate Housing Through ‘Engagement’” (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 703 707; 
D Brand “Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-Economic Rights Cases in South Africa” 
(2011) 22 Stell LR 614 615; S Liebenberg “Judicially Enforceable Socio-Economic Rights in 
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However, an overly deferent approach to remedial design will not amount to effective 
relief and will not lead to the realisation of the transformative potential of socio-
economic rights.46 Courts should thus carefully design remedies that are capable of 
securing compliance with positive obligations while also mitigating democratic and 
related concerns.47 
 
3 2 2 The nature of socio-economic rights violations 
 
3 2 2 1 Isolated violations of socio-economic rights 
 
Isolated violations of socio-economic rights will mostly occur in cases where private 
parties or the State breach the negative obligations arising from socio-economic rights. 
Jaftha v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz (“Jaftha”) is illustrative of an isolated violation 
of a socio-economic right.48 This case concerned the constitutionality of sections 
66(1)(a) and 67 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (“the Act”). These provisions 
made provision for immoveable property to be sold in a sale in execution in order to 
satisfy a debt.49 The applicants argued that the impugned provisions infringed on their 
section 26(1) right of access to housing since this right places a negative obligation on 
both the State and private parties to not hinder their existing access to housing.50 The 
Court found that section 66(1)(a) of the Act was “overbroad” and that it violated section 
26(1) of the Constitution “to the extent that it allow[ed] execution against the homes of 
                                            
South Africa: Between Light and Shadow” (2014) 37 Dublin U LJ 137 167 and S van der Berg 
“The Need for a Capabilities-Based Standard of Review for the Adjudication of State Resource 
Allocation Decisions” (2015) 31 SAJHR 330 345.  
46 See S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties 
Dichotomy” (2011) 26 SAPL 37 38. See also chapter one part 1 1 1 where transformative 
constitutionalism is discussed. 
47 See chapter five part 5 4 1 where it is argued that the inclusion of a participatory element 
into strong remedies such as structural interdicts can effectively mitigate concerns relating to 
separation of powers and polycentricity. 
48 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). This case was first brought before the High Court in Jaftha v 
Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2003 10 BCLR 1149 (C). 
49 Jaftha v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 2. 
50 Para 17. 
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indigent debtors, where they lose their security of tenure”.51 The Court stated that 
judicial oversight was necessary in the execution process in order to ensure that all 
relevant considerations are taken into account.52 The Court made use of the reading 
in remedy in order to rectify the limited unconstitutionality of the impugned provision.53  
The isolated nature of the infringement in this case meant that it was relatively easy 
to remedy due to several reasons.54 First, there was a very limited number of people 
whom were affected and the victims were furthermore easy to identify.55 Second, the 
origin of the violation points to the isolated nature of the violation. This potential 
infringement on the victims’ existing access to housing was caused by a deficient 
legislative provision as opposed to a deficiency in a large government institution. This 
legislative deficiency was easily remedied by employing the reading in remedy. Third, 
relatively few resources were needed to remedy the violation.56 
Another case which is illustrative of an isolated violation of a socio-economic right 
is Bondev Midrand (Pty) Ltd v Madzhie.57 This case concerned the purchasing of an 
open residential stand in a security estate. The purchase contract contained a clause 
which stated that the property had to be transferred back to the developer if the 
purchaser had not built her or his home within 18 months of the purchase date.58 The 
Court found that this clause should not be enforced since it violated the negative 
                                            
51 Para 44. See paras 50-51 where the Court discusses the constitutionality of s67 of the Act. 
The Court found that s67 is constitutional. 
52 Para 62. 
53 Para 64. See part 3 3 4 of this chapter where the reading in remedy is discussed. 
54 See S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1378 
where the author states in the context of isolated rights violations that “[i]n some situations the 
remedy is clear”. One can thus infer from this statement that Sturm believes that isolated 
violations are simpler to remedy than systemic violations, in which case she argues for more 
complex, structural remedies (1379).  
55 Jaftha v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 2.  
56 The Court stated that “[t]he availability of state resources [was] not an issue” since this case 
concerned the protection of existing access and not the lack of access (para 31). However, 
one could argue that more resources will be needed since the oversight role of the judiciary 
was expanded by this case. See S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ 
Positive Duties Dichotomy” (2011) 26 SAPL 37 50 where the author argues that the reading 
in remedy requiring judicial oversight does in fact involve substantial resources. 
57 (63297/15) ZAGPPHC 1097 (19 December 2016). 
58 Para 4. 
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obligation imposed by section 26(1) of the Constitution.59 The Court further stated that 
developers also have a positive obligation in terms of section 26(1) because of the 
context in which they operate and that the clause additionally violated this obligation.60 
The violation caused by the impugned contractual clause in this case was isolated 
in nature. The victim was an easily identifiable individual who had entered into a 
contract with the developer. Furthermore, the violation was not caused by multiple 
parties or institutional deficiencies, but by an unconstitutional contractual term. The 
violation was also easily remedied in this case. The Court simply dismissed the 
application, which was brought by the developer in an attempt to enforce the 
contract.61 There were furthermore no resource implications in this case, which again 
points to the isolated nature of the infringement. 
 
3 2 2 2 Systemic violations of socio-economic rights 
 
Sturm, similarly to Mbazira,62 defines systemic public law violations as “ongoing 
constitutional and statutory violations” involving “complex institutions”.63 She further 
states that “targets of remedial activity [in cases of systemic violations] tend to be 
organizations and systems involving participants with differing perspectives on, and 
interests in, the remedy”.64 She thus argues that many systemic rights violations, or 
ongoing violations, are not a consequence of individual actions, but rather of 
institutional deficiencies. Rodríguez-Garavito similarly defines systemic violations of 
socio-economic rights as cases which “implicate multiple government agencies found 
to be responsible for pervasive public policy failures that contribute to such rights 
violations”.65 A remedy aimed at rectifying a systemic socio-economic rights violation 
                                            
59 Para 37. See also para 28 where the Court stated that “persons must desist from preventing 
or impairing a person’s attempts to gain access to adequate housing.” 
60 Para 37. 
61 Para 54. 
62 See chapter two part 2 3 2 1 2 (b) where systemic rights violations in general are discussed 
with reference to Mbazira. See also C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa: A Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 110. 
63 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1377. 
64 1377.  
65 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2010) 89 Tex L Rev 1669 1671. See also G 
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must thus be able to address and consider the interests of multiple actors, both private 
and public in nature, who might have contributed to the violation.66 
Systemic socio-economic rights violations are mostly due to non-compliance with 
the positive obligations imposed upon the State to realise these rights.67 The fulfilment 
of positive obligations presupposes State departments that are effective and 
functional. Infringements of “positive” rights will thus occur when and where there “is 
a breakdown or malfunctioning of the system”.68 Effective and appropriate relief in the 
context of socio-economic rights adjudication would thus have to allow for a systemic 
approach to ending the rights violation in cases where there is non-compliance with 
positive obligations.69 Such a systemic approach will often involve “a series of steps 
                                            
Budlender “The Role of the Courts in Achieving the Transformative Potential of Socio-
Economic Rights” (2007) 8 ESR Review 9 10 where the author states that systemic violations 
occur because of ineffective or broken systems. 
66 The remedial norms of diverse participation and respect for the separation of powers 
doctrine are relevant here. A court observing these norms in a systemic case will be in a good 
position to address the interests of the multiple complex institutions which are responsible for 
the violation and this will result in a more effective remedy. See chapter two part 2 3 1 where 
these norms are discussed. 
67 See for example Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 
1169 (CC), Minster of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC), Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC), Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC), Section 27 v Minister of Education 
2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) and Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 
BCLR 1039 (GP). See also S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ 
Positive Duties Dichotomy” (2011) 26 SAPL 37 39 and G Budlender “The Role of the Courts 
in Achieving the Transformative Potential of Socio-Economic Rights” (2007) 8 ESR Review 9 
10 where the authors respectively link systemic violations to the non-compliance with positive 
obligations and C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism 
on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2010) 89 Tex L Rev 1669 1684 where the author 
ascribes certain systemic socio-economic rights violations to the “inaction of relevant 
institutions” and “the lack of coordination among them”.  
68 G Budlender “The Role of the Courts in Achieving the Transformative Potential of Socio-
Economic Rights” (2007) 8 ESR Review 9 10. It is important to note that mere non-compliance 
with a positive obligation will not automatically amount to a systemic violation. The other 
elements of this type of violation as identified here must also be present. 
69 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 111.There is thus a clear correlation between the nature of the 
right as factor to be considered and the nature of the violation since the nature of the violated 
right can be indicative of the nature of the violation. 
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or measures… over a period of time”70 and “once off” remedies will thus not be 
appropriate and effective.71 
Rodríguez-Garavito further states that the systemic violation of a socio-economic 
right will affect large groups of people, referring to the millions of people who were 
adversely affected in Columbian socio-economic rights cases dealing with severe 
overcrowding in prisons and the failing health care system.72 This is also true in the 
South African context, where severe poverty and subpar socio-economic conditions 
are the reality of the majority of the population.73 Non-compliance with positive 
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights due to institutional deficiencies will thus 
always affect large groups of people. A remedy granted in a systemic socio-economic 
rights case will accordingly have to be able to effect structural changes aimed at 
improving the lives of groups of people, as opposed to individuals, in order to constitute 
effective relief. A remedy that neglects to provide relief to everyone affected cannot be 
regarded as effective.74 
It is clear from the many different aspects of systemic socio-economic rights 
violations that such violations will require complex remedies which incorporate the 
interests of many different stakeholders. The need to adhere to remedial norms such 
as participation and respect for the separation of powers doctrine is thus intensified in 
systemic socio-economic rights cases.75 Designing effective relief for systemic socio-
economic rights violations is furthermore more difficult when compared to designing 
effective relief for isolated violations, as discussed above, which can be remedied by 
                                            
70 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 39. 
71 W Trengove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights" (1999) 1 ESR 
Review 8 10. 
72 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2010) 89 Tex L Rev 1669 1671. See also S 
Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/ Positive Duties Dichotomy” (2011) 
26 SAPL 37 52. 
73 See chapter one part 1 1 2 where the structural poverty and socio-economic deprivation in 
South Africa are discussed. 
74 This element of systemic socio-economic rights violations highlights the need for courts to 
consider the interest of people similarly situated to the victims in also receiving relief. See part 
3 2 3 below in this chapter where this factor is discussed. 
75 See chapter two part 2 3 1 where these norms are discussed. 
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simple, once-off remedies. The remainder of this study will thus focus on effective relief 
within the context of systemic socio-economic rights violations.76 
 
3 2 3 Balancing diverse interests 
 
Socio-economic rights are aimed at enhancing the dignity, freedom and substantive 
equality of those who are poor, marginalised and vulnerable.77 The realisation of these 
rights are therefore essential to the transformative project of our Constitution, and 
sufficient weight must thus be given to the interests of the applicants who bring these 
cases to court.78  
Other pressing concerns in socio-economic rights cases are the interest in 
maintaining the separation of powers doctrine and the interests of the institution that 
is responsible for rectifying the violations.79 These interests should not be neglected 
since the cooperation of the institutions whose non-compliance with positive 
obligations led to the systemic violation will be needed for the remedial plan to be 
effectively implemented.80 Institutions that feel that their interests were not considered 
and adequately accommodated might adopt a recalcitrant attitude that will negatively 
impact upon the effective implementation of the remedy.81  
                                            
76 See chapter four where the potential of the structural interdict to constitute effective relief 
for systemic socio-economic rights is explored. 
77 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 9 where 
the Court states that the socio-economic rights provisions are specifically aimed at rectifying 
the injustices of the past. 
78 See chapter one part 1 1 1 for a discussion of transformative constitutionalism. 
79 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-29. The Court refers in Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 11 
BCLR 1211 (CC) para 45 to this process of taking into account the victim’s interest and the 
wider societal interests as “a balancing process”. 
80 See chapter two part 2 3 1 1 where it is stated that parties who are responsible for the 
implementation of a remedy should be allowed to participate in the remedial phase of 
adjudication in order for the relief to be effective. 
81 See chapter two part 2 3 1 5 where the norm of remediation as identified by Sturm is 
discussed. See also S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo 
LJ 1355 1411. 
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The need to consider the interests of those similarly situated to the victims of the 
right infringement becomes magnified in systemic socio-economic rights cases.82 The 
Court stated in Fose that South Africa is a country where “few have the means to 
enforce their rights through the courts”.83 Remedies granted in those cases where 
victims do gain access to courts should thus as far as possible also provide relief to 
other similarly situated people if the transformative ideals of the Bill of Rights, and 
specifically the socio-economic rights contained therein, are to be fulfilled.84  
It is important to note the large-scale, structural poverty which persists in our society 
means that in order to extend relief to those who are similarly placed, additional 
resources will be needed by government, thus again raising separation of powers-
based concerns.85 
 
3 2 4 The reason for the infringement 
 
Discrete socio-economic rights violations occurring because of non-compliance 
with negative obligations can be due to different reasons. Mere inattentiveness by the 
violator will often be the reason for non-compliance in cases where unconstitutional 
legislative provisions result in negative constitutional obligations not being complied 
with.86 However, non-compliance with negative obligations can also occur due to 
deliberate actions. For example, a discrete violation of section 26(3) of the Constitution 
will occur if a group of occupiers are evicted from buildings without a court order in 
order to fulfil a political mandate.87 Simple remedies such as reading in, prohibitory 
                                            
82 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 182. Gutto supports this by 
arguing that the justiciability of socio-economic rights should not only lead to “goods and 
services” for the parties to the litigation, but that it should also have a broader impact on the 
“development of transformative normative ideas, values and institutional arrangements” which 
will benefit many people who are not parties to the litigation. S B O Gutto "Beyond Justiciability: 
Challenges of Implementing/Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa" (1998) 4 Buff 
Hum Rts L Rev 79 99. 
83 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. 
84 See chapter one part 1 1 1 for a discussion of transformative constitutionalism. 
85 See chapter five part 5 2 where these concerns are discussed. 
86 See Jaftha v Schoeman, Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
87 Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba has recently expressed worrying sentiments with 
regard to the inner city housing crises, stating that he will use “shock and awe” tactics in order 
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interdicts or damages (where a private party is the infringing party) will likely be 
effective in most isolated cases. 
Systemic socio-economic rights violations occurring because of non-compliance 
with positive obligations imposed on the State can likewise be due to various reasons. 
These types of violations can usually be ascribed to either incompetence (lack of 
capacity) or recalcitrance on the part of the State as bearer of positive duties.88 These 
violations might require stronger, more managerial remedies in order to be effectively 
remedied. 
 
3 2 5 The practicability of the envisaged remedy  
 
Practicability concerns are exacerbated in cases where socio-economic rights have 
been systemically violated since such remedies would necessarily have to be 
implemented on a large scale and strike at the institutional shortcomings that led to 
the infringement. Courts might be tempted to grant far-reaching, detailed structural 
remedies aimed at rectifying institutional deficiencies, but they must be cautious 
against granting a remedy which the respondents cannot reasonably be expected to 
comply with.89  
However, the court must not only consider the ability of the respondent to comply 
with the order, but also its own ability to effectively supervise complicated and detailed 
                                            
to reclaim the so-called “highjacked” buildings. This rhetoric used by Mashaba is concerning 
since it suggests that whole scale evictions might take place without court orders or the 
provision of alternative housing, which will amount to a violation of s26(3) of the Constitution. 
See S Mkokeli “Herman Mashaba is Pressing On with ‘shock and awe’ Plan for Inner City, 
Despite Cries of Xenophobia” (15-08-2017) Business Day 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-08-15-herman-mashaba-is-pressing-on-
with-shock-and-awe-plan-for-inner-city-despite-cries-of-xenophobia/> (accessed 15-08-
2017). 
88 See Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng 2008 1 SA 223 (T) in which 
incompetence led to a systemic violation and MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 
2 All SA 455 (SCA) in which government recalcitrance was a major contributor to the systemic 
rights violations in respect of social assistance grants. 
89 Froneman J stated in Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
2001 2 SA 609 (E) 663A that “[i]t seems futile to make an order which the respondents might 
have difficulty in complying” with. 
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structural interdicts.90 Remedies aimed at systemic socio-economic rights violations 
must thus be practical and realistically designed in order to effect positive change.91 
The Constitutional Court has stated before that the “effectiveness of court orders or 
decisions is substantially determined by the assurance that they will be enforced”.92 A 
perfect remedy that cannot be complied with will not be regarded as an effective 
remedy. 
 
3 2 6 Deterrent effect of the envisaged remedy 
 
The need for deterrence in cases dealing with socio-economic rights are crucial 
since the victims of these violations are often amongst the poorest and most 
vulnerable members of our society.93 They may not have the capacity to bring further 
litigation if the violations reoccur. The need for deterrent remedies is especially 
important in cases where socio-economic rights have been systemically violated since 
a failure to effectively remedy the institutional shortcomings will naturally result in a 
continuing violation at a structural level. Relief in such cases would thus have to 
address the systemic issues in order to effectively deter and prevent future violations 
of the right in question.  
The relief would have to target the root of the systemic issue to achieve this and not 
merely deal with the symptoms.94 Cases dealing with systemic socio-economic rights 
violations are more complex to remedy. This is why Sturm argues, as noted in the 
previous chapter, that the traditional binary, adversarial litigation process is not 
appropriate in such cases. She argues that non-adversarial and participatory 
mechanisms are more appropriate for remedying systemic violations as these hold 
                                            
90 See chapter five part 5 2 3 where this concern is discussed in more depth. 
91 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 BCLR 150 (CC) para 69. 
92 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 1. See 
chapter four part 4 3 1 2 for a critical analysis of this case. 
93 See chapter two part 2 3 2 5 where deterrence is discussed as a factor that must be 
considered when designing effective relief in the context of general human rights violations. 
94 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 177. 
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greater potential to rectify the root problems and thus deter similar infringements in 
future.95 
 
3 3 Constitutional remedies in the context of socio-economic rights 
 
Having proposed what effective relief entails where constitutional rights in general, 
and socio-economic rights in particular, are infringed, this part of the chapter will briefly 
evaluate some constitutional law remedies granted by the Constitutional Court in past 
socio-economic rights cases. This study will, as noted above, focus on effective relief 
for the systemic violation of socio-economic rights since these violations occur often 
in the context of socio-economic rights, are complex, and cannot easily be addressed 
within the structures of our traditional, binary mode of adjudication. The following 
chapters will deal solely with the structural interdict because of its ostensible potential 
to constitute appropriate and effective relief in cases of systemic socio-economic rights 
violations.96 The remedies that will be briefly considered here are declaratory orders, 
prohibitory and mandatory interdicts, constitutional damages, reading in and contempt 
of court proceedings.97 
 
3 3 1 Declaratory orders 
 
3 3 1 1 A description 
 
Section 38 of the Constitution explicitly makes provision for the granting of a 
declaration of rights by a court where it is alleged that a right has been infringed.98 
                                            
95 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1377. 
96 1379. The author justifies the use of structural interdict remedies for systemic public law 
violations with reference to the court’s “remedial duty”. 
97 Pieterse states that a wide variety of remedial orders could possibly constitute appropriate 
and effective relief in cases dealing with socio-economic rights infringements. M Pieterse 
“Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 
383 413. 
98 Mbazira defines this type of remedy as “a legal statement of the legal relationship between 
the parties”. C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between 
Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 156. 
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This flexible and discretionary remedy allows a court to declare what obligations are 
imposed by a right whilst leaving the decision as to how best to fulfil the obligations to 
the other branches of the State.99  
 
3 3 1 2 Declaratory orders as appropriate and effective relief 
 
Declaratory orders hold the greatest potential to constitute effective relief in cases 
dealing with systemic socio-economic rights violations where such violations are 
caused by the government’s mere inattentiveness to its constitutional obligations.100 
In such cases, courts can use declaratory orders to provide guidance to government 
as to how a particular constitutional violation can be rectified. The Court stated in TAC 
that “[e]ven simple declaratory orders against government or organs of state can affect 
their policy” and that “Government is constitutionally bound to give effect to such 
orders”.101 
Liebenberg argues that pure declaratory orders are appropriate as relief in cases 
dealing with systemic socio-economic rights violations in one of two circumstances. 
Purely declaratory orders are firstly appropriate in cases where it is expected that the 
government or relevant State agency will both understand their constitutional 
obligations and comply therewith in accordance with the declaratory order.102 The 
Court stated in Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail that 
interdictory relief, as opposed to declaratory relief, would not be appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case as there was “nothing to suggest on the papers that 
Metrorail and the Commuter Corporation will not take steps to comply” with the 
declaratory relief granted by the Court.103  
The second circumstance in which a declaratory order might be regarded as being 
appropriate and effective relief is in cases where the matter before the court has 
                                            
99 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 196. 
100 See part 3 2 4 above for a discussion of the different reasons for socio-economic rights 
violations.  
101 Minster of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 99. 
102 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 408. 
103 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 109. See also Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 
2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 129 where the Court followed a similar line of reasoning. 
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become moot.104 Currie and De Waal define a case which is moot as a case which 
can no longer affect the interest of the parties before the court or a case where there 
is no longer an existing controversy present.105 A declaratory order in a moot case 
might still be appropriate relief for two reasons. Firstly, it can serve as a confirmation 
that the applicant’s constitutional right has been infringed and by doing so it vindicates 
the right.106 Secondly, it can deter future infringements of socio-economic rights by 
government by declaring what its constitutional duties are in a particular case.  
Declaratory orders also have certain shortcomings that should be taken into 
account by courts when designing effective relief for systemic socio-economic rights 
violations. Declaratory orders often “suffer from vagueness, [have] insufficient 
remedial specificity, an inability to monitor compliance, and [could lead to] an ensuing 
need for subsequent litigation to ensure compliance”.107 Bishop argues that these 
deficiencies mean that declaratory orders are often too weak as a form of remedy in 
cases of systemic rights violations.108 He continues by stating that the South African 
government is inefficient and will possibly not be able to comply with broad 
declarations in the context of socio-economic rights. He further argues that litigants in 
South Africa are often poor and marginalised groups who might not have the 
necessary financial resources to bring subsequent litigation which might be needed to 
ensure compliance. This renders declaratory orders less appropriate in cases where 
on-going institutional reform is required because of systemic violations.109 
                                            
104 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 398. 
105 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 87. 
106 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 399. 
107 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice) 2000 2 SCR 1120 para 
258. 
108 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9–141. 
109 141. The author refers to Treatment Action Campaign v MEC for Health, Mpumalanga and 
Minister of Health TPD case no 35272/02 in which contempt of court proceedings had to be 
launched to ensure complete compliance with the Court’s order as granted in Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). See also Fose v Minister of Safety 
and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69 where the Court stated that many poor and 
marginalised people do not possess the necessary means to access courts in order to protect 
their constitutional rights. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
Establishing whether or not declaratory orders are effective in systemic socio-
economic rights cases is often difficult. For example, in the landmark case of 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom (“Grootboom”)110 the Court 
issued a declaratory order that the State was “to devise and implement within its 
available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme progressively to 
realise the right of access to adequate housing” as required by section 26 of the 
Constitution.111 The case concerned a group of people who illegally occupied a piece 
of privately owned land.112 A previous court order ordered that the occupiers must be 
evicted from the privately-owned land.113 The group of occupiers accordingly moved 
to a nearby sports field after being evicted and brought an urgent application to the 
High Court since the conditions became intolerable.114 The declaratory order followed 
a settlement of the dispute between the parties.115 Pillay notes that two years after the 
judgment was delivered, the circumstances and the absence of a “reasonable” 
housing policy, which the Constitutional Court declared to be unconstitutional, 
subsisted.116 According to the author, this delay was arguably a result of the nature of 
the relief granted by the Court which did not provide for implementation timeframes or 
judicial supervision over the implementation process.117  
On the other hand, Grootboom led to significant positive housing policy 
developments and outcomes which helped to address the systemic housing issue in 
                                            
110 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC). 
111 Para 99. 
112 Para 3. 
113 Para 9. 
114 Para 11. See Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C) for the High 
Court judgment. 
115 C Mbazira Strategies for Effective Implementation of Court Orders in South Africa: You are 
the “weakest link” in Realising Socio-economic Rights: Goodbye (2008) 15. 
116 K Pillay “Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights” (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Dev 255 270. 
117 K Pillay “Implementing Grootboom: Supervision Needed” (2002) 3 ESR Review 13 14. See 
T Roux “Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African 
Constitutional Court” (2003) 10 Democratization 92 97 where the author likewise criticises this 
judgment on the grounds that the Court neglected to prioritise the needs of the poor by not 
granting them immediate relief. 
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South Africa.118 It is important to distinguish between the settlement agreement which 
was made an order of the Court and the declaratory orders which were made with 
regard to the constitutionality of the State’s housing programme in the Cape Town 
area in terms of section 26 of the Constitution.119 The settlement order dealt with the 
question of immediate relief for the applicants, in terms of which the respondents were 
required to provide certain basic services to the affected community.120 The main 
criticism against this settlement order is that it was only focused on a short term 
solution for the occupants, and not for other persons similarly situated.121 The 
declaratory order did prompt government compliance, even though this compliance 
was delayed. A new plan entitled “Housing Assistance in Emergency Housing 
Situations” was approved in August 2003 and later incorporated into the National 
Housing Code.122 Liebenberg argues that the Court’s confidence that the State would 
comply with the orders made in Grootboom was justified given that this was the first 
significant case to come before the Court in terms of section 26 of the Constitution.123  
Divergent academic opinions regarding the efficacy of the Grootboom order thus 
illustrate the complexity involved in designing effective remedies in systemic socio-
economic rights cases. The declaratory orders made by the Constitutional Court 
                                            
118 Budlender, Marcus and Ferreira note that the judgment in Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) led to broad positive outcomes related 
to improved national housing policy and the development of South African law on housing and 
evictions. S Budlender, G Marcus & N Ferreira Public Interest Litigation and Social Change in 
South Africa: Strategies, Tactics and Lessons (2014) 45–46. 
119 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 401. Roach and Budlender contend that because of the nature of the right and breach 
in question, considering whether or not a mandatory and supervisory order would be 
appropriate was no longer necessary, K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and 
Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 
329. 
120 Grootboom v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 
5. 
121 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 401. 
122 401. The National Housing Code was published in terms of section 4 of the Housing Act 
107 of 1997. 
123 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 409. 
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therefore cannot simply be assumed to have been ineffective or inappropriate given 
the structural housing problems at issue. 
 
3 3 2 Interdicts 
 
3 3 2 1 A description 
 
An interdict does not merely declare what the legal position is, but also orders a 
party to either do something (mandatory interdict) or to not do something (prohibitory 
interdict).124 These remedies are thus essentially future orientated as they aim to 
regulate future conduct.125 Courts can grant either a permanent interdict or an interim 
interdict.126  
 
3 3 2 2 Interdicts as appropriate and effective relief 
 
Liebenberg notes that prohibitory interdicts can be appropriate in the context of 
socio-economic rights cases where there is a “threatened interference” with a person’s 
existing access to socio-economic rights.127 In other words, prohibitory interdicts can 
be most effective in cases where a violation occurred because of non-compliance with 
a negative obligation arising from a socio-economic right.128 Prohibitory interdicts can 
also be granted to deter future socio-economic rights violations if there is a threat of 
                                            
124 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9–130. 
125 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 409. 
126 The requirements for the granting of permanent and interim interdicts differ. See Setlogelo 
v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 para 227 where the requirements for the granting of permanent 
interdicts are discussed and Janse van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NNO 
2001 1 SA 29 (CC) para 32 where the requirements for interim interdicts are discussed. 
127 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 410. 
128 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 170. 
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such a violation.129 These interdicts can thus potentially be effective in cases of 
discrete socio-economic rights violations, but will not be effective in cases dealing with 
systemic socio-economic rights violations.130 Liebenberg further states that mandatory 
interdicts may constitute effective relief in cases where socio-economic rights are 
infringed because of a failure to give effect to a positive obligation by the government 
or organ of State.131 It is this ability of mandatory interdicts to enforce positive 
obligations that renders these types of remedies particularly effective in cases dealing 
with systemic socio-economic rights violations.132 
Mbazira argues that mandatory interdicts will be inappropriate as a remedy in cases 
where there is reason to believe that the government or organ of State will be bona 
fide in obeying the court’s order.133 One could thus argue that a mandatory interdict 
as remedy will be appropriate and effective in cases where non-compliance is 
reasonably expected.134 Mbazira further supports this argument by stating that the 
distinction between declaratory orders and interdicts is most prevalent in cases where 
government disregards its constitutional obligations because of the different ways in 
which these remedies can be enforced. An interdict can be followed by contempt of 
court proceedings whereas declaratory orders cannot.135 The consequences for 
                                            
129 Mbazira refers to prohibitory interdicts aimed at deterring future infringements as 
“preventative interdicts” (170). 
130 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1378. 
131 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 410. 
132 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 170. 
133 171. 
134 171. See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) in which 
the Court granted a mandatory interdict despite stating that government compliance was 
expected (para 129). This matter needed to be urgently remedied because of the potential 
infection of thousands of infants with HIV. It is thus this urgency of the underlying interests that 
justified the mandatory interdict component of the relief. See chapter four part 4 3 3 where it 
is argued that detailed and immediate relief is needed in cases where irreparable harm might 
ensue. 
135 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 38. See also MEC for the 
Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 31 where the Supreme Court of 
Appeal stated that interdictory remedies have “the capacity to be effective where there is a 
breach or a threatened breach by a public official of a duty that is imposed upon him or her by 
a statute or by the Constitution”. See also M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
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disobeying an interdict are thus potentially more severe, which may have a deterrent 
effect.136 This type of remedy is thus potentially more effective in cases of possible 
government recalcitrance.137 
 
3 3 3 Constitutional damages 
 
3 3 3 1 A description 
 
Constitutional damages can be defined as “a sum of money paid to a person to 
compensate him or her for harm that was caused” due to a violation of her or his 
constitutionally protected rights.138 Currie and De Waal state that there is nothing in 
the Constitution that prevents the courts from awarding damages in cases where 
constitutionally protected rights have been infringed upon.139 This position has been 
confirmed in the Fose-case where the Court stated that “there is no reason in principle 
why ‘appropriate relief’ should not include an award of damages, where such an award 
is necessary to protect and enforce” the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.140 
 
3 3 3 2 Constitutional damages as appropriate and effective relief 
 
Mbazira argues that non-pecuniary damages hold the most potential in terms of 
damages as a remedy to constitute appropriate and effective relief in systemic socio-
economic rights cases.141 Non-pecuniary damages do not only vindicate the victim’s 
                                            
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-130 where the author 
discusses how contempt of court proceedings can contribute to the effectiveness of mandatory 
orders. 
136 See part 3 2 6 above where the deterrent effect of a remedy is discussed as an important 
consideration during the remedial enquiry. 
137 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 172. 
138 P de Vos & W Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 409. 
139 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 200. 
140 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 60. 
141 Pecuniary damages refer to what the “plaintiff has suffered directly in monetary terms” 
because of the rights violation. Non-pecuniary damages refer to the compensation for pain 
and suffering of a victim. This is often very difficult to reduce to a monetary value as it might 
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violated right, but also serve as a deterrent which might help to end the systemic 
violation, since the respondent and other institutions who might engage in similar 
unlawful conduct are made aware that such conduct will result in a loss for them in the 
form of payable damages.142  
However, Sturm differs from Mbazira in this respect since she argues that damages 
will be ineffective in cases where public law rights have been systemically violated for 
two reasons. First, damages in systemic cases are difficult to quantify and there is a 
tendency to undervalue the harm caused by these violations. This results in the 
payment of damages being “viewed as considerably cheaper than efforts to achieve 
compliance with legal norms”.143 Second, officials responsible for the violations are 
normally not personally liable for the payment of the damages, which has a negative 
impact on the deterrent effect of the remedy.144 
A further argument against the award of damages in systemic socio-economic rights 
cases centres on the financial impact it might have on the public purse. South Africa 
is a resource scarce country and awarding damages to a litigant might have a negative 
effect on the State’s ability to fulfil its positive obligations in respect of myriad policies 
aimed at the realisation of diverse constitutional rights.145 
                                            
include compensation for things such as anxiety, depression and humiliation. C Mbazira 
Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective and 
Distributive Justice (2009) 143. Trengove suggests that “reparations in kind” might be a more 
appropriate and effective form of relief. He states that the purpose is exactly the same as an 
award for conventional damages, but that it “is tailored to suit the nature of the violation”. This 
remedy will be awarded in the form of “appropriate remedial services” aimed at vindicating the 
infringed right. W Trengove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights" 
(1999) 1 ESR Review 8 10. 
142 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 144. See W Trengove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of 
Socio-Economic Rights" (1999) 1 ESR Review 8 9 for a discussion of preventative damages. 
He states that concerns relating to punitive damages can be mitigated if one rather awards 
preventative damages against the State and in favour of a non-governmental organisation 
which has the ability to prevent similar rights violations. 
143 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1379. 
144 1379. 
145 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 154. 
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Despite the above mentioned concerns, the courts have recognised direct 
constitutional damages as appropriate in certain cases dealing with socio-economic 
rights violations.146 The Court awarded direct constitutional damages for the first time 
in President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd after the 
State failed to give effect to two previous court orders.147 The Court held that 
constitutional damages constituted an appropriate remedy as this allowed the 
residents of Gabon (the unlawful occupiers) to stay in their homes while 
simultaneously vindicating Modderklip’s right to private property.148 It was deemed fair 
for the State to pay the damages as it had not fulfilled its obligation to provide 
alternative land to the occupiers and had failed to meet its obligation to help Modderklip 
execute the eviction order.149 The Constitutional Court essentially upheld the order of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Court rejected the State’s argument that an order 
declaring the rights of the parties would be sufficient, holding that “something more 
effective than the suggested clarification of its rights” was needed to rectify this 
systemic issue which was caused in large part by the government’s failure to both 
protect Modderklip’s property rights and also to progressively realise the occupiers’ 
housing rights.150 
                                            
146 Liebenberg identifies two such areas. The first area deals with the reconciliation between 
property rights and housing rights. The second area is where direct constitutional damages 
are awarded as compensation for the maladministration of social grants. S Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 438. 
147 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA). See chapter two part 2 3 2 4 for a brief discussion of the previous 
court orders in this case. 
148 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) 
para 43. 
149 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-134. The Court justified damages as the only appropriate remedy 
by stating that “Modderklip will not receive more than what it has lost, the State has already 
received value for what it has to pay and the immediate social problem is solved”. President 
of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 43. 
150 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 
(CC) para 60. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69 
where the Court stated that the granting of constitutional damages is supported by the 
judicially recognised need for effective relief. 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal again granted constitutional damages in MEC for the 
Department of Welfare v Kate (“Kate”).151 This case arose from a 40-month delay by 
the Department of Social Welfare in deciding whether or not Kate should receive a 
disability grant. The Court awarded the damages based on the fact that the delay 
infringed Kate’s right to social security as contained in section 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution. The Court regarded the violation as systemic in nature.152 Constitutional 
damages were the only appropriate and effective remedy in the circumstances of the 
case.153 In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered other constitutional 
remedies such as a declaration of rights and an interdict. Declaratory relief would have 
been ineffective and thus inappropriate in this case, as there was reason to believe 
that the government would not act bona fide and promptly.154 The Court further 
considered the appropriateness of an interdict as relief in this case.155 The Court stated 
that such a remedy would be ineffective, because the “rights that [were]… in issue are 
directed towards the very poorest in our society, who have little or nothing to sustain 
them”.156 The Court further stated in this regard that grant beneficiaries might very well 
not understand their rights, and even if they did, might not have the necessary 
resources to protect and enforce their rights.157 An interdict which might need further 
litigation to be enforced because of the recalcitrant nature of the Department would 
thus not be effective.158 
                                            
151 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA). 
152 The Court emphasised the systemic nature of the violation by stating that “there seems to 
be no end in sight” with regard to the maladministration of social grants in the Eastern Cape 
(para 5). The Court further stated (para 31) that the violation of the right to social security in 
the Eastern Cape was “endemic”. 
153 Para 22. See also para 25 where the Court considered factors such as the nature of the 
right, the availability of other remedies, and the “consequences of the breach for the claimant 
concerned” in deciding whether or not damages would be appropriate and effective. 
154 The Court based this conclusion in para 29 on the fact that the High Court had already 
made such orders with regard to social grants and that the Department of Welfare had still not 
ended the “impasse”. 
155 Para 31. 
156 Para 31. 
157 Para 31. 
158 Remedies should be practically implementable and enforceable as per part 3 2 5 above in 
order to constitute effective relief for systemic socio-economic rights violations. 
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It is clear from the above discussion and case analyses that constitutional damages 
can constitute appropriate and effective relief in cases dealing with systemic socio-
economic rights infringements. However, this will depend on the facts of each case 
since constitutional damages will almost always have a negative impact on the public 
purse. 
 
3 3 4 Reading in 
 
3 3 4 1 A description 
 
Reading in is a remedy used by courts to remedy a statute that has been found to 
be constitutionally invalid. This remedy can help rectify a statute that is inconsistent 
with the Constitution if such an inconsistency is caused by an omission of certain 
words.159 Courts must ensure that the constitutional inconsistency is cured, but they 
must do this with the minimal required intrusion.160 
 
3 3 4 2 Reading in as appropriate and effective relief 
 
Reading in as constitutional remedy has been granted by South African courts in 
cases dealing with isolated non-compliance with the negative obligations imposed by 
socio-economic rights.161 This section will consider whether this remedy has the ability 
to constitute appropriate and effective relief in cases dealing with the systemic violation 
of socio-economic rights. 
An important case in this context is Khosa v Minister of Social Development; 
Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development (“Khosa”).162 This case concerned the 
confirmation of an order of invalidity of certain provisions in the Social Assistance Act 
59 of 1992 which excluded permanent residents who did not have citizenship from 
receiving certain welfare grants. The Court held that this exclusion amounted to unfair 
                                            
159 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 187. 
160 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 
(CC) para 24. See also para 75 where the Court formulated additional requirements that 
should be adhered to when employing the reading in remedy. 
161 See for example Jafta v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stolz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
162 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). 
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discrimination in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution and that it violated the right 
of access to social assistance as provided for in section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
In considering what remedy to grant, the Court stated that “[r]eading in the words 
‘or permanent resident’ after ‘South African citizen’” in the challenged provisions would 
be the most appropriate remedy in this case.163 Chenwi notes that this “intrusive” 
remedy vindicated the victims’ rights since permanent residents gained access to the 
same social welfare benefits as enjoyed by South African residents.164 However, 
vindication of the infringed right is not the only requirement for an appropriate and 
effective remedy.165 Reading in as a constitutional remedy essentially means that 
courts become embroiled in the work of the legislative authority by altering legislation. 
This concern was exacerbated in Khosa where the remedy had financial implications 
because of the wider group of people who now qualified for social assistance from the 
State. Mokgoro J held in the majority judgment that while this was a concern, the 
overall budgetary impact would be too small to justify not widening the pool of 
beneficiaries.166 
However, in his minority judgment, Ngcobo J arrived at a different conclusion. He 
stated that it is the work of policymakers to determine what the financial impact on 
government will be if access to social welfare were to be expanded.167 He further 
stated that courts “should be slow to reject reasonable estimates made by 
policymakers” as this was not the Court’s area of expertise. It is clear that Ngcobo J 
placed more emphasis on the separation of powers-doctrine when compared to the 
majority judgment in this case. 
Liebenberg argues that the appropriateness of the reading in remedy must be 
determined by conducting a balancing exercise.168 Courts must consider whether the 
                                            
163 Para 89. 
164 L Chenwi “Socio-Economic Gains and Losses: The South African Constitutional Court and 
Social Change” (2011) 3 Social Change 427 437. 
165 See chapter two part 2 2 3 where it is argued that an interest balancing approach must be 
followed when determining what the most effective relief would be. 
166 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 
6 SA 505 (CC) para 62. 
167 Para 128. 
168 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 388. 
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relief provided by the re-drafting of the legislative provision justifies the granting of 
such an intrusive remedy. She further notes that this type of remedy will generally not 
be appropriate in cases where the rights infringement can be remedied by a range of 
different policy options.169 She argues that this is the case since the drafting of policy 
normally involves broad public participation which ultimately contributes to the efficacy 
of said policy. Lastly, she notes that reading in as remedy will be inappropriate in cases 
where the violation can only be rectified “through organs of state undertaking a series 
of positive steps and structural reforms over a period of time”, thus indicating that this 
remedy will only be effective in rare systemic cases where violations are caused by 
non-compliance with a negative constitutional obligation.170 
 
3 3 5 Contempt of court proceedings 
 
3 3 5 1 A description 
 
Contempt of court proceedings can be launched by a party who seeks to enforce a 
mandatory order which has not been complied with. Such proceedings normally follow 
the issuing of a rule nisi in order to give the party who has allegedly not complied with 
the mandatory order an opportunity to show why he or she should not be held in 
contempt of court.171 In order to be successful in contempt of court proceedings, an 
applicant would have to show that there was indeed non-compliance and that the non-
compliance was wilful and mala fide.172 
  
                                            
169 388. 
170 388. 
171 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 205. 
172 205. See also Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 42 for an 
elaboration on these requirements and Eisenberg de Saude v Director-General of the 
Department of Home Affairs (14705/15) ZAWCHC (15 September 2015) para 51 where a 
distinction is drawn between contempt of court proceedings directed at committal and those 
directed at other relief such as a declaration of contempt or monetary fines. 
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3 3 5 2 Contempt of court proceedings as appropriate and effective relief 
 
Court orders must be implementable and enforceable in order to qualify as 
appropriate and effective relief. Contempt of court proceedings are one way of making 
orders against the State more effective, because one can approach a court for an 
order stating that the other party is in contempt of court due to non-compliance.173 The 
Court stated in Victoria Park Ratepayers Association v Greyvenouw CC that the 
court’s ability to declare a recalcitrant party to be in contempt of court “has at its heart 
the very effectiveness and legitimacy of the judicial system”.174 Contempt of court 
proceedings can thus contribute to the efficacy of certain remedies as it enhances the 
enforceability of such remedies. 
Contempt of court proceedings have been particularly needed in cases where the 
State had been ordered to pay a sum of money in the context of socio-economic rights 
cases as these orders seem to be problematic in terms of compliance.175 A judgment 
debtor may not, according to the common law, be held in contempt of court for failing 
to comply with an order to pay a sum of money.176 This aspect of the common law has 
since been developed to allow such orders against the State because an effective 
mechanism was needed to force the government to comply with money orders in 
cases dealing with the infringement of the right to social assistance.177 This 
development was again possibly overturned in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern 
Cape (“Jayiya”) which led to an uncertain legal position.178 Froneman J, however, 
                                            
173 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 451. 
174 2004 3 ALL SA 623 (SE) para 5. Nkabinde J defines contempt of court in Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 ZACC 10 (CC) para 28 as “the commission 
of any act or statement that displays disrespect for the authority of the court or its officers 
acting in an official capacity”. See chapter four part 4 3 1 2 where this case is discussed. 
175 The Court stated in Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare 2005 1 All SA 745 (SE) para 
5 per Froneman J that “there has been a persistent and huge problem with the administration 
of social grants” in the Eastern Cape Province. See also MEC for the Department of Welfare 
v Kate 2006 2 All SA 455 (SCA) para 4. 
176 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 205. 
177 See Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk) and East 
London LTC v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape 2001 3 SA 1133 (Ck). 
178 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA).  
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construed the Jayiya-judgment narrowly in Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape and courts can as a result still make a declaratory order stating that a 
State functionary is in contempt of court when not complying with a money order.179  
This discussion will not be complete without brief reference to Minister for Justice 
and Constitutional Development v Nyathi.180 Enforcement of money orders against the 
State has been a major issue faced by successful litigants, as discussed above.181 
Courts were forced to develop the common law in respect of contempt of court 
proceedings because section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 precluded 
execution against State assets. However, the Constitutional Court declared this 
section to be unconstitutional as there were no other effective ways for litigants to 
enforce judgment debts.182 Attachment of State assets is now regulated by section 3 
of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011 and this will make contempt of court 
proceedings much more effective in cases dealing with money orders against the 
State.183  
                                            
179 2005 1 All SA 745 (SE). Froneman J was critical of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment 
in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA), stating that this judgment 
creates the impression that the State is above the law as there is no way to ensure compliance 
with a money order against the State. See also the important judgment of City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) in which the 
Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider whether an order obliging the State functionaries to 
ensure compliance by the City with a court order was justified. The Court concluded that it was 
appropriate, referring to the statutory and constitutional obligations imposed on the 
functionaries to ensure that court orders are complied with (paras 15-26). It is important to 
note that an order of contempt of court against a State functionary would not be appropriate if 
the functionary in question have been nominated or deployed for that purpose by the relevant 
organ of State and if she or he were not “responsible for the wilful default in complying with a 
court order that lies at the heart of contempt proceedings.” See Meadow Glen Home Owners 
Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 2 SA 413 (SCA) para 20 in this 
regard. 
180 2010 4 SA 567 (CC). 
181 See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 450. 
182 Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health Gauteng 2008 5 
SA 94 (CC) para 58. See S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 453 for an in-depth discussion of the Nyathi-judgment and 
subsequent developments. 
183 See Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health Gauteng 2008 
5 SA 94 (CC) para 75 where Madala J criticises contempt of court proceedings and specifically 
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3 4 Conclusion 
 
The first part of this chapter considered the judicially recognised requirement for 
effective relief in respect of public law remedies within the specific context of socio-
economic rights violations. It was established that discrete violations will mostly occur 
where either the State or private parties breach their negative duties relating to socio-
economic rights. Socio-economic rights violations arising in instances where the State 
did not fulfil its positive obligations will often be systemic in nature and these violations 
are difficult to remedy. It was further established that the reason for the violation might 
also be an indication as to the nature of the violation and that considerations relating 
to the practicability of the remedy and the deterrent effect of the remedy are crucial in 
cases where socio-economic rights have been systemically violated. 
The second part of this chapter considered different constitutional remedies in order 
to establish whether or not they have the potential to deal effectively with systemic 
socio-economic rights violations. It was concluded that all of these could potentially 
constitute appropriate and effective relief in such cases, but that it would depend on 
the circumstances of each case. 
Declaratory orders have the potential to be effective, but this potential is limited by 
their weak nature. Compliance with these remedies cannot be guaranteed since there 
is no real and direct recourse for parties in cases where these remedies are 
disregarded, other than to bring subsequent litigation. Mandatory interdicts seem to 
have more potential to constitute effective relief in cases of systemic socio-economic 
rights infringements because of the threat of contempt of court proceedings. However, 
both these remedies will require further litigation which makes it inaccessible for poor 
and marginalised people. 
This chapter also considered constitutional damages and reading in as remedies. 
Both these remedies do have the potential to constitute appropriate and effective relief, 
but should only be granted in limited circumstances. Constitutional damages will 
almost always have a negative impact on the public purse and broader societal 
interests thus fall to be considered before an order for damages is made. Reading in 
                                            
the heavy burden this form of relief places on successful litigants, especially where these 
litigants are poor and marginalised people, ultimately making this remedy less effective. 
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is also available in limited circumstances since it can only be granted to rectify 
unconstitutional texts, and does not promote broad participation. 
The limitations of the “traditional” constitutional remedies as discussed above 
confirms Sturm’s argument relating to the unsuitability of the traditional binary 
adversarial model of adjudication for public law violations.184 The next chapter will thus 
focus solely on the structural interdict remedy, which is a more recent and 
experimental remedy in South African constitutional law, in order to establish whether 
this remedy can constitute appropriate and effective relief in cases of systemic socio-
economic rights violations. 
 
                                            
184 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1377. 
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Chapter 4: The structural interdict 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter explored effective relief as a judicially recognised requirement 
for remedies in the specific context of socio-economic rights violations. It is clear from 
the earlier chapters of this study that isolated violations are relatively easy to remedy. 
However, systemic violations are difficult to remedy since it often involves the 
cooperation of various government departments and other actors. 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the apparent potential of the structural interdict 
remedy to constitute appropriate and effective relief in cases where socio-economic 
rights have been systemically violated. The first part of this chapter will discuss the 
nature and main characteristics of the structural interdict. The second part of this 
chapter will then analyse and evaluate case law dealing with systemic socio-economic 
rights violations in which structural interdict type remedies have been granted. The 
analysis and evaluation will be conducted with reference to the overarching norms for 
public law remedial processes as identified by Sturm and the factors which need to be 
considered during the remedial phase as discussed in chapter two.1 
 
4 2 Nature of the structural interdict 
 
4 2 1 Remedial powers of courts to grant structural interdicts 
 
The structural interdict as remedy in South African constitutional law was first 
foreshadowed in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security when the Court recognised 
that courts may have to design new remedies if there is no existing remedy which will 
adequately protect and vindicate the constitutionally entrenched rights.2 This led to the 
Court confirming its powers to grant such a remedy in Pretoria City Council v Walker, 
in which case the respondent refused to pay the City Council for rendered services, 
                                            
1 See chapter two part 2 3 where the evaluative framework for remedies in human rights cases 
is discussed. 
2 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19. 
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because they were allegedly unfairly discriminating against him.3 The respondent 
based these allegations on the fact that residents of “old Pretoria” (the former white 
areas) were levied higher rates for water and electricity than residents living in 
Mamelodi and Atteridgeville (former black areas).4 The Court found that there was 
indeed unfair discrimination.5 However, the Court stated that the respondent should 
not have taken the law into his own hands in an attempt to remedy the discrimination 
by not paying his municipal fees. Instead, he should have approached a court for an 
appropriate remedy. The Court envisioned that this appropriate remedy could 
potentially have taken the form of a mandamus compelling the City Council to 
eliminate the rights infringement and “to report back to the court” so as to inform the 
court of the steps taken and progress made in remedying the situation.6 The Court 
further stated that “further ancillary orders or directions” could be given if such a 
remedy is granted in order to ensure satisfactory compliance, thus indicating that 
courts have the remedial power to retain judicial supervision after a remedy has been 
granted.7 
The remedial powers of the courts to grant structural interdicts have been confirmed 
in various subsequent cases,8 most notably in the landmark case of Minister of Health 
v Treatment Action Campaign.9 The government argued in this case that the only 
appropriate remedy which the Court could grant was a declaratory order, stating that 
the separation of powers doctrine prevented the Court from making orders that would 
intrude on government’s policy terrain.10 The Court rejected this argument, stating: 
 
                                            
3 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) para 1. 
4 Para 6. The residents of “old Pretoria” were charged metered rates which were higher than 
the flat rates which residents in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville had to pay.  
5 Para 82. 
6 Para 96. 
7 Para 96.  
8 See for example August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC) para 42, Grootboom v 
Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C) para 23 and Sibiya v The Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Johannesburg 2005 5 SA 315 (CC) para 61. 
9 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). See chapter three part 3 2 1 2 where this case is discussed in order to 
illustrate the urgent nature of the underlying interests in socio-economic rights cases. 
10 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 97. 
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“South African courts have a wide range of powers at their disposal to ensure that the 
Constitution is upheld. These include mandatory and structural interdicts. How they should 
exercise those powers depends on the circumstances of each particular case. Here due 
regard must be paid to the roles of the legislature and the executive in a democracy. What 
must be made clear, however, is that when it is appropriate to do so, courts may – and if 
need be must – use their wide powers to make orders that affect policy as well as 
legislation.”11 
 
The Court further stated in this regard that its “primary duty… is to the Constitution 
and to the law” and that it must declare unconstitutional and subsequently remedy any 
State policy which is not congruent with the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”).12 The Court thus confirmed its wide remedial powers to 
grant effective relief.13 The Court closed its remedial discussion by explicitly confirming 
that its wide remedial powers set out above includes the power to grant a structural 
interdict, stating that it must grant such a remedy if necessary to “secure compliance” 
with its order.14 The Court concluded that this was not such a case, since compliance 
on the part of government was expected.15 
 
4 2 2 Defining structural interdicts 
 
A structural interdict type remedy consists, in part, of interdictory relief.16 The 
relevant party will thus be instructed by the court to either carry out a positive act or 
refrain from doing something in order to end the violation as established in the liability 
stage of adjudication. Such an order will often contain timeframes within which certain 
steps must be taken.17 However, this interdictory relief must be complied with under 
                                            
11 Para 113. 
12 Para 99. 
13 Para 101. 
14 Para 129.  
15 Para 129. 
16 See chapter three part 3 3 2 for a discussion of the different types of interdicts in South 
African law and their potential to constitute effective relief in cases dealing with systemic socio-
economic rights infringements. 
17 N Swanepoel “Die Aanwending van die Gestruktureerde Interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Konstitusionele Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige Beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 LitNet Akademies 
374 378. 
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court supervision in order for the remedy to amount to a structural interdict.18 In other 
words, compliance with the remedy will be subject to judicial review if the remedy is 
granted in the form of a structural interdict. Courts can also issue “periodic directions” 
as the case will remain under court supervision.19 The court will continue to approve 
interim steps and issue directions, as necessary, until the constitutional infringement 
is effectively remedied.20 This remedy thus “provides for an ongoing regime of 
performance” which means that the court will stay involved in the case until it is 
satisfied that the constitutional infringement has been rectified.21 The aim of the 
structural interdict is thus not solely deterrence, as is the case with most other 
constitutional remedies, but rather to remedy structural violations by focusing on 
changes that need to be effected in institutional or organisational design and 
functioning.22 The structural interdict therefore “seeks to adjust future behaviour and 
is deliberately fashioned rather than logically deduced from the nature of the legal 
harm suffered”.23  
It is important to differentiate between a “reporting order” and a “structural interdict” 
as the two are not identical, even though these terms are often used interchangeably 
in academic literature. A “reporting order” is an order coupled with some form of other 
relief granted by a court which requires the respondent to report back to the court and 
all other parties to the litigation on the progress of the implementation of the relief. A 
structural interdict will normally contain a reporting back element, but the court will also 
supervise the implementation of the remedy and give further directions if necessary to 
ensure the effective vindication of the constitutional right.24 Judicial approval of the 
                                            
18 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 199. 
19 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 424. 
20 424. 
21 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 176. 
22 176. This is not to say that deterrence is not one of the purposes of this remedy, but it is 
certainly not the primary purpose. See I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed 
(2013) 181 for an in-depth discussion of the purpose of constitutional remedies. 
23 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive justice (2009) 176. 
24 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 424. 
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remedy and implementation thereof is thus a key difference between a reporting order 
and a structural interdict. The court is thus a participant in the structural interdict type 
remedy and not merely an observer. 
 
4 2 3 Unique features of the structural interdict 
 
The first feature that makes the structural interdict type remedy unique is its 
flexibility.25 Systemic socio-economic rights cases are often complex and polycentric 
in nature.26 It is not always possible to predict all possible consequences and factors 
that might arise but which were not considered or even present when the remedy was 
initially designed.27 The form of this remedy allows for judicial adaption to 
accommodate changed circumstances.28 
Mbazira argues that the initial structural interdict in a case is often vague as to how 
the rights infringement must be rectified.29 This allows the court to give the executive 
or legislative branch of government an opportunity to decide how best to remedy the 
systemic rights infringement in the first instance.30 The court can then alter the 
structural interdict at a later stage if compliance with the initial design is not satisfactory 
and it is thus quite possible for the initial design and the final design of the remedy to 
                                            
25 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 180. 
26 See chapter five part 5 2 3 for a discussion on polycentricity. 
27 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 180. These changing factors can include the inadequacy of the 
respondents’ plans to remedy the systemic rights infringement, increasing recalcitrance on the 
respondents’ part, or urgency caused by the threat of irreparable harm. 
28 See chapter five part 5 3 for a discussion of the different models of structural interdict type 
remedies. 
29 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 180. See also K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and 
Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 
334. 
30 This approach helps to alleviate separation of powers, democratic legitimacy and 
institutional capacity concerns. See chapter five part 5 2 for a discussion of these concerns. 
This gradual approach to remedying a violation, which is possible due to the flexibility of the 
structural interdict, might not be appropriate in cases where the underlying interests of the 
right are very urgent. Such urgent cases might warrant immediate relief. See part 4 3 3 below 
where this is discussed in more detail. 
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differ significantly.31 The flexibility of the structural interdict thus makes it possible for 
a court to revise its remedy. Michelman explains this revisability within the context of 
democratic experimentalism: 
 
“As the discursive benchmarking moves along and the emerging answers gain public 
recognition and authorization, the court might turn up the heat on deployment of its powers 
of review. At a relatively early stage, what the court presumes to dictate will be agendas of 
questions to be addressed and answered by one or another stakeholder group or class. At 
later stages, the court starts calling for substantive compliance with the emergent best-
practice standards, in the name of the constitutional right (say) to access to healthcare 
services. The screws tighten on what can count as cogent or ‘reasonable.’ The court serves 
as arbiter but it never has or claims a door-closing last word.”32 
 
The second feature that sets the structural interdict apart from other constitutional 
remedies is the retention of supervision by the court.33 This feature means that the 
structural interdict can potentially be effective in ensuring compliance in cases of 
systemic rights infringements as the applicants can approach the court without 
instituting new proceedings if they believe that the initial order is not being complied 
with.34 However, supervisory jurisdiction could also be beneficial to the respondents 
as they can without difficulty approach the court on the same papers if they seek clarity 
on what the initial order entails.35 
These two features, namely flexibility and retention of supervision, are dependent 
on each other. The flexibility of structural interdicts allows courts to gradually change 
its remedy to accommodate changing circumstances. Supervisory jurisdiction, on the 
other hand, allows the court to make sure that there is satisfactory compliance with 
                                            
31 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 180. 
32 F I Michelman “Constitutionally Binding Social and Economic Rights as a Compelling Idea: 
Reciprocating Perturbations in Liberal and Democratic Constitutional Visions” in H A García, 
K Klare & L A Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice (2015) 277 
288-289. See also O Fiss The Civil Rights Injunction (1978) 36 and S van der Berg A 
Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation Decisions Impacting on 
Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2015) 320-321. 
33 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 181. 
34 181. 
35 181. 
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this remedy, and to amend its directions as circumstances change. These two features 
give courts the capacity to respond to polycentric, unforeseen consequences as they 
arise, thus contributing to the efficacy of structural interdicts in cases dealing with 
systemic socio-economic rights violations.36  
 
4 3 Structural interdicts as appropriate and effective relief for systemic socio-
economic rights violations 
 
Budlender argues that systemic rights violations cannot be effectively remedied 
overnight.37 There is no quick and simple solution to these issues. He suggests that 
systemic rights violations should be addressed in a systemic manner that allows for 
“proper interaction between the government, civil society and the courts”.38 The 
structural interdict has the potential to meet these criteria as suggested by Budlender 
because of its peculiar nature and features.39 
Roach and Budlender identify three different circumstances under which structural 
interdicts will constitute appropriate and effective relief for systemic violations. These 
circumstances will often overlap with each other since systemic violations are complex 
and often not the result of one single identifiable cause. The three main circumstances 
                                            
36 S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation 
Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 303-304. See also C F Sabel & W H Simon “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 117 Harv LR 1016 1080 where the authors state: 
“Just as the court’s liability determination destabilizes relations and practices within the 
defendant institution, so does it ramify to other institutions and practices. These 
ramifications, and their monitored feedback on the institutions in the case, are the web 
effect. The web effect makes it possible to address sequentially - in a sequence determined 
in the course of problem-solving itself - reforms too complex to be addressed whole. This 
effect is polycentricity viewed as an aid, not an obstacle, to problem solving.” 
37 G Budlender “The Role of the Courts in Achieving the Transformative Potential of Socio-
Economic Rights” (2007) 8 ESR Review 9 11. 
38 11. See chapter three part 3 2 2 2 for a discussion of systemic socio-economic rights 
violations. 
39 Swanepoel argues that structural interdict remedies are especially effective in cases where 
rights have been systemically violated. N Swanepoel “Die Aanwending van die 
Gestruktureerde Interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Konstitusionele Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige 
Beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 LitNet Akademies 374 387. See also M du Plessis, G Penfold & 
J Brickhill Constitutional Litigation (2013) 124. 
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under which structural interdicts will constitute appropriate and effective relief in cases 
dealing with the systemic violation of socio-economic rights are cases of government 
intransigence, government incompetence, and lastly cases with possible grave 
consequences.40 This section will analyse and evaluate jurisprudence that has been 
identified to best illustrate these different circumstances. Much development with 
regard to structural interdicts has taken place at the High Court level and this section 
will thus make use of the best illustrative examples from both the High Court and the 
Constitutional Court. This analysis will be done according to the factors which must be 
considered by courts when determining what the most effective relief will be in the 
circumstances, as developed in chapter two, and with reference to Sturm’s 
overarching norms for public law remedies.41 
 
4 3 1 Government intransigence 
 
The first scenario in which a structural interdict will constitute appropriate and 
effective relief is when the constitutional violation occurred because of an intransigent 
government.42 Roach and Budlender argue that the most prominent challenge for the 
implementation of court orders in cases dealing with systemic violations is government 
officials who are purposefully not complying with their constitutional obligations and 
who are thus unlikely to comply with a court order directing them to do so.43 Courts 
                                            
40 This is not a closed list. See K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory 
Jurisdiction: When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 345 where the 
authors state that they identify only “some [of the] guidelines and principles” for determining 
when structural interdicts will be appropriate (emphasis added). 
41 The factors for choosing effective relief as developed in chapter two are: the nature of the 
right and the nature of the violation; balancing of diverse interest; the reason for the 
infringement; practicability of the remedy and the deterrent effect of the remedy. See chapter 
two part 2 3 1 above for a discussion on the overarching norms for public law remedies as 
identified by Sturm. 
42 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 350. 
43 350. See Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 58 
where the Court criticises the conduct of the Minister of Social Development, stating that her 
conduct contributed to the “continued recalcitrance” in the SASSA saga. The SASSA saga 
refers to the crisis in South Africa’s social security administration which arose after a contract 
for the administration of social grants were awarded to Allpay based on a constitutionally 
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will, on the other hand, generally not consider structural interdicts as appropriate if 
there is reason to believe that government will in fact comply with the court order.44  
 
4 3 1 1 Rudolph 
 
4 3 1 1 1 Analysis 
 
City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph (“Rudolph”)45 serves as an illustration of where 
government intransigence led to the systemic violation of the right to housing. This 
case concerned the eviction of a group of illegal occupiers who were in desperate 
need. The group started occupying a public park in the Valhalla Park area in 2001. 
The occupiers found themselves in horrendous living conditions where they were living 
in overcrowded houses, backyards, car wrecks and even schools.46  
The High Court in the Rudolph case ultimately granted a structural interdict in the 
form of a report-back-to-court model, ordering the City to comply with its constitutional 
obligations as declared in the order and to report back to the Court on the progress 
made in this regard.47 Final judgment was given after the City submitted a total of four 
reports. The Court stated that there was still no satisfactory compliance by the City 
with its constitutional obligations.48 However, the Court went further, stating that it was 
                                            
invalid tender process. Non-compliance with the relief granted in Allpay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security 
Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) led to further litigation which were aimed at preventing the 
crises from fully unfolding. See part 4 3 3 2 below where this crisis is critically analysed. 
44 See the Constitutional Court’s judgments in both Minster of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) and Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 
2005 2 SA 359 (CC) where the Court refused to grant structural interdict remedies since there 
was no reason to believe that the government would not comply with its duties in the respective 
cases. See also part 4 3 3 below in this chapter for a discussion of one of the exceptions to 
this rule. 
45 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C). 
46 Para 13. 
47 Para 218. The Court declared that the City’s housing policy was unconstitutional as it did 
not make provision for people who “are in a crisis or in a desperate situation” and that the 
housing allocation process did not take the relevant factors into consideration. See chapter 
five part 5 3 1 where the report-back-to-court model of the structural interdict is discussed. 
48 City of Cape Town v Rudolph WC 01-12-2005 case no 8970/01 para 35. 
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satisfied that the City now understood and acknowledged its obligations and that a 
further structural interdict would thus not be appropriate. There was evidence that the 
City had made progress in providing help to people in desperate circumstances.49 The 
Court granted a declaratory order declaring that the City had not complied with its 
constitutional obligations as set out in the initial order.50 This order was deemed 
appropriate by the Court since the City no longer sought an eviction order and the 
immediate crisis situation was thus circumvented.51 In crafting its initial order, the Court 
considered several factors in deciding which remedy would be most appropriate and 
effective in the circumstances: 
 
(a) Nature of the right and nature of the infringement 
 
The Court considered the nature of the infringed right since a remedy “must be 
chosen for its ability to protect the constitutional right”.52 The Court went on to say that 
this remedy must also be designed to “meet the nature of the infringement”.53 The 
Court stated in this regard that a mere declaratory order would not be effective, 
referring to the Constitutional Court’s remedy in Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom (“Grootboom”).54 Grootboom dealt with similar housing issues in 
the Western Cape and the government was ordered to develop a progressive housing 
plan which would include people living in crisis situations.55 Rudolph is a result of the 
failure by government to develop such a plan timeously.56 The Court stated that one 
must consider the factual context of a case when deciding what the most effective 
                                            
49 Para 41. 
50 Para 42. 
51 Para 40. 
52 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 202. This is congruent 
with the factors considered by the Constitutional Court in Minster of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106. 
53 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 202. 
54 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC). 
55 Para 99. 
56 See City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 151 where the Court 
stated that the issue in this case was whether the government “has complied with its 
constitutional duties as declared by the Constitutional Court” in Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC). 
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remedy would be. The factual context in Rudolph suggested that the right to housing 
had been systematically violated in the Cape Town metropole. The Court referred in 
this regard to the continuous infringement of the right to housing and the substantial 
back log faced by the Department in terms of providing houses. The Court drew this 
conclusion after considering the nature of the right of access to adequate housing 
enshrined in section 26 of the Constitution and the positive obligations relating to it.57 
The Court also referred to the applicable standard of review and stated that the 
Constitutional Court had already found the State’s policy with regard to emergency 
housing to be unreasonable. The Court further noted that it was clear that not much 
had been done to implement the Constitutional Court’s remedy and that the State was 
thus still not complying with its positive obligations, despite being aware of what these 
entailed.58 The Court held that a stronger and more managerial remedy was needed 
to remedy this systemic problem and thus opted for the structural interdict.59 
 
(b) Balancing diverse interests 
 
The Court balanced a diverse set of interests in the judgment.60 The Court 
considered the interests of the victims with reference to the purpose of The Prevention 
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”). The 
Court stated in this regard that “PIE mandates the courts to ensure that justice and 
equity prevail” and that there is a constitutional mandate to protect occupiers.61 Great 
emphasis was placed on the interest of the marginalised and vulnerable occupiers in 
not being left homeless.62 However, the Court also considered the interests of 
                                            
57 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 145–150. 
58 Para 176. 
59 Para 206. 
60 See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 above for a discussion on the balancing of diverse interests as 
a factor which needs to be considered when designing effective relief and chapter three part 
3 2 3 where this is discussed within the specific context of socio-economic rights violations. 
61 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) paras 98–102. 
62 The Court, in considering the interest of the victims, discussed the circumstances of the 
victims and how they were living in intolerable conditions. These terrible conditions 
exacerbated the need for their rights to be vindicated. See paras 153–170 in this regard. It is 
important to note that the balancing process was conducted by the Court during the liability 
stage of adjudication. However, the balancing enquiry exerted significant influence on the 
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government. The Court stated that a lack of funds had an inhibitory effect on the ability 
of the government to provide housing. In balancing this interest against the interest of 
the victims, the Court concluded that the lack of funds and consequential housing 
shortage made the need for “emergency provisions” much greater.63 
 
(c)  Reason for the rights violation 
 
The Court also considered the reason for the rights violations in deciding on the 
structural interdict as the most appropriate and effective relief in this specific case.64 
The Court observed that the State in this case was denying its responsibility towards 
people who found themselves in a desperate situation due to having nowhere to live, 
despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Grootboom.65 The Court concluded that 
the State had disregarded its constitutional obligations.66 This was thus not a case of 
mere inattentiveness, since the applicant had already been made aware of its 
obligations. Such continued non-compliance with constitutional obligations point 
                                            
remedial enquiry, as is evident from the Court’s statement that “the factual context of the case”, 
which was discussed at length during the liability stage, would determine what the most 
effective relief would be (para 202). This is congruent with Sturm‘s argument that “the liability 
norm… bears profoundly on the scope of the remedial enterprise”. S P Sturm “A Normative 
Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1365. See also C F Sabel & W H 
Simon “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 117 Harv LR 1015 
1054 where the authors discuss the relationship between the liability phase and the remedial 
phase. They contend that the liability stage indicates only what the “broadest goals” of the 
remedy must be, but that it does have “implications for the specific forms” of the relief. 
63 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 180. 
64 See chapter two part 2 3 2 3 above for a discussion on why rights are violated and how this 
is an important factor to consider when designing a remedy. 
65 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 172. This observation 
was based on a statement by the applicant’s Head of Housing which stated that none of the 
respondents were “persons in crises”. The Court further stated (para 189) that the State did 
not only acknowledge the fact that it did not fulfil its constitutional obligations with regard to 
people in desperate situations, but that it also “does not intend to do so.” 
66 Para 206. 
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toward a recalcitrant attitude.67 Government intransigence was thus an overriding 
factor in the Court’s decision to grant a reporting-back structural interdict.  
 
(d) Practicability of the remedy 
 
The Court further considered the practicability of the remedy during the design 
phase.68 The Court decided to grant the government four months to comply with the 
order (which included the filing of a report). The Court also decided that the 
government would need a month to reply to the respondents’ comments on the report, 
stating that the “[a]pplicant is a very large institution with many departments” which 
would have to have an input in order to remedy the violation effectively.69 The Court 
was thus cautious of providing government with unrealistic timeframes as this might 
have rendered the remedy ineffective.70 
 
4 3 1 1 2 Evaluation 
 
(a) Consideration of factors in designing effective relief 
 
The remedy granted in Rudolph can largely be regarded as an effective remedy. 
The Court considered many of the factors outlined in chapter two in determining which 
remedy would be most appropriate. The Court considered both the nature of the right 
and the nature of the infringement. The consideration of this factor led to the Court 
deciding that a strong form of remedy like the structural interdict was needed to provide 
                                            
67 The Court condemned the government’s attitude, stating (para 180) that it “has displayed 
and continues to display, an unacceptable disregard for the order of the Constitutional Court 
– and therefore for the Constitution itself.” 
68 The Western Cape High Court also considered the remedial practicability in the earlier 
judgment of Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C) para 58. The Court 
stated in this regard that the remedy should not be too vague as the respondents will then not 
know what is expected of them in order to rectify the violated right. 
69 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) paras 208–209. 
70 See chapter two part 2 3 2 4 above for a discussion of practicability as a factor that should 
be considered when choosing and designing a remedy. 
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effective relief to the litigants.71 The Court also paid attention to the practical concerns 
which contributed to the remedy’s efficacy. 
It is clear that the Court allowed diverse interests to enter the enquiry since it 
considered the interests of both the applicants and the respondents. However, the 
Court neglected to consider the interest of other parties who might have been in a 
position to impede the implementation of the remedy, such as other levels of 
government and residents of the Valhalla Park suburb who were not parties before the 
Court.72 The Court should thus have allowed for more participation during the remedial 
phase of adjudication.  
 
(b) Norms for public law remedies 
 
The consideration of multiple factors by the Court suggests that Sturm’s 
requirement for reasoned decision making was indeed met in this case.73 Furthermore, 
the Court explicitly justified why a structural interdict was more appropriate than other 
available constitutional remedies.74 The norm of respect for the separation of powers 
doctrine was also observed in the judgment. The Court, although granting a strong 
remedy, merely set the normative parameters of the remedy. It held that the State 
                                            
71 The recalcitrant attitude of the government in this case was also a contributing factor which 
led to the strong managerial remedy to be granted. See City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 
2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 207. 
72 Sturm argues that the interests of all parties who can affect the implementation of the 
remedy should be considered. S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” 
(1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1365, see chapter two part 2 3 2 2 where this is discussed as a factor 
in human rights cases and chapter three part 3 2 3 where balancing of diverse interests is 
discussed in the specific context of socio-economic rights cases. Not allowing sufficiently 
diverse interests to enter the remedial enquiry is one of the weaknesses of the report-back-to-
court model, see chapter five part 5 3 1. 
73 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
See also chapter two part 2 3 1 4. 
74 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 206. See also S 
Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in Education Rights Disputes” 
(2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 7 where the author explains what reasoned 
decision making entails.  
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must comply with its constitutional obligations as set out in the judgment, but did not 
instruct the State on how this should be done.75 
The norm of remediation was not satisfactorily met in this case.76 The fact that the 
Court ultimately granted an order declaring that the State had still not complied with 
its constitutional obligations indicates that the rights violation was not sufficiently 
remedied. However, the structural interdict was successful in eliminating the reason 
for the rights violation, since the Court stated that the continued lack of compliance by 
the City could not be ascribed to “incompetence, inattentiveness or intransigence” 
anymore.77 The Court could potentially have incorporated a bigger participatory 
component into the remedial phase of the adjudication aimed at addressing the 
broader issue of systemic housing shortages with an interim order aimed at addressing 
the narrow emergency housing issue. The Court could then have joined other 
stakeholders to the litigation such as provincial and national government departments 
which would have ensured that the participation was diverse.78 Such an approach 
                                            
75 City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C) para 218. The Court stated 
that the State must report to the Court on “what steps it has taken to comply with its 
constitutional and statutory obligations”. 
76 One of the weaknesses of the report-back-to-court model for structural interdicts is that the 
remediation norm is often not satisfied. See chapter five part 5 3 1 in this regard. 
77 City of Cape Town v Rudolph WC 01-12-2005 case no 8970/01 para 40. 
78 Sturm argues that courts must identify stakeholders whose assistance is needed for the 
formulation of an effective remedy and invite them to “join in the formulation of the remedy.” S 
P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1429. Joinder 
of parties under South African law is regulated in terms of the Uniform Rules of the High Court 
GN R315 in GG 19834 of 12-03-1999 as amended by GN R678 in GG 40045 of 3-06-2016 
and the Constitutional Court Rules GN R1675 in GG 25726 of 31-10-2003. The Relevant rules 
are rule 10 and rule 5, respectively. It is important to note that these rules do not specifically 
provide for the joinder of parties to the remedial phase of adjudication. However, the remedial 
powers of courts in cases where constitutionally entrenched rights have been violated in terms 
of ss38 and 172(1)(b) are wide enough to allow for this if the participation of these parties are 
needed for an effective remedy to be designed. See Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) in which parties were joined in order to secure 
effective implementation of a previous order and part 4 3 1 2 below where this case is 
discussed. See also the in-depth discussion of joinder in G Muller The Impact of Section 26 of 
the Constitution on the Eviction of Squatters in South African Law LLD dissertation, 
Stellenbosch University (2011) 231 and G Muller & S Liebenberg “Developing the Law of 
Joinder in the Context of Evictions of People from their Homes” (2013) 29 SAJHR 554. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
97 
 
could potentially have led to better adherence to the remediation norm as well as the 
alleviation of concerns traditionally associated with structural interdicts.79 
 
4 3 1 2 Pheko 
 
4 3 1 2 1 Analysis 
 
Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (“Pheko 1”) is another good example 
of where recalcitrance led to a socio-economic rights violation.80 This case concerned 
the lawfulness of the forcible removal of residents of the Bapsfontein Informal 
Settlement and the subsequent demolition of their homes.81 This followed after 
Bapsfontein was declared a disaster area in terms of section 55(1) of the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002 (“DMA”). This declaration was based on the dolomite 
instability in the area which led to the formation of various sporadic sinkholes, 
depressions and cracks. The municipality issued a directive in terms of the DMA 
instructing the residents to move to temporary shelters and warning them that they 
would be relocated in terms of the DMA if they resisted.82 The municipality argued that 
they could evacuate the residents without a court order. The residents believed that 
this would amount to an eviction and subsequently applied to the High Court for an 
urgent interdict against the municipality. The High Court dismissed their application. 
The residents accordingly sought leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court.83  
The Constitutional Court found that the forced “evacuation” of the Bapsfontein 
residents amounted to an eviction since it was not authorised by the DMA.84 The Court 
furthermore found that the residents’ right not to be evicted or have their homes 
demolished as contained in section 26(3) of the Constitution was violated.85 The Court 
                                            
79 See chapter five part 5 4 1 where participation during the remedial phase of adjudication is 
discussed as a mitigating factor. 
80 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC). 
81 Para 3. 
82 Para 11. 
83 See Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (5394/11) ZAGPPHC 130 (11 March 
2011) for the High Court judgment. 
84 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 45 
85 Para 45. 
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decided that the most appropriate and effective relief in the circumstances would be a 
structural interdict to ensure compliance with the positive obligations relating to the 
provision of alternative accommodation imposed by the order.86 
However, non-compliance led to contempt of court proceedings in Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (“Pheko 2”).87 Neither the municipality nor 
its lawyer was found to be in contempt since the crucial elements of wilfulness and 
mala fides were not present. The Court, despite this finding, stated that the 
municipality’s explanation for not complying with its obligations flowing from the 
structural relief granted in Pheko 1 was inadequate and that it was still in breach of its 
constitutional obligations.88 The Court furthermore ordered the Municipality’s Mayor, 
Manager, Head of Department for Human Settlements as well as the Member of the 
Executive Council for the Gauteng Department for Human Settlements (“MEC”) to be 
joined to the case in order to ensure that the structural interdict as granted in Pheko 1 
was complied with.89  
The third judgment, Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (“Pheko 
3”),90 followed after numerous reports were filed by both the applicants and the 
respondents which gave rise to factual disputes. The Court decided to discharge its 
supervisory jurisdiction and to refer the matter back to the High Court, which was 
deemed better placed than the Constitutional Court to supervise the relocation 
process.91  
These three judgments must be viewed as one concerted effort by the Court to bring 
relief to the former residents of Bapsfontein and will thus be analysed simultaneously. 
The Court considered various factors over the course of these three judgments in 
designing the most effective relief in the circumstances. 
  
                                            
86 Para 53. 
87 2015 ZACC 10 (CC). 
88 Para 43. 
89 Para 68. 
90 2016 10 BCLR 1308 (CC). 
91 Para 36. 
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(a) Nature of the right and nature of the infringement 
 
The Court stated in Pheko 1 that two rights were implicated in this case. First, the 
Court stated that any case involving alleged arbitrary evictions will necessarily 
implicate the section 26 right to have access to adequate housing.92 Secondly, the 
Court stated that the applicants’ right to have their dignity respected and protected as 
contained in section 10 of the Constitution was also implicated in this case.93 
The municipality argued that section 26(3) consists of two distinguished parts and 
that evictions authorised by legislation can take place without a court order as long as 
it is not arbitrary.94 The Court found that this is not the case and stated that section 
26(3) must be read as a whole and thus concluded that no legislation may allow for an 
eviction to take place without a court order.95 The Court continued, stating that section 
55(2)(d) of the DMA which provides for the “evacuation to temporary shelters” of 
people in a disaster area, must be interpreted narrowly since a wide construction could 
potentially lead to the violation of the rights contained in section 26 of the 
Constitution.96  
The Court also considered the positive obligation implicated in this case which 
requires the State to provide suitable temporary accommodation to the applicants 
which are in the immediate vicinity of Bapsfontein and with no less amenities than 
what was initially provided.97 The Court went further, stating that the positive obligation 
includes the obligation to “identify and designate land for housing development for the 
applicants”.98 The consideration of these positive obligations contributed to the 
appropriateness of the structural interdict since this remedy aims to prevent non-
compliance with positive obligations imposed by a court order.99 
  
                                            
92 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 28. 
93 Para 28. 
94 Para 21. 
95 Para 35. 
96 Para 37. 
97 Para 49. 
98 Para 50. The Court referred in this regard to s9(1) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 which 
was promulgated to give effect to s26 of the Constitution. 
99 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 10 BCLR 1308 (CC) para 1. 
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(b) Balancing diverse interests 
 
The Court considered interests of both the applicants and the respondent in this 
case. It is clear from the Court’s reasoning in Pheko 1 that it did implicitly consider the 
interests of the municipality in designing the structural interdict. This is firstly evident 
from the fact that the Court did not, as part of the remedy, order the municipality to 
restore the occupiers’ homes in the Bapsfontein Informal Settlement, thus giving effect 
to the municipality’s interest in ensuring the health and safety of its residents.100 The 
Court thus accepted the fact that the area was too dangerous for mass housing and 
instead ordered the municipality to relocate the community to alternative land.101  
The Court furthermore implicitly gave effect to the municipality’s interest to organise 
its own affairs by not ordering it to move the applicants to the specific land which had 
been identified in the consulting geologists’ report as suitable for housing.102 This is 
implicit form the order which states that the municipality must meaningfully engage 
with the applicants with regard to the identification of suitable land.103 
The Court also considered the applicants’ interest in receiving relief that is 
effective.104 This is firstly evident from the fact that the Court ordered the applicants to 
be provided with the same standard of amenities as what they were originally provided 
with.105 This is furthermore evident from the strong remedy granted by the Court which 
required the municipality to report back to the Court on the progress made in relocating 
the applicants. This judicial oversight contributed to the remedy’s efficacy since the 
Court was in a position to counter any recalcitrance and unnecessary delays by the 
municipality. This interest was again considered in Pheko 2 when the Court stated that 
compliance with court orders are in the interest of successful litigants and the broader 
                                            
100 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 1. 
101 Para 6 
102 Para 7. 
103 Para 53. 
104 See para 50 where the Court stated that “[t]he applicants are entitled to effective relief.” 
105 Para 49. 
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public.106 The Court accordingly, of its own accord, instituted contempt of court 
proceedings after there was non-compliance with its order in Pheko 1.107 
The Court furthermore considered the interests of the whole community to have 
governmental officials who “act diligently and expeditiously”.108 This consideration, 
together with the interest of the applicants to have their rights vindicated, formed part 
of the Court’s reasoning to join certain State functionaries to the proceedings in Pheko 
2. It stated in this regard that these functionaries are there to serve the interests of the 
community.109  
 
(c) Reason for the rights violation 
 
The judgment in Pheko 1 and the subsequent strong remedy suggests that the 
Court regarded the municipality as recalcitrant. Section 55(2)(d) of the DMA authorises 
“the evacuation to temporary shelters” of people in disaster areas if it “is necessary for 
the preservation of life”. The Court held that the municipality went significantly beyond 
what the DMA envisions an evacuation to be since it demolished the residents’ homes 
and indefinitely relocated them to a faraway area.110 The Court also noted the lack of 
urgency in this case which furthermore indicates that this was not an emergency 
evacuation as envisioned by the DMA. The Court referred in this regard to the history 
of Bapsfontein and the fact that it has been identified as a dangerous area as early as 
the 1980’s. It stated that “the facts do not suggest that there was any need for urgent 
                                            
106 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 2. See 
also para 27 where the Court stated that non-compliance with court orders by State parties 
negatively impacts the interests of the people they are supposed to serve and para 53 where 
the Court acknowledges the harm caused to the applicants due to the delay by the municipality 
to comply with the order granted in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 
388 (CC). 
107 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 2. 
108 Para 64.  
109 Para 63. 
110 Para 40. 
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evacuation at all” and that the action taken by the municipality in this case was 
completely unwarranted and unlawful.111 
One can conclude from the disconnect between the municipality’s actions and what 
is authorised by the DMA that the municipality attempted to circumvent its obligations 
which would arise in normal eviction proceedings by relying on the DMA.112 Such a 
circumvention of constitutional obligations would amount to recalcitrance. 
The recalcitrant attitude of the municipality is further evident from the fact that the 
applicants informed the municipality prior to the forced removal that its “evacuation” 
plans would amount to an unlawful eviction.113 Concluding that the municipality was 
recalcitrant is thus fair, since it had been informed of its obligations. 
 
(d) Practicability of the remedy 
 
The Court did, albeit not explicitly, consider the practicability of the remedy in Pheko 
1. The Court took note of the fact that identifying land which is suitable for mass 
housing within the immediate vicinity of Bapsfontein could be a lengthy and contested 
process.114 It is exactly circumstances like this where the practical nature of the 
structural interdict becomes apparent. Structural interdicts are, as discussed above, 
flexible in nature.115 This allowed the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in 
an attempt to ensure that the relocation process was dealt with expeditiously and 
effectively and to give further directions if needed. 
                                            
111 Para 41. See also para 42 where the Court states that the municipality’s powers in terms 
of the DMA may only be used “to the extent that it is strictly necessary” and not for “purposes 
other than evacuation.” 
112 S26(3) of the Constitution states that evictions can only take place if there is a court order 
to that effect which has been granted after consideration of all relevant circumstances. See S 
Viljoen “The Systemic Violation of Section 26(1): An Appeal for Structural Relief by the 
Judiciary” (2015) 30 SAPL 42 52 where the author argues that the State attempted to 
circumvent s26(3) of the Constitution and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 by relying on the DMA, thus indicating that the State was 
recalcitrant in complying with its obligations. See also G Muller “Evicting Unlawful Occupiers 
for Health and Safety Reasons in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2015) 132 SALJ 616 638 
where the author makes a similar point.  
113 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 9. 
114 Para 50. 
115 See part 4 2 above where the nature of the structural interdict remedy is discussed. 
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The Court again took practicability concerns into account in Pheko 2 when it 
considered whether certain State functionaries should be joined to the proceedings. It 
stated in this regard that the Mayor and Municipal Manager should be joined since 
they already had “[c]onstitutional and statutory obligations in relation to the supervisory 
orders of Pheko 1”.116 The Court similarly argued that the MEC should be joined since 
he has a statutory obligation to assist the municipality with the provision of adequate 
housing.117 Joining these parties to the proceedings was a practical way of making the 
structural interdict as granted in Pheko 1 more effective since the State functionaries 
responsible for overseeing the implementation thereof were now directly involved and 
accountable to the Court. 
Practical considerations also played a significant role in Pheko 3. The Court took 
practicability considerations into account in both deciding whether referral is 
appropriate and in deciding on the terms of the referral. The applicants approached 
the Court for an order referring the matter back to the High Court because of the 
“factual and technical disputes which have arisen” over the course of the case.118 The 
Court stated in this regard that issues raised by the various expert reports “are 
incapable of being resolved” by the Constitutional Court.119 The Court concluded that 
the High Court was better placed to deal with these disputes. 
The municipality suggested, with regard to the terms of referral, that the Court 
should order that all affidavits regarding the factual disputes be filed in the High Court, 
but that it retains jurisdiction over the case. The Constitutional Court stated that such 
a bifurcated supervisory order would not be practical since the Court would run the 
risk of getting “enmeshed in disputes... that are best suited to be determined by the 
High Court”.120 Practical considerations thus contributed to the Court discharging its 
supervisory jurisdiction completely and referring the matter back to the High Court.121 
  
                                            
116 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 59. 
117 Para 60. The Court referred in this regard to s7 of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
118 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 10 BCLR 1308 (CC) para 16. 
119 Para 36. 
120 Para 29. 
121 The Court did not, however, discharge the declaratory component of the order (para 26). 
See part 4 3 1 2 1 (e) below where this is discussed. 
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(e) Deterrent effect of the remedy 
 
The Court stated in Pheko 2 that the negligent conduct of the attorney relating to 
him not informing the Court or the municipality of his change of address led to the 
“extensive delay [which] has already caused [harm] to the applicants”.122 The Court 
ordered him to pay costs de bonis propriis.123 This penalty against the lawyer will deter 
other officers of the court from acting negligently or unreasonably, especially if the 
conduct can negatively impact on the rights of others.124  
The cost orders awarded against the municipality in Pheko 2 and Pheko 3 also 
served a deterrent effect since it might deter municipalities from unlawfully evicting 
people in terms of health and safety legislation in future.125 It can furthermore 
encourage municipalities to comply with positive obligations imposed on them by 
structural court orders timeously since failure to do so can lead to massive cost orders 
in later judgments. 
The refusal of the Court in Pheko 3 to discharge the declaratory component of its 
order as granted in Pheko 1 also served a deterrent effect.126 The declaratory order 
makes it clear that the permanent removal of residents from their homes according to 
health and safety legislation will amount to an unlawful eviction. Municipalities are thus 
now aware that a court order is needed for such “evacuations”. 
 
4 3 1 2 2 Evaluation 
 
(a) Consideration of factors in designing effective relief 
 
The relief as granted in this series of judgments can be regarded as having been 
effective. The Court considered, albeit not explicitly, all of the factors that are relevant 
                                            
122 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 53. 
123 Para 68. 
124 Para 51. 
125 The municipality and its lawyer were ordered to each pay 50% of the applicants’ costs in 
Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). The cost order 
awarded against the municipality in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 
10 BCLR 1308 (CC) para 42 was more adverse since the municipality had to pay the 
applicants’ costs, including the costs of two counsel and the expert fees. 
126 Para 26. 
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to the remedial enquiry over the course of the three judgments. The revisability allowed 
for by structural interdicts allowed the Court to consider different factors over the 
course of the litigation and to amend its order accordingly. This is evident from the 
ultimate discharge by the Court of its structural interdict order after it concluded, based 
on the consideration of relevant factors, that it was not the most effective relief under 
the circumstances anymore.  
 
(b) Norms for public law remedies 
 
The relief granted in this case can furthermore be regarded as effective since all of 
the norms for public law remedies were adhered to. The norm of participation was met 
in this case since the Court allowed the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South 
Africa to be admitted as an amicus curiae and stated that their submissions had been 
“most helpful”.127 The Court furthermore ordered the parties to meaningfully engage 
with each other with regard to the identification of land for the alternative 
accommodation.128 However, more diverse participation during the remedial design 
phase could potentially have resulted in more expeditious compliance with the positive 
obligations imposed by the order. This could have been achieved if the court invited 
all potential stakeholders such as the relevant provincial and national government 
departments to also participate in the design phase. Such course of action could also 
potentially have avoided the need for Pheko 2 in which multiple stakeholders were 
joined to the proceedings in an attempt to secure compliance.129 
The Court also adhered to the norms of respect for the separation of powers 
doctrine and judicial impartiality. This is evident from the remedy which only gave the 
broad requirements for the alternative accommodation, thus not encroaching on the 
municipality’s terrain.130 The Court again adhered to the separation of powers doctrine 
in Pheko 2 when it considered whether certain State functionaries should be joined to 
the proceedings. The Court carefully considered the role of each functionary and their 
                                            
127 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 4. 
128 Para 53. 
129 See part 4 3 1 1 2 (b) above in which the joinder of stakeholders to the remedial phase of 
adjudication is discussed in the context of City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 2003 11 BCLR 
1236 (C). 
130 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC) para 50. 
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statutory and constitutional obligations.131 The Court did this in order to not unduly 
impose obligations on these parties, thus adhering to the separation of powers 
doctrine. The Court also adhered to this norm in Pheko 3 when it considered its and 
the High Court’s own roles within the separation of powers doctrine. The Court 
concluded in this regard that there are certain functions which can be more 
appropriately dealt with by the High Court than the Constitutional Court.132 The Court’s 
impartiality is evident from the fact that the Court called for submissions from both the 
applicants and the respondent in Pheko 2 in order to ensure that it considered all 
possible arguments.133 
The Court only partially adhered to the reasoned decision making norm. The 
consideration and incorporation of the factors as discussed above are evidence of the 
Court’s adherence to this norm. However, the Court did not explicitly explain why the 
structural interdict as remedy was more appropriate than other constitutional 
remedies, as is required by this norm.134 
The norm of remediation was also only partially met in this case. It is important to 
note that the applicants organised themselves into two groups, namely the N12 
community and the Mayfield community. The participatory structural interdict as 
granted in this case led to successful negotiations between the municipality and the 
N12 community with regard to alternative accommodation.135 However, no agreement 
was reached between the municipality and the Mayfield community.136 The 
remediation norm was further negatively impacted by the many factual disputes which 
led to Pheko 3. These disputes further hindered the relocation processes of both 
communities. The referral of this case to the High Court is thus aimed at addressing 
the remediation norm since it is regarded as the appropriate forum to deal with these 
                                            
131 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 56-60. 
132 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 10 BCLR 1308 (CC) paras 34-
37. 
133 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 17. 
134 See chapter two part 2 3 1 4 where the norm of reasoned decision making and how this 
norm requires a court to consider why a specific remedy is more appropriate in the 
circumstances than other constitutional remedies, are discussed. 
135 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 8. 
136 Para 8. See chapter five part 5 4 4 2 where fair and equal participatory processes are 
discussed. 
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factual disputes. The fact that the remediation norm was not completely satisfied in 
this case despite the consideration of all of the factors and adherence to all of the other 
remedial norms illustrates how difficult it is to effectively remedy systemic socio-
economic rights violations. 
 
4 3 2 Government incompetence 
 
The second scenario in which a structural interdict will be an appropriate and 
effective remedy is when the systemic violation is a product of a severely incompetent 
government.137 Roach and Budlender argue that the use of structural interdicts should 
not be confined to cases where the government is intransigent since it also holds 
enormous potential to remedy violations caused by incompetence.138 The authors 
justify this by stating that governments in developing democracies such as South 
Africa often require expertise and guidance in terms of their constitutional obligations 
and that courts can provide this via a structural interdict.139 
The granting of a structural interdict remedy in such cases should not be perceived 
to be a form of punishment, but rather as an invitation to the relevant government 
department to comply with its constitutional obligations under the guidance and 
supervision of the court.140 Bishop explains this by stating that court supervision in 
such cases is justified since the relevant governmental department might not be able 
to fulfil its obligations even if it is bona fide.141 The Textbook case saga in Limpopo will 
                                            
137 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 349. The authors argue that the 
justification for a structural interdict remedy will increase the more incompetent or incapable 
government is to fulfil its human rights obligations. 
138 349. 
139 349. A lack of expertise (incompetence) can present a significant obstacle to compliance 
with court orders. Structural interdicts can help overcome this obstacle by directing different 
parties with the necessary expertise to work together in order to rectify the infringement. 
Courts can further direct independent monitors with the necessary technical expertise to 
supervise compliance, see Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 
(CC) para 76 for such an example and chapter five part 5 4 4 3 2. 
140 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 350. 
141 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-10. 
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be analysed and evaluated in this section since it illustrates severe government 
incompetence which led to the systemic breach of the right to a basic education of 
thousands of children.  
The series of textbook cases followed after the not-for-profit organisation, Section 
27, initiated legal action against the Limpopo Department of Education and the 
National Department of Basic Education because of a failure by these two government 
departments to fulfil their constitutional duties relating to the right to a basic education. 
Section 27 alleged that this was the case because of the non-delivery of textbooks to 
students across schools in the province.142 The need for new textbooks in schools 
arose because the curriculum changed from the Revised National Curriculum 
Statement (“RNCS”) which was implemented in 2002 to the new Curriculum and 
Assessment Policy Statement (“CAPS”) in 2009.143 
 
4 3 2 1 Analysis of the Textbook case saga 
 
4 3 2 1 1 Section 27 
 
The first judgment was handed down in Section 27 v Minister of Education (“Section 
27”).144 Kollapen J found that the failure to provide learners with textbooks does indeed 
constitute a violation of the right to a basic education.145 The judge stated that a 
remedy must be effective and meaningful in cases where rights are found to have 
been violated.146 He went on to state that an order merely requiring the delivery of 
textbooks would not meet the requirements of being effective and meaningful as it 
would not fully vindicate the infringed right since the negative consequences of non-
delivery would still persist and that something more innovative was thus needed to 
address these consequences.147 The Court granted a structural interdict remedy 
coupled with an order declaring that the non-delivery of textbooks constituted a 
                                            
142 F Veriava “The Limpopo Textbook Litigation: A Case Study into the Possibilities of a 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (2016) 32 SAJHR 1 7. 
143 3. 
144 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP). 
145 Para 32. 
146 Para 35. 
147 Para 36. 
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violation of the right to a basic education. The respondents had to develop a “catch-
up/remedial plan” for all affected grade ten learners in the province.148 
 
(a) Nature of the right and nature of the infringement 
 
The Court considered the nature of the right in determining liability as well as what 
remedy would be most appropriate and effective in the circumstances. The Court 
stated in this regard that the right to a basic education is immediately realisable unlike 
some other socio-economic rights which must be progressively realised by the 
State.149 The Court described the right to a basic education as a “central and 
interlocking right” since it enables individuals to enjoy and exercise their other 
constitutionally protected rights.150 The Court further stated that it was an urgent matter 
as the academic year had already reached the halfway mark and that many learners 
still did not have access to textbooks.151 The Court found that the respondents should 
have considered the adverse consequences which would be faced by students if 
textbooks were not delivered, again indicating that this was a matter that merited 
urgent attention and remediation.152 It is thus urgency and the empowering nature of 
the right that partly justified a strong, managerial remedy like the structural interdict.153 
                                            
148 Para 43. 
149 Para 21. See also Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO (Centre 
for Child Law as amici curiae) 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC) para 37 where the Constitutional Court 
distinguished between the right to a basic education and other socio-economic rights.  
150 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) para 2. The Court also stated 
that “[e]ducation is critical in both freeing and unlocking the potential of each person” (para 3). 
151 Para 20. 
152 Para 30. 
153 The Court stated that the respondents had so far acted in good faith, but that their actions 
were unreasonable because of the urgency of the matter (para 32). Urgency acted as a 
unifying factor between the liability stage and the remedial stage in this litigation since it 
contributed not only to the conduct being classified as unreasonable, but also to the 
justification of a strong remedy. See part 4 3 3 of this chapter where it is argued that structural 
interdicts are not only appropriate in cases of government recalcitrance or incompetence, but 
also where the violation should be urgently remedied because of a risk of adverse 
consequences. See also K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory 
Jurisdiction: When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 333 where the 
authors argue that structural interdicts will be appropriate in cases where even bona fide non-
compliance will have serious consequences. 
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(b) Balancing diverse interests 
 
Kollapen J also took cognisance of the fact that a structural interdict requiring the 
respondents to submit a plan should accommodate a diverse set of interests in order 
to be effective. The Court stated that the respondents were primarily responsible for 
formulating the plan and that the Court should not prescribe the exact contours of the 
plan.154 However, the Court went further, stating that the formulation of the plan should 
be a “collaborative effort” and that schools, teachers, parents and learners should be 
consulted since they have a vested interest in the remedy.155  
 
(c)  Reason for the rights violation 
 
It is important to note that the Limpopo Department of Education was placed under 
national administration in December 2012 in terms of section 100(1)(b) of the 
Constitution.156 This provision makes it possible for the national executive to intervene 
“[w]hen a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation”.157 This indicates 
that severe incompetence contributed to this systemic violation. The Court stated that 
the violation did not occur due to mala fide conduct by the Department.158 It cited the 
Department’s unreasonable conduct as the reason for the violation, stating that the 
Department could not meet its own targets and indicators.159 This suggests that the 
infringement did not occur due to an inattentive or intransigent state, but rather 
because of severe incompetence. 
 
4 3 2 1 2 BEFA 
 
Compliance by the Department was unsatisfactory despite the strong managerial 
remedy granted in Section 27. The parties reached a settlement out of court which 
                                            
154 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) para 40. 
155 Para 39. 
156 Para 11. 
157 S100(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
158 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) para 32. 
159 Para 32. 
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was endorsed by the Court and thus made an order.160 The parties further agreed to 
appoint an independent party to verify the contents of the progress reports which the 
respondents had to submit as per the order in Section 27.161 
The applicants returned to court in September 2012 because of non-compliance by 
the respondents, which led to the continued violation of the right to a basic 
education.162 Kollapen J declared that the respondents had failed to comply with the 
two previous court orders, describing the situation created by this failure to comply as 
“distressing”.163 
In 2014, another urgent application was launched in Basic Education for All v 
Minister of Basic Education (“BEFA”) after reports were received relating to textbook 
shortages in the Limpopo province.164 The applicants firstly sought an order declaring 
that the late delivery of textbooks constituted a violation of the basic right to education. 
Secondly, the applicants sought an agreement with regard to the delivery date of 
textbooks as reached between them and the Department to be made an order of court, 
and they lastly sought a structural interdict remedy.  
 
(a) Nature of the right and nature of the infringement 
 
The Court firstly considered the nature of the right. The Court found that the positive 
obligations flowing from section 29(1)(a) did require the provision of textbooks to 
students.165 The Court further confirmed the empowering nature of this right and thus 
the urgency with which it had to be remedied.166 The Court did not explicitly discuss 
the nature of the violation, but it did discuss the history of the Textbook case saga in 
                                            
160 F Veriava “The Limpopo Textbook Litigation: A Case Study into the Possibilities of a 
Transformative Constitutionalism” (2016) 32 SAJHR 1 7. 
161 7. Professor Mary Metcalfe, the former MEC for Education in Gauteng, was appointed as 
the independent party. 
162 Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education (GNP) 23-12-2012 case no 24565/2012. 
163 Para 9. 
164 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP). This application was brought by Basic Education for All with 
Section 27 acting as the attorneys in this case. 
165 Para 55. 
166 Para 54. See Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education for All 2016 1 All SA 369 (SCA) 
para 1 where the Supreme Court of Appeal, similarly to the previous judgments in this series, 
confirmed the centrality of the right to a basic education. 
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Limpopo.167 The Court therefore acknowledged that the Department had continuously 
failed to meet its positive obligation to provide textbooks, thus making this violation 
systemic in nature.168 
 
(b) Balancing diverse interests 
 
The Court took different interests into account during the judgment. The Court took 
into consideration the financial interests of the State.169 It stated in this regard that the 
right to a basic education is not subject to any limitations, but that the content of the 
right is subject to the availability of State resources.170 It further considered the interest 
of separation of powers in this regard, stating that the authority to determine how State 
resources should be used “has been vested in the state and secondly that courts are 
not well equipped to make such determinations”.171 The Court elaborated on this, 
stating that the Constitution does empower courts to grant supervisory orders in cases 
where the State has disregarded its constitutional obligations.172 However, the Court 
found that this was not such a case since the Department did attempt to get the 
necessary funding, but that the relevant fiscal authorities only granted it a lesser sum 
than what was requested.173 The Court refused to consider whether Parliament failed 
to fulfil its constitutional obligations by not adequately budgeting for textbooks in 
Limpopo, citing the “policy laden” nature of this obligation and the fact that it was not 
an issue before the court.174 
 
                                            
167 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP) paras 11–
31. 
168 See chapter three part 3 2 2 2 where systemic socio-economic rights violations are 
discussed. 
169 See Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP) para 72 
where budgetary constraints are discussed. 
170 Para 67. 
171 Para 68. 
172 Para 69. The Court quoted para 183 of Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC) in this regard. 
173 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP) para 73. 
174 Para 74. However, the Court acknowledged that such a case, although difficult, could 
hypothetically be made. 
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(c)  Reason for the rights violation 
 
The Court further considered the reason for the violation. The Court stated in this 
regard that the Department had initially failed to fulfil its constitutional obligation 
because it had, in good faith, erred in thinking that the provision of textbooks did not 
form part of this responsibility.175 The Court went on to consider why there was 
unsatisfactory compliance with the previous court orders. The Court accepted the 
respondents’ contentions with regard to budgetary constraints, stating that the “non-
compliance has been explained”.176 The Court concluded that there was no reason to 
believe that the respondents would not fulfil their constitutional obligations following 
the judgment and that a structural interdict would thus not be appropriate.177  
 
(d) Practicability of the remedy 
 
Practicability concerns increased in the Textbook case saga since the first judgment 
which led to the Court placing more emphasis on this consideration in BEFA than it 
had done in Section 27. The applicants had suggested in BEFA that the South African 
Human Rights Commission (“SAHRC”) be instructed by the Court to supervise the 
                                            
175 Para 75. 
176 Para 75. On appeal in Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education for All 2016 1 All SA 
369 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal was less satisfied with the explanation for non-
compliance. The Court ascribed the systemic rights violation to the incompetence of the 
Department, stating that the violation clearly occurred because of incompetence and 
insufficient planning (para 43). The Court referred in this regard to the implementation of the 
new curriculum, stating that the Department “stumbled” in doing this. The Court, similarly to 
the previous judgments, found that the right to a basic education does include the right of 
every learner to be provided with the necessary textbooks. The Court held that the failure by 
government to provide the affected learners with textbooks did not only violate their right to a 
basic education, but also their rights to equality and dignity as contained in ss9 and 10 of the 
Constitution (para 53). The Court also found that there was non-compliance with the previous 
court orders (para 53). 
177 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP) para 75. See 
also Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 109 
where the Constitutional Court made a similar statement with regard to bona fide denial of 
constitutional obligations. 
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Department’s compliance and progress.178 The Court in BEFA rejected this on the 
basis that the SAHRC does not have the necessary capacity to fulfil this function.179 
Such an order would thus not be enforceable and could not be regarded as effective 
relief. The Court further stated that such an order would be inappropriate since there 
was no good reason for the Court to interfere with the responsibilities of the SAHRC.180  
Another practical consideration which the Court took into account during the 
remedial phase in BEFA was that the record for this case was exceptionally 
voluminous. The Court concluded that a new record would be easier to deal with 
effectively if this case were to come before a new judge in the future.181 The Court thus 
declined the request for a structural interdict.182 
  
                                            
178 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP) para 78. 
179 Para 78. 
180 Para 78. 
181 Para 79. 
182 This case was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Basic 
Education v Basic Education for All 2016 1 All SA 369 (SCA). The Department appealed 
Tuchten J’s findings in Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 
1039 (GP) relating to textbooks and the right to a basic education, arguing that the right to a 
basic education did not require them to provide every learner in every school with a textbook. 
BEFA cross-appealed on grounds that Tuchten J erred in not finding that there had been non-
compliance with the first two judgments and, secondly, against Tuchten J’s refusal to grant a 
structural interdict remedy. However, BEFA abandoned their cross-appeal relating to the 
structural relief. See F Veriava “The Limpopo Textbook Litigation: A Case Study into the 
Possibilities of a Transformative Constitutionalism” (2016) 32 SAJHR 1 21 where the author 
explains this abandonment of the structural interdict prayer by stating that a structural interdict 
would have made it possible for the Department of Basic Education to go back to the Court in 
an “attempt to justify its reasons for continued non-delivery”. This litigation strategy can be 
questioned since the South African Human Rights Commission reported that many schools in 
the Limpopo province has not received learning materials in the form of textbooks by the start 
of the 2017 academic year, thus indicating that BEFA’s strategy to supervise implementation 
itself was ineffective. See G Smith “SAHRC Considering Legal Action on Non-delivery of 
Textbooks” (20-01-2017) South African Human Rights Commission 
<http://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/507-sahrc-considering-legal-
action-on-non-delivery-of-textbooks> (accessed 20-01-2017). 
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4 3 2 2 Evaluation of the Textbook case saga 
 
(a) Consideration of factors in designing effective relief 
 
Section 27 is a significant judgment since it elaborated on the normative content of 
the right to a basic education, finding that this includes the provision of textbooks. 
However, the structural interdict as granted by Kollapen J can be criticised on the basis 
that the judge did not consider all of the necessary factors. The judge disregarded the 
respondents’ argument that it was bona fide in not complying with its constitutional 
obligation, thus not thoroughly engaging with the reason for the rights violation.183 
However, the judge justified the strong managerial remedy, stating that the right should 
be urgently vindicated because a delay could have “adverse consequences” for the 
affected pupils.184 The judge considered the nature of the right in concluding that it 
should be urgently vindicated.185 
Tuchten J’s judgment in BEFA is similarly subject to criticism. He decided that a 
structural interdict would not be an appropriate remedy in this case after considering 
the reason for the violation. In contrast to Kollapen J, he was of the view that the 
respondent’s argument was bona fide, and that there was no reason to believe that 
the respondents would not comply with the order.186 This belief that the government 
would comply was ultimately misplaced since the government had already failed to 
comply with several previous judgments and court orders. Objectively, it seems clear 
that government was aware of its obligation to provide textbooks to all learners in 
public schools prior to this series of litigation and should thus have planned 
accordingly.187 Tuchten J should have emphasised the interests of the students in 
                                            
183 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) para 27. This also negatively 
affected the norm of impartiality since the eventual remedy might be viewed as unfair. 
184 Para 30. See part 4 3 3 in this chapter where the possibility of adverse consequences is 
discussed as a scenario in which structural interdicts will be appropriate. 
185 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) para 21. 
186 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP) para 75. 
187 See Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) para 23 where the judge 
quotes President Zuma as stating that every student should be provided with textbooks, as 
well as the Limpopo Education Department’s Annual Performance Plan for 2011 to 2012 which 
also stated that every child should have textbooks. 
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receiving textbooks to a greater extent, given the importance and transformative 
potential of the right to a basic education.188 
 
(b) Norms for public law remedies 
 
The Section 27 judgment did not explicitly order or make use of meaningful 
participation. However, the judge did envisage engagement as a useful tool to let a 
diverse set of interests enter the remedial enquiry.189 He stated in this regard that the 
various relevant parties should participate in the formulation of the catch-up plan in 
order for the plan to be effective. However, this judgment can arguably be criticised 
for a lack of adequate reasoned decision making in that other available constitutional 
remedies were not considered.190 However, the judge justified the strong remedy with 
reference to the importance and urgency underlying the right.  
The judgment in BEFA can similarly be criticised for not fully adhering to Sturm’s 
overarching norms for public law remedies. The Court placed a lot of emphasis on the 
separation of powers norm, but did this to the detriment of norms such as remediation. 
Tuchten J stated: 
 
“I do not think that this is a case where the Court should enter the terrain demarcated for 
the exercise of public power by another arm of government by directing the DBE to report 
to the Court on their progress with the deliveries which they have undertaken to make”.191 
 
The Court stated that a structural interdict would not be appropriate since BEFA 
could institute new proceedings in the case of non-compliance.192 Evidently, the Court 
in BEFA adopted a deferential approach since it regarded the textbooks saga as a 
predominantly political issue, stating that “political issues require political solutions”.193 
 
                                            
188 See chapter one part 1 1 1 for a discussion of transformative constitutionalism. 
189 Section 27 v Minister of Education 2013 2 BCLR 237 (GNP) para 39. 
190 The lack of reasoned decision making also negatively affects the Court’s adherence to the 
norm of impartiality and this can affect the perceived legitimacy of the remedy. 
191 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 (GP) para 75. 
192 Para 75. 
193 Para 76. 
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4 3 3 Irremediable harm 
 
The third set of circumstances in which a structural interdict will be appropriate and 
effective is in those cases where the consequences of even bona fide non-compliance 
will be so serious that a strong form of remedy is justified.194 Roach and Budlender 
argue that the consequences of non-compliance in some cases could be so grave that 
further remedial action will not be adequate in vindicating the infringed right.195 The 
revisability or gradual approach which structural interdicts allow for, as discussed 
above, will not by itself be effective in such urgent cases since this form of remedy can 
result in a lengthy process.196 A court granting a structural interdict in systemic cases 
                                            
194 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 333. See also N Swanepoel “Die 
Aanwending van die Gestruktureerde Interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Konstitusionele 
Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige Beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 LitNet Akademies 374 388. 
195 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 333. The authors state that Minster of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) is, with the benefit of hindsight, an 
example of such a case. See chapter three part 3 2 1 2 where this case is discussed in order 
to illustrate that the underlying interests in socio-economic rights will often be urgent in nature. 
196 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2010] ZAFSHC 73 (5 August 2010) illustrates the 
inability of structural interdicts to grant immediate relief to successful litigants. This case 
concerned the funding policy of the Free State Department of Social Development which 
regulated the grants awarded to non-profit organisations (“NPO’s”). The Court found that the 
NPO’s were fulfilling the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Department as 
contained in ss26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution, s4(2) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and 
s3(2) of the Older Persons Act 13 of 2006 (para 37). The Court furthermore found that the 
NPO’s were chronically underfunded (paras 33-36) and that the arbitrary funding policy was 
unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. The Court accordingly granted a structural interdict 
directing the parties to redraft their funding policy (para 56). The Court found in the subsequent 
judgment of National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations v MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011) 
that the revised policy was still not reasonable and ordered the Department to meaningfully 
engage with the NPO’s in order to formulate a reasonable policy. The Court found in National 
Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v MEC for Social 
Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2013] ZAFSHC 49 (28 March 2013) para 14 that the 
revised funding policy was still deficient because of, inter alia, the failure by the Department 
to meaningfully engage with the NPO’s. The third revised funding policy of the Department 
was finally upheld as compliant with the first three judgments and the Constitution in National 
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with urgent underlying interests197 must also, as part of the structural interdict, grant 
detailed and immediate relief in order to prevent irremediable harm to the victims.198 
This section will analyse and evaluate three cases which would have resulted in grave 
consequences if compliance was not achieved, namely EN v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa (“EN”),199 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) (“Allpay 
2”)200 in which there was no compliance and Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social 
Development (“Black Sash”)201 which was aimed at preventing the constitutional crisis 
almost created by the government in Allpay 2. 
 
                                            
Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v Member of the 
Executive Council for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2014] ZAFSHC 127 (28 
August 2014). Whereas this chapter analyses case law where socio-economic rights were 
systemically violated, it is not clear that the NAWONGO saga involved a large-scale systemic 
issue, since an identifiably provincial government department was responsible for formulating 
a fair funding formula for an identifiable number of NPO’s. Once a reasonable funding formula 
was devised, the funding shortfall and indirect violation of myriad socio-economic rights could 
be relatively simply rectified. It is nevertheless clear from this case, which consists of four 
judgments and spanned over a period of more than four years, that flexible structural interdicts 
alone cannot be regarded as a quick fix solution and that it will be inappropriate in urgent 
cases where there is a risk of adverse consequences. This inability of pure structural interdicts 
which is not accompanied by some form of immediate relief highlights the contradiction in 
academic literature which often advocates for structural interdicts as effective relief in cases 
with urgent underlying interests. 
197 It is important to note that the underlying interests in socio-economic rights cases will often 
be urgent as discussed in chapter three part 3 2 1 2. However, urgency as referred to here is 
qualified in that there must be a risk of irremediable harm. 
198 This detailed and immediate relief can potentially take the form of interim relief. This will be 
similar to cases where a court grants an order for interim relief when suspending a declaration 
of invalidity. The interim relief in such a case will be aimed at providing immediate relief to the 
victim of a rights violations in order to ensure that the victim does not suffer any further harm, 
whilst at the same time affording the government with sufficient “space and time to select the 
precise means by which to comply with the Constitution.” K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory 
Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 
SALJ 325 340. See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 391 in this regard. 
199 2007 1 BCLR 84 (D). 
200 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). 
201 2017 ZACC 8 (CC).  
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4 3 3 1 EN 
 
4 3 3 1 1 Analysis 
 
EN concerned the right to health care of prisoners who were serving sentences at 
the Westville Correctional Centre. There were approximately twenty prisoners who 
were HIV positive but did not have access to antiretroviral treatments. The applicants 
approached the High Court, arguing that the prisoners have a right to health care and 
that they must accordingly be provided with the necessary medication.202 The Court 
found that the government did not meet its constitutional obligations and that the 
medical care provided to the prisoners was not “reasonable” or “adequate”.203 The 
applicants sought a structural interdict, and the Court thus had to consider several 
factors in deciding whether such a remedy would be appropriate and effective in the 
circumstances.204 
 
(a) Nature of the right and nature of the infringement 
 
The Court considered the nature of the infringed right as well as the nature of the 
infringement. The Court referred in this regard to the positive obligations of the 
government imposed by section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution which are not subject to 
any qualifications,205 stating that the State is “legally and constitutionally bound to 
provide adequate medical treatment to prisoners”.206 The Court noted in this regard 
that this was a matter of “life and death” since many of the applicants were very sick 
                                            
202 The applicants based their arguments on ss27 and 35(2)(e) of the Constitution. 
203 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 BCLR 84 (D) para 31. 
204 Para 4. The Court also confirmed the powers of the courts to grant structural interdicts in 
suitable cases to ensure compliance with a court order, referring to City of Cape Town v 
Rudolph 2004 5 SA 39 (C) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 
5 SA 721 (CC). 
205 Section 35(2)(e): “Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the 
right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least 
exercise and the provision, at state expenses, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading 
material and medical treatment”. 
206 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 BCLR 84 (D) para 8. 
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at the time that the judgment was given.207 The Court accordingly emphasised the 
need for this rights violation to be urgently rectified.208 The Court further considered 
the nature of the infringement, observing that “there has been and continues to be a 
violation of the applicants’ constitutional rights” with regard to health care.209 This 
statement indicates that this was not a once-off violation, but rather systemic and 
ongoing in nature.210  
The Court furthermore considered the context of the case. The Court described 
prisoners as a particularly vulnerable group of persons in our country as they are 
incarcerated and thus left to the mercy of the State.211 The Court further emphasised 
prisoners’ vulnerability in stating that a prisoner’s “prospects of emerging from prison 
alive is seriously compromised because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic”.212 It is this 
vulnerability that makes it important for courts to protect and enforce the rights of 
prisoners. 
 
(b) Balancing diverse interests 
 
The Court considered diverse interests in this case. This included the interests of 
parties (namely the respondents and broader public) other than the interests of the 
applicants to urgently access treatment. The Court did not have to consider the 
financial implication for the respondents as they did not raise a lack of resources as 
justification for non-compliance with their constitutional obligation.213 The Court further 
considered the interest of people who were similarly situated in also receiving relief. 
The Court stated in this regard that it was contemplated by the applicants that a 
structural interdict remedy in a class action such as this case would also afford relief 
to other similarly situated prisoners.214 The Court agreed that similarly situated people 
                                            
207 Para 18. 
208 See paras 6, 18 and 32 where urgency as factor to consider is discussed. 
209 Para 32. 
210 See chapter three part 3 2 2 2 for a discussion of systemic socio-economic rights 
infringements. 
211 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 BCLR 84 (D) para 18. 
212 Para 29. 
213 Para 25. 
214 Para 4. See also paras 17 and 25 with regard to the interests of similarly situated people. 
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should receive comparable relief, in displaying its dismay with the fact that the 
respondents had no plan with timeframes for the provision of antiretroviral medication 
to prisoners similarly situated to the applicants.215 The Court accordingly included the 
words “other similarly situated prisoners” in its mandamus, ordering the respondents 
to remove any obstacles preventing prisoners from receiving treatment for HIV, thus 
rendering the relief more effective.216 
 
(c)  Reason for the rights violation 
 
The Court raised concern over the apparent “dilatoriness and lack of commitment” 
of the respondents in dealing with this systemic issue.217 The Court stated that the 
respondents argued that they were indeed meeting their constitutional obligations.218 
However, the Court found the State’s policies aimed at meeting its obligations to be 
unreasonable.219 The reasoning of the Court suggests that this was not a case where 
pure recalcitrance or incompetence led to the violations, but rather a case of 
inattentiveness coupled with a degree of recalcitrance.220  
 
(d) Practicability of the remedy 
 
Another factor considered by the Court was the practicability of the remedy. 
Remedies can be less effective if they are difficult to comply with.221 The Court took 
this into consideration when it decided on the timeframe of the structural interdict. The 
Court described the suggested time limit of one week for submitting a report on how 
                                            
215 Para 27. 
216 Para 35. See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3 where it is discussed that an effective remedy must 
also provide relief to similarly situated people. 
217 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 BCLR 84 (D) para 24. 
218 Para 25. 
219 Para 31. 
220 The Court reasoned that the respondents were somewhat recalcitrant in this case, stating 
that the respondents had not provided any “workable” solutions and that their attempt to 
adhere to their obligations had been “characterised by delays, obstacles and restrictions” (para 
32). 
221 M Swart “Left Out in the Cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the Poorest of the 
Poor” (2005) 21 SAJHR 215 217. 
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they intended to comply with the order as “optimistic and impractical” and decided 
instead to give the respondents a more realistic time limit of two weeks which, in turn, 
made the remedy more effective.222 
 
4 3 3 1 2 Evaluation 
 
(a) Consideration of factors in designing effective relief 
 
The relief granted in this case can be considered to have been effective, but there 
are some shortcomings in the Court’s judgment. The Court considered many of the 
factors for effective relief. The Court attached sufficient weight to the interests of the 
applicants in this urgent case as well as the urgent nature of the underlying interests 
of the right by granting a detailed and strongly managerial structural interdict.223 The 
Court discussed the controversial nature of the structural interdict, but concluded that 
such a strong remedy was justified in the circumstances.224  
The Court proceeded to grant a detailed and managerial structural interdict which 
was aimed at preventing any irremediable harm.225 However, this urgency and threat 
of irremediable harm warranted an explicit consideration of the deterrent effect of the 
remedy, which the Court neglected to do. The need for an explicit consideration of the 
deterrent effect of the remedy was intensified in this case since there is a great need 
to deter future violations with such potentially grave consequences.  
  
                                            
222 See EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 BCLR 84 (D) para 33 where 
the Court considered the practicability of the remedy in order to ensure that the relief is 
effective. The Court acknowledged that the formulation and implementation of a plan to 
provide prisoners with antiretroviral medication would require consultations between various 
parties including the State, hospitals and legal counsel and that one week would not be 
sufficient to allow for such a process. 
223 Paras 23–24. 
224 Para 32. 
225 The remedy granted by the Court ordered the respondents to immediately provide the 
prisoners with the necessary medical care (para 35), and did thus not give them much leeway 
since this could have led to irremediable harm.  
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(b) Norms for public law remedies 
 
The Court did not facilitate participation by all the different parties during the 
remedial phase of adjudication as required by the theoretical paradigm espoused by 
Sturm.226 Participation might have allowed more diverse interests to enter the remedial 
enquiry.227 For example, the Court stated that the respondents’ financial interests in 
the case were not a concern since it was not brought up during formal liability 
proceedings.228 The Court thus made assumptions with regard to the diverse interests 
implicated in the matter. Direct and meaningful participation by government officials 
could possibly have placed the Court in a better position to grant an effective and 
impartial remedial judgment aimed at solving the systemic cause of the violation, while 
increasing the remedy’s practicability and deterrent effect. 
The Court did partially adhere to the norm of reasoned decision making in its 
remedial judgement. The Court justified the structural interdict as appropriate and 
effective relief, citing the facts and the circumstances of the case.229 The Court did not, 
however, explicitly state why a structural interdict remedy was more appropriate and 
effective in this case when compared to other available constitutional remedies such 
as a mandatory interdict or declaratory order.230 
The Court also only partially adhered to the norm of remediation. The Court granted 
a strong remedy in order to secure immediate compliance. However, the respondents 
were reluctant in implementing the remedy. This again supports the argument for 
                                            
226 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
See also S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in Education Rights 
Disputes” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 6. 
227 This case confirms Sturm’s argument that structural interdicts granted in the form of a 
report-back-to-court model will often not comply with the participation norm for public law 
remedies. See chapter five part 5 3 1 where this is discussed. 
228 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 BCLR 84 (D) para 25. 
229 Para 32. The judgment emphasised the urgency of the case since people were severely ill 
and the retention of jurisdiction thus made the remedy effective since the Court could easily 
have been approached again for ancillary relief in the case of non-compliance. 
230 See S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in Education Rights 
Disputes” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 7 where the author states that 
this is a requirement of substantive reasoned decision making. 
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diverse participation, because respondents who participate in the design of a remedy 
are more likely to comply with it.231 
 
4 3 3 2 SASSA saga 
 
4 3 3 2 1 Analysis of Allpay 
 
In Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of 
the South African Social Security Agency,232 the Constitutional Court found that the 
award of a tender by the South African Social Security Agency (“SASSA”) to Cash 
Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd (“CPS”) was constitutionally invalid.233 The tender in this 
case was for the administration of social grants on behalf of SASSA. Allpay instituted 
legal proceedings challenging the validity of the tender process after the tender was 
awarded to CPS. However, the Court did not immediately rule on an appropriate 
remedy, stating that the Court needed “further information”.234 The Court accordingly 
issued an order directing the parties to present further facts and arguments to the 
Court. In Allpay 2, which dealt with the remedy, the Court considered several factors 
in determining what the most effective relief would be.235  
 
(a) Nature of the right and nature of the infringement 
 
The Court aimed to ensure that the infringed right (the right to just administrative 
action) was vindicated.236 This was done by declaring the tender award and 
                                            
231 See chapter two part 2 3 1 1 where this is argued.  
232 2014 1 SA 604 (CC). This case was brought before the Court on the basis of the right to 
just administrative action (s33 of the Constitution) and the tender was set aside for reasons 
relating to this. However, the Court recognised in para 4 that this case directly implicates the 
socio-economic right to social assistance (s27(1)(c) of the Constitution) and that the public 
thus had a major interest in this case. 
233 Para 93. 
234 Para 96. 
235 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). 
236 Section 33: “Just administrative action 
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
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subsequent contract between CPS and SASSA constitutionally invalid in the merits 
judgment.237 The Court further had to consider the nature of the right to social 
assistance as provided for in section 27(1)(c) read with subsection (2) of the 
Constitution. The Court stated that these provisions place a positive obligation on the 
State to provide social assistance to people who are unable to support themselves 
and that this must be realised progressively.238 The Court went further, stating that this 
right has been realised through the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004.239 
 
(b) Balancing diverse interests 
 
The main interest taken into account was that of social grant beneficiaries, 
especially children, to receive their grants in an uninterrupted manner.240 This is a 
significant consideration since the beneficiaries were not parties before the court.241 
The Court also took the interests of SASSA and CPS into account.242 Merely declaring 
the tender to be invalid and setting it aside would have created practical difficulties for 
these bodies in meeting their obligations, which could have resulted in the serious 
                                            
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons.” 
237 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) para 98. 
238 Para 47. 
239 Para 47. 
240 Para 33. See also Tripartite Steering Committee v Minister of Basic Education 2015 3 All 
SA 718 (ECG) which was similarly decided on the basis of administrative law, but which also 
directly implicated a socio-economic right. This case concerned the right to a basic education 
because pupils did not have transport to schools. Plasket J granted a supervisory remedy 
requiring the government to report back to the court on the progress of adopting a new policy 
regulating scholar transport (para 67). 
241 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) para 96. The interest of the unrepresented 
grant beneficiaries, specifically child beneficiaries, were brought into focus before the Court 
by the amici curiae. See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 2 where it is argued that the interests of 
stakeholders not before the court must be considered during the remedial enquiry. 
242 The Court stated that constitutional obligations can extend to non-State actors, such as 
CPS. Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 52. 
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infringement of grant beneficiaries’ right to social assistance.243 The suspension of 
invalidity was aimed at safeguarding the above-mentioned interests – especially the 
interests of socio-economically vulnerable grant recipients – and thus rendering the 
relief more effective. 
The Court also considered other diverse interests.244 The Court took the interest of 
the public in having accountable and transparent government agencies into account. 
The Court stated in this regard that the “public interest in procurement” must be 
considered in the remedial phase.245 Proper procurement processes that are 
constitutional ensure that citizens receive the most cost effective, quality service. The 
Court further recognised Allpay’s interest in this case as “being co-extensive with the 
public interest”.246 The Court elaborated on this, stating that Allpay had an interest to 
compete in a fair and legal tender process.247  
The Court also recognised another interest of Allpay in designing the remedy, 
namely Allpay’s interest to compete for a profitable contract. The Court held in this 
regard that the duration of the new contract must also be for a period of at least five 
years since a shorter contract would not be profitable for a new company and would 
thus not constitute effective relief.248 The Court accordingly ordered that the 
procurement process in this case for a five year contract had to be rerun in a 
constitutionally valid manner.249 The choice of whether or not to award a new tender 
was left to SASSA. The declaration of invalidity was suspended pending SASSA’s 
                                            
243 Paras 36–41. 
244 The Court stated (para 33) that the Court must have a “broader range” as opposed to a 
“one dimensional” approach in the remedial stage, thus indicating that diverse interest must 
be considered. 
245 Para 33.  
246 Para 72. 
247 Para 72. 
248 Para 43. This is the case since a “long [contractual] period is essential to recoup the 
tenderer’s huge initial outlay.” A contract for a shorter period of time would thus effectively 
have meant that CPS would be the only bidder since it would not be a profitable contract for 
anyone else, thus maintaining the status quo. 
249 Para 71. It is clear that the Court also considered the interests of people who were not 
before the Court, thus making the remedy more effective. 
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decision and the Court ordered that the suspension will continue for the duration of the 
initial contract with CPS if no new tender was awarded.250  
 
(c)  Reason for the rights violation 
 
The right to just administrative action seems to have been violated because of 
inattentiveness on SASSA’s part. SASSA neglected to confirm the empowerment 
credentials of CPS.251 The Court described this negligent conduct as “fatally 
defective”.252 The Court stated that “SASSA’s irregular conduct has been the sole 
cause for the declaration of invalidity”.253 SASSA’s unsatisfactory conduct and attitude 
escalated during the investigation prior to the litigation. The Court stated that SASSA 
failed to provide Allpay and Corruption Watch with information which was necessary 
for the investigation into the irregularities of the tender process.254 The Court described 
SASSA’s attitude as “unhelpful and almost obstructionist”, thus indicating that SASSA 
adopted an intransigent attitude.255 
 
4 3 3 2 2 Analysis of Black Sash 
 
The Court discharged its supervisory jurisdiction over Allpay 2 after SASSA filed a 
report in November 2015. This report stated that it would not award a new tender 
contract and further assured the Court that it would be able to take over the payment 
of grants in 2017.256 The lack of supervision led to subsequent litigation in Black Sash 
after it became clear that SASSA still had made no provision for the payment of social 
grants for after 31 March 2017.  
                                            
250 Para 78. SASSA was ordered to report back to the Court on various issues, including on 
when and how it will pay social grants itself after completion of the initial contract. 
251 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) para 72. 
252 Para 72. 
253 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 73. 
254 Para 75. 
255 Para 75. 
256 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 18. 
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An analysis of the Black Sash judgment is thus important as this will contribute to 
evaluating the efficacy of the relief granted in Allpay 2. The Court ordered a very 
strongly managerial remedy in the form of a structural interdict. The order declared 
that SASSA and CPS are under a constitutional obligation to ensure that social grants 
are paid after 31 March 2017. The declaration of invalidity as suspended in Allpay 2 
was again suspended for a period of twelve months. The Court retained supervisory 
jurisdiction over all aspects of the case.257 
 
(a) Nature of the right and nature of the infringement 
 
The Court stated in Black Sash that the circumstances and context of the case 
justified a strong and intrusive remedy.258 The context which the Court considered 
during the remedial stage is different from the context which the Court considered 
during Allpay 2. This case was not about a “competitive and cost-effective 
procurement” process, but rather about the “very real threatened breach… to social 
assistance”.259 The Court emphasised the urgency of this matter by referring to the 
vast number of people who would be negatively affected if SASSA and CPS failed to 
meet their constitutional obligations relating to the payment of social grants.260 
 
                                            
257 Para 76. The order requires the Minister and SASSA to report back to the Court every three 
months on the progress they have made to ensure that grants will be payed after 1 April 2018. 
The Court further ordered that a committee consisting of experts must, together with the 
Auditor-General, report back to the Court at least every three months on: the payment of 
grants for the twelve months following 1 April 2017; any bidding process by SASSA aimed at 
the appointment of a new contractor for the payment of social grants; and on any “steps 
envisaged or taken by SASSA aimed at SASSA itself administering and paying” social grants 
after the twelve month period. See chapter five part 5 4 4 3 2 where the appointment of experts 
to monitor the implementation of court orders is discussed with reference to this case. 
258 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 42. 
259 Paras 42–43. 
260 Para 43. The Court’s reasoning justifying the strong and detailed mandatory component 
which was aimed at ensuring that there would be no interruption of the payment of social 
grants is similar to the reasoning in EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 1 
BCLR 84 (D) as discussed above in part 4 3 3 1. Non-compliance in this case would have led 
to irremediable harm since millions of people would not have been able to afford the basic 
necessities needed to live a minimally dignified life. 
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(b) Balancing diverse interests 
 
The Court took into account the interests of the different parties and stakeholders 
in this case. However, the Court justifiably attached overwhelming weight to the 
interests of the beneficiaries to receive their grants without interruption, since the Court 
stated that SASSA’s conduct had put them “at grave risk”.261 The strongly managerial 
remedy granted in this case attests to the emphasis placed on the urgent interests of 
grant beneficiaries, and the grave consequences that would result if no grants were 
paid at the end of CPS’ contractual term. The Court furthermore considered the 
interests of SASSA and CPS. The respondents argued that the continued relationship 
between SASSA and CPS must be based on a consensual contract. The Court 
considered this, but stated that this was a private law argument which was 
inappropriate when dealing with two institutions which are under a duty to meet the 
State’s constitutional obligations in terms of section 27 of the Constitution.262 
 
(c)  Reason for the rights violation 
 
The Court was scathing in its criticism of the Department’s conduct. It stated that 
supervisory jurisdiction must be considered against the background of the failure of 
SASSA to “get its own affairs in order”.263 The Court stated that the recalcitrant nature 
of SASSA and the Department of Social Development had not yet changed and that 
this necessitated a strong remedy.264 The respondents were deemed to have been 
recalcitrant on the basis that they ignored the material content of the order in Allpay 
2.265 The Court stated: 
 
“SASSA and the Minister have used the discharge by this Court of its supervisory 
jurisdiction as justification that there was no need for them to inform or approach the Court 
                                            
261 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 58. 
262 Para 48. 
263 Para 57. The Court also described the conduct of the Minister and SASSA as 
“extraordinary” (para 1). 
264 Para 57. The Court stated that the only difference was that the Minister of Social 
Development had now also “contributed to the continued recalcitrance.” 
265 Para 60. 
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when it became clear that SASSA would not be in a position to assume the duty to pay the 
grants itself. This is disingenuous and incorrect.”266 
 
The Court further stated that the failure of SASSA to approach the Court after 
realising that it could not comply with the Allpay 2 order is a threat to the right to social 
assistance of our society’s most poor and vulnerable people.267 It is this conduct, or 
lack thereof, which “justifie[d] further Court supervision”.268 
 
(d) Practicability of the remedy 
 
The Court took practical considerations into account with regard to the supervisory 
function of the structural interdict. The Court invited SASSA and the Minister of Social 
Development to make suggestions with regard to “practical measures” for monitoring 
compliance.269 The final order made provision for the appointment of independent 
monitors to assist the Court with the practical implementation of the remedy.270 
 
(e) Deterrent effect of the remedy 
 
The Court did not explicitly consider the deterrent effect of the remedy, but it is clear 
from the judgment that the Court wanted to make sure that its order was to be complied 
with and that similar crises were avoided in future. The Court stated that the Minister 
is the “office-holder ultimately responsible for the crisis” and thus ordered her to furnish 
the Court with reasons explaining why she should not be held personally liable for the 
costs of the application.271 The possibility for public servants of being held personally 
                                            
266 Para 59. 
267 Para 62. 
268 Para 62. 
269 Para 19. 
270 Para 76. See chapter five part 5 4 4 3 2 where different possible ways for monitoring the 
implementation of a remedy are discussed. 
271 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 74. See the 
follow up order of Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others (Freedom 
Under Law NPC Intervening) 2017 ZACC 20 (CC) in which the Court ordered that the Minister 
be joined to the proceedings in her personal capacity (para 4). The Court further ordered an 
investigation to take place into the Minister’s conduct in terms of s38 of the Superior Courts 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
 
liable for costs could possibly deter these individuals from causing rights infringements 
in future. 
 
4 3 3 2 3 Evaluation of Allpay 
 
(a) Consideration of factors in designing effective relief 
 
The relief granted in the remedial judgment in the Allpay-case must be criticised for 
not having been effective. This criticism comes despite the fact that the Court did 
consider most of the factors for effective relief. However, the Court should have 
considered the deterrent effect of the remedy, since the main reason for the remedy 
being ineffective is that the Court prematurely discharged its supervisory jurisdiction 
over this case. Supervisory jurisdiction would have served as a deterrent against 
SASSA’s unsatisfactory and unhelpful conduct.272 The Court should thus have 
retained jurisdiction in expectance of non-compliance. The Court also laid emphasis 
on the poor and marginalised members of our society and their dependence on social 
grants.273 This underscored the need for effective relief which ensured compliance, 
since non-compliance could potentially have led to a breakdown in the grants payment 
system. This would have had a devastating effect on the millions of people who rely 
on these grants in order to afford basic necessities.  
However, the Court decided that the progress report filed by SASSA in terms of its 
order was sufficient and that it was no longer necessary to retain jurisdiction over the 
case.274 Retention of jurisdiction in this case would not only have served as a deterrent, 
but would have allowed the Court to keep track of SASSA’s progress in terms of setting 
                                            
Act 10 of 2013, stating (para 21) that it “cannot make an order adverse to the Minister on the 
basis of allegations that are untested and which she has not had an opportunity to challenge.” 
The parties were ordered to engage with each other in order to agree on a process for the 
investigation in terms of the Act and to report back to the Court within 14 days. Failure to reach 
an agreement would result in the Court giving further directions determining the process to be 
followed (para 24). 
272 See Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) paras 73–75 where the 
Court discusses the unsatisfactory conduct of SASSA.  
273 Para 33. 
274 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 18. 
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up their own grants payment system and earlier intervention by the Court would thus 
have been possible.  
 
(b) Norms for public law remedies 
 
The Court did adhere to some of the remedial norms in Allpay 2. It is obvious that 
the Court adhered to the separation of powers doctrine since the Court left the decision 
as to whether or not a new tender contract must be concluded to SASSA.275 SASSA 
also had to formulate its own plan aimed at the payment of social grants post 31 March 
2017. Furthermore, the discharge of the supervisory jurisdiction indicates that the 
Court respected SASSA’s powers and functions and trusted it to fulfil these. 
The Court also adhered to the reasoned decision making norm. The Court did not 
order just any remedy, but rather requested the presentation of more facts and 
arguments in order to grant the most appropriate relief available. The Court considered 
different potential remedies in Allpay 2 and also justified the structural interdict by citing 
accountability concerns.276 
The Court should have allowed for more participation during the remedial phase of 
adjudication. This could have been achieved by ordering the parties and other 
interested stakeholders to meaningfully engage with each other.277 Such engagement 
could potentially have resulted in a more effective remedy since SASSA would have 
been exposed to more expertise which would have enabled it to successfully take over 
the payment of social grants. Such engagement would furthermore have contributed 
to more transparency which would have granted participating parties the opportunity 
                                            
275 See Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) paras 42-46 where the Court 
discusses separation of powers. This illustrates how the remediation norm and the corrective 
principle in this case had to yield to other pressing interests. This resulted in a remedy which 
was imperfect in nature since Allpay’s right to just administrative action was not specifically 
vindicated. See chapter two part 2 2 3 where perfect and imperfect remedies are discussed 
within the context of effective relief. 
276 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 71. 
277 See chapter five part 5 4 3 for a discussion of the meaningful engagement jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court. 
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to approach the Court for further directions once they have realised that SASSA would 
not be able to comply with the court order. 
The Court did adhere to the norm of judicial impartiality in this case. The Court 
placed significant emphasis on the interests of grant beneficiaries, but nevertheless 
granted fair opportunities to the respondents to make arguments with regard to what 
the most appropriate remedy would be.278 
 
4 3 3 2 4 Evaluation of Black Sash 
 
(a) Consideration of factors in designing effective relief 
 
The relief granted by the Court in Black Sash can be regarded as effective. The 
Court considered all five different factors for effective relief. This is not only evident 
from the Court’s reasoning, but also from the remedy ultimately granted. The Court 
granted a managerially strong and detailed structural interdict with many built in 
safeguards aimed at securing compliance. The stringent reporting back requirements 
coupled with the independent monitors placed the Court in a good position to give 
further ancillary orders if circumstances change.  
 
(b) Norms for public law remedies 
 
The remedial phase in this litigation is congruent with Sturm’s norms for public law 
remedies. The Court allowed participation by diverse stakeholders in order to help it 
with the remedial design. This is apparent from the admission of both Corruption 
Watch and the South African Post Bank as amici curiae in this case.279 The Court also 
granted access to Freedom under Law to intervene in the application, thus allowing 
diverse interests to enter the enquiry.280 
                                            
278 See Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) paras 73-75 where it is clear 
that the Court wanted SASSA to participate in the remedial process. 
279 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) paras 38-39. 
280 Para 37. 
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The Court further adhered to the separation of powers doctrine. The remedy in this 
case is very intrusive, but the Court did give ample opportunity for the Minister and 
SASSA to present the Court with facts via the issued directives.281 The Court thereafter 
exercised its remedial powers as set out in sections 38 and 172(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. The Court has previously stated that if it grants a remedy “that constitutes 
an intrusion into the domain of the executive [in order to protect a right], [then] that is 
an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself”.282 
 
4 3 4 Conclusion 
 
It is clear from the above case analysis that structural interdicts do have the 
potential to constitute effective relief in cases dealing with the systemic violation of 
socio-economic rights. All of the cases discussed above had some success in terms 
of remediation. However, subsequent litigation will often ensue in cases where the 
courts did not retain full supervisory jurisdiction, as was seen in Allpay 2.283 This can 
render the remedy ineffective since parties who resort to socio-economic rights 
                                            
281 This does not only indicate adherence to the separation of powers norm, but also promotes 
the judicial impartiality norm since the Court gave the respondents a fair chance to explain 
their side of the story. 
282 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 99. 
283 Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education 2014 3 SA 441 (ECM) is another good example 
of where non-compliance ensued after the Court neglected to retain supervisory jurisdiction 
over the case, despite articulating the need for such a remedy (para 36). This case concerned 
the serious school furniture shortage in the Eastern Cape. The Court found that this amounted 
to the systemic violation of the right to a basic education. However, the Court neglected to 
retain supervision, ordering the respondents to provide the necessary furniture and to only 
approach the court by way of application if it foresees its own inability to comply with the 
mandamus. Granting a proper structural interdict with retained jurisdiction could possibly have 
avoided the last consent order in 2016 and the systemic violation could have been rectified 
earlier. The latest consent order was the result of a combination of the respondent’s 
application for an extension of the timeframe and a counter application by the Centre for Child 
Law asking for systemic relief. See Centre for Child Law v Minister of Basic Education (ECM) 
14-01-2016 case no 2144/12 in which the order, in the form of a structural interdict, required 
the appointment of a task team by the Minister. This task team was tasked with preparing a 
consolidated list of the furniture needs of all public schools in the Eastern Cape (para 2). The 
Department was ordered to provide furniture accordingly and to report on the progress made 
(paras 8–9). 
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litigation are almost always poor and marginalised members of society who might not 
have the necessary resources or assistance from civil society organisations to bring 
subsequent litigation. 
One can also conclude, based on the case discussions above, that broad 
participation is crucial in order to design a remedy that can effectively remedy a 
systemic socio-economic rights violation. Black Sash is the only judgment discussed 
here that sufficiently adhered to this remedial norm. The remedies granted in EN, 
Allpay and Rudolph fell short to the extent that diverse interests were not 
accommodated and were as a result less effective. 
Lastly, it is also clear that the circumstances under which structural interdict 
remedies will be appropriate for systemic violations will often overlap. Both Black Sash 
and EN illustrate this point. The relevant government agencies in both cases were 
recalcitrant and non-compliance in both cases would have resulted in catastrophic 
consequences. Millions of people would not have been able to support themselves 
and their dependents if social grants were not paid and HIV positive prisoners could 
possibly have died if they did not receive the necessary medicine. These two cases 
further illustrate that detailed mandatory interdicts ordered as part of a larger structural 
interdict will be appropriate and justified in cases where violations must be urgently 
rectified in order to prevent grave consequences. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated the structural interdict remedy and its specific potential to 
constitute appropriate and effective relief in cases dealing with systemic socio-
economic rights violations. The first part of this chapter discussed the nature of the 
structural interdict remedy. The remedial powers of courts to grant a structural interdict 
were firstly discussed, followed by a critical analysis of the different elements and 
features of a structural interdict.  
The second part of this chapter critically analysed and evaluated case law in which 
structural interdicts were granted to remedy systemic socio-economic rights violations. 
The discussions were grouped under the three main scenarios in which these 
remedies will be appropriate in systemic cases, as identified by Roach and 
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Budlender.284 It was concluded that the relief as granted in these cases was partially 
effective and did meet most of the legitimacy norms proposed by Sturm. However, it 
is clear from the case discussions that the failure to retain supervision and the absence 
of broad participation will render a remedy less effective and increase the likelihood 
for the need of subsequent litigation in order to remedy the systemic violation. 
                                            
284 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 350. 
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Chapter 5: Designing structural remedies to provide effective relief in socio-
economic rights cases  
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the structural interdict as an appropriate and 
effective remedy in cases where socio-economic rights have been systemically 
violated. It was established that the structural interdict does have the potential to 
constitute effective relief. This remedy, although flexible, must include certain 
components in order to be effective.  
This chapter consists of two main parts. The first part of this chapter will consider 
the traditional concerns which arise when structural interdicts are granted to enforce 
socio-economic rights. These concerns are related to the separation of powers 
doctrine, the democratic legitimacy of the courts and also the institutional capacity of 
the judiciary. This discussion will be followed by a brief analysis of the different 
structural interdict models as identified by Sturm in order to investigate the 
responsiveness of these models to the concerns and to evaluate them against the 
overarching norms for public law remedies. 
The second part of this chapter will propose a participatory structural interdict model 
which seeks to address the concerns as identified in the first part of the chapter, but 
which will simultaneously constitute effective relief in cases involving the systemic 
violation of socio-economic rights. This discussion will consider participation as a key 
element of the structural interdict remedy and what role, if any, the court should play 
in a participatory process. 
 
5 2 Concerns regarding the granting of structural interdicts in systemic socio-
economic rights cases 
 
There are a number of legitimate concerns which arise when socio-economic rights 
are enforced. These concerns are exacerbated in cases where the structural interdict 
remedy is used to enforce these rights as this remedy is perceived to be an intrusive 
and undemocratic remedy. These concerns question whether granting managerial 
remedies breach the separation of powers doctrine, as well as whether the judiciary 
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possesses the democratic legitimacy and institutional capacity to grant these 
remedies. 
 
5 2 1 Separation of powers 
 
The separation of powers doctrine is often raised as an argument against the 
granting of a structural interdict.1 Sturm notes that both courts and critics are 
concerned that the courts’ role in the public remedial process will breach the doctrine 
of separation of powers.2 This doctrine is based on the principle that citizens must be 
protected from the abuse of State power and that the “division of centralised 
institutionalised power” is essential for this protection.3 This doctrine consists of four 
principles. There must firstly be a formal distinction between the executive, legislative 
and judicial branches of government.4 Secondly, each of these three branches must 
be staffed by different officials.5 Thirdly, each branch is assigned its own focal role.6 
Lastly, each branch must have the necessary powers “to keep a check on the others 
so that an equilibrium in the separation and distribution of powers may be upheld”.7 
                                            
1 N Swanepoel “Die Aanwending van die Gestruktureerde Interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Konstitusionele Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige Beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 LitNet Akademies 
374 382. See also M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human 
Rights Commission to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South 
Africa” (2008) 83 NYU L Rev 1565 1584 and S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the 
Judicial Review of Resource Allocation Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD 
dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2015) 297. 
2 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1403. 
3 P Labuschagne “The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and its Application in South Africa” 
(2004) 23 Politeia 84 85. See also K O'Regan “Checks and Balances Reflections on the 
Development of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers under the South African Constitution” 
(2005) 8 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1. 
4 P Labuschagne “The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and its Application in South Africa” 
(2004) 23 Politeia 84 87. 
5 87. This is, according to Sturm, the crux of the criticism against the public remedial process, 
since structural interdict opponents focus on “the proper division of responsibility among the 
judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government.” S P Sturm “A Normative Theory 
of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1404. 
6 P Labuschagne “The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and its Application in South Africa” 
(2004) 23 Politeia 84 87. 
7 87. 
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The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”) does not 
make provision for the separation of powers doctrine explicitly,8 but the Constitutional 
Court confirmed in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath that 
the Constitution does in fact provide for such a separation of powers amongst the 
judicial, legislative and executive branches of government.9 The Constitutional Court 
has stated that “[c]ourts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and 
the Constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other branches of government”.10 
It is against this backdrop that the structural interdict is criticised for moving courts into 
the terrain of the other branches of government.11 
Critics argue that courts become unduly involved in the functions of especially the 
executive branch of government when ordering managerial remedies like the structural 
interdict. The Supreme Court of Appeal has stated: 
 
“Structural interdicts… have a tendency to blur the distinction between the executive and 
the judiciary and impact on the separation of powers. They tend to deal with policy matters 
and not with the enforcement of particular rights.”12 
 
This impact on the separation of powers doctrine occurs since court orders in the 
form of structural interdicts aimed at rectifying systemic socio-economic rights 
                                            
8 Constitutional Principle VI of Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 200 of 1993 required the Final Constitution to make provision for the separation of powers 
doctrine and Constitutional Principle VII made provision for an impartial judiciary with the 
power to enforce and protect the Constitution. 
9 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) paras 18-22. 
10 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 12 BCLR 1399 (CC) 
para 37. See also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 
2000 2 SA 1 (CC) para 66 and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 
721 (CC) para 98. 
11 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 192. 
12 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 39. See also National 
Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 6 SA 223 (CC) para 93 where Froneman 
J stated that policy decisions made by the executive must be contested in the political process 
and not in the courts. 
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infringements will often have an impact on budgetary and policy related questions.13 
These questions are considered to fall to the exclusive terrain of the legislative and 
executive branches of the government.14 
However, the separation of powers doctrine must be understood in light of the 
Constitution. The doctrine, as stated above, assigns the function to adjudicate to the 
courts.15 This includes the power to grant remedies that are effective, just and 
equitable.16 The Constitutional Court has confirmed this, stating that the separation of 
powers doctrine does not only limit the courts’ powers, but also invests it with the 
power to grant effective remedies in cases where the Constitution has been violated.17 
This is congruent with the checks and balances principle noted above. Sabel and 
Simon note in this regard that structural injunction type remedies can provide an 
“accountability-reinforcing” role for the courts which is in line with our traditional notions 
of checks and balances.18  
Hirsch similarly argues that the structural interdict remedy can improve executive 
accountability, stating that this remedy “vindicates separation of powers concerns”.19 
                                            
13 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 192. 
14 192. 
15 See National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 6 SA 223 (CC) para 64 
where the Court, in discussing the separation of powers doctrine in the context of interim 
interdicts, states that “[t]he exercise of all public power is subject to constitutional control.” 
16 S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation 
Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 297. 
17 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 42. 
18 C F Sabel & W H Simon “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 
117 Harv LR 1015 1090. 
19 D E Hirsch “A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law” (2007) 9 Or 
Rev Int'l L 1 62. Judicial review and enforcement of socio-economic rights can similarly 
promote legislative accountability. See R Dixon “Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic 
Rights: Strong-form Versus Weak-form Judicial Review Revisited” (2007) 5 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 391 394 where the author argues that courts are well placed to 
“counter failures of inclusiveness and responsiveness” by the legislature because the judicial 
process is “coercive” and participatory. She further states (406) that this role for the court is 
congruent with a dialogic understating of constitutionalism and that courts are obliged to 
pronounce socio-economic rights violations arising from legislative “blockages”. 
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She argues that in the past, the High Court has issued structural interdicts while 
granting the executive a significant degree of discretion by merely requiring it to fulfil 
its constitutional obligations through the promulgation of reasonable policies which 
would address the socio-economic rights violations in the relevant cases.20 Hirsch 
states that separation of powers-based concerns would have been more pressing if 
the High Court had instructed the executive on precisely how these policies should be 
drafted.21 Davis agrees when he argues that the structural interdict is not supposed to 
replace the State administration with the judiciary – to the contrary, the remedy can be 
designed so as to afford sufficient leeway to the State to design the remedy without 
reducing the efficacy of the remedial process.22  
 
5 2 2 Democratic legitimacy 
 
The second concern that will be discussed is the democratic legitimacy of the 
courts.23 The democratic legitimacy concern refers primarily to the legislative branch 
                                            
20 Hirsch argues this with reference to Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 
277 (C) and Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 4 BCLR 356 (T). See D E 
Hirsch “A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law” (2007) 9 Or Rev 
Int'l L 1 62. 
21 62.  
22 D Davis “Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record of the Constitutional Court 
after Ten Years” (2004) 5 ESR Review 3 6. See also E Ling "From Paper Promises to Real 
Remedies: The Need for the South African Constitutional Court to Adopt Structural Interdicts 
in Socioeconomic Rights Cases" (2015) 9 H K J Legal Stud 51 65 where the author argues 
that the non-specificity of the structural interdict remedy is aimed at granting government the 
discretion to decide how best to remedy a socio-economic rights violation in order to respect 
the separation of powers doctrine. 
23 Mbazira states that democratic legitimacy concerns with regard to socio-economic rights 
and structural interdicts have two dimensions. The first is the separation of powers concern 
as discussed above, and it is legal in nature. The second dimension is political in nature and 
is concerned with the democratic legitimacy of the courts. C Mbazira Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 
233. Compare with M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human 
Rights Commission to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South 
Africa” (2008) 83 NYU L Rev 1565 1579 where the author discusses democratic legitimacy 
and separation of powers as one broad concern. 
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of government.24 Critics argue that unelected judges should not invalidate policies and 
decisions made by officials who are, unlike the judges, accountable to the public.25 It 
can furthermore be argued that if courts lack the democratic legitimacy to invalidate 
government decisions and policies, they would similarly lack the democratic legitimacy 
to impose judicially crafted solutions upon these branches of government. Mbazira 
argues that this concern is most prominent at the remedial stage of socio-economic 
rights adjudication since the enforcement of these rights is often resource intensive.26 
Critics argue that policy and budgetary issues arising from socio-economic rights 
litigation should be addressed “by debate through the established democratic 
systems” and not through unelected judges.27  
Courts granting structural interdicts with budgetary and policy implications are thus, 
according to this line of critique, acting in a counter majoritarian manner.28 However, 
such criticism reveals a narrow understanding of democracy.29 Democracy also 
includes the notions of the rule of law and constitutionalism.30 These notions can act 
                                            
24 See C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between 
Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 93 where the author regards this concern as 
referring to both the legislative branch and the executive branch of government. See also R 
Dixon “Creating Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-form Versus Weak-form 
Judicial Review Revisited” (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional Law 391 406 where 
the author states that South African courts have a duty to rectify legislative failures. 
25 M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission 
to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” (2008) 83 
NYU L Rev 1565 1580. See also M Pieterse “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of 
Socio-Economic Rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 390 where the author discusses the concern 
of unelected officials intruding on the domain of the democratically accountable branches of 
the government. 
26 28. See chapter three part 3 2 1 3 2 (b) where the resource intensive nature of socio-
economic rights enforcement is discussed. 
27 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 28. 
28 28. Counter majoritarian conduct refers to the setting aside of democratically reached 
decisions by unelected and unaccountable judges.  
29 32. See also S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties 
(2008) 105 where the author argues that democracy aims to “increase the scope for 
deliberation” and that courts are well suited to facilitate such deliberations. 
30 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 32. Constitutionalism and the rule of law are two separate but 
complementary notions. South African courts have applied these notions concurrently. See 
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as limitations on the will and conduct of the majority. This function of democracy is 
essential for the protection of minority and marginalised groups, since they do not 
necessarily have adequate political representation to ensure that their rights and 
interests are protected.31 The protection of minority interests is guaranteed by the 
inclusion of justiciable rights in the Constitution,32 in which it is further acknowledged 
that the Bill of Rights forms the cornerstone of the South African democracy.33 The 
State’s conduct must be congruent with these rights and courts are constitutionally 
mandated to protect the Constitution and to ensure that the legislative and executive 
branches of government exercise their powers in accordance with the constitutional 
limitations.34 Courts have wide remedial powers to do this and the other branches of 
the State must obey these orders.35 
The Constitutional Court stated in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg36 that litigation 
which concerns the positive socio-economic obligations of government is aimed at 
holding government accountable and this encourages participatory democracy.37 
                                            
for example Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1998 2 SA 374 (CC) and Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille 1999 4 SA 863 
(SCA). 
31 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 32. See Larbi-Odam v Member of the Executive Council for 
Education (North-West Province) 1997 12 BCLR 1655 (CC) para 28 where the Constitutional 
Court confirmed that conduct or legislation representing the will of the majority must be 
pronounced as unconstitutional if it infringes on the rights of the minority in a constitutional 
democracy. 
32 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 9. 
33 S7 of the Constitution. See also M Pieterse “What Do We Mean When We Talk About 
Transformative Constitutionalism?” (2005) 20 SA Public Law 155 161 where the author states 
that s7 of the Constitution has two main implications. It firstly conceptualises South African 
democracy as being based on the values of dignity, equality and freedom and it secondly 
establishes that the rights enshrined in the Constitution must be extended to all who live in 
South Africa.  
34 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 35. 
35 S165(5) of the Constitution states that “[a]n order or decision issued by a court binds all 
persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies.” See chapter two part 2 2 1 and 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 113 in relation to 
the remedial powers of South African courts. 
36 2010 3 BCLR 239 (CC). 
37 Para 160. 
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Budlender goes further, arguing that structural interdict remedies granted in such 
systemic cases, where positive obligations have not been met, can “create spaces for 
a dialogue between the court, the government and civil society actors”.38 Structural 
interdicts thus have the potential to foster a participatory process which, if employed 
in systemic socio-economic rights cases, can moreover promote the constitutional 
values of accountability, responsiveness and openness.39 Structural interdicts granted 
in appropriate socio-economic rights cases will thus not only be congruent with our 
constitutional democracy, but can in fact strengthen it. 
 
5 2 3 Institutional capacity of courts 
 
Another concern regarding the granting of structural interdicts is related to the 
perceived lack of institutional capacity of courts to grant strongly managerial 
remedies.40 This concern is practical in nature since it is not concerned with “whether 
the courts should perform certain tasks, but whether they can perform those tasks 
competently”.41 This concern has two distinct dimensions.42 The first dimension has to 
do with the court’s capacity to make decisions dealing with social policy and public 
finance. Judges who are trained to apply legal principles are “ill-equipped to evaluate 
and adjudicate more complex questions of social policy”43 and public finance and 
should therefore not be involved in such decisions. This concern is thus based on the 
                                            
38 G Budlender “The Role of the Courts in Achieving the Transformative Potential of Socio-
Economic Rights” (2007) 8 ESR Review 9 11. 
39 S1(d) of the Constitution. See also G Budlender “The Role of the Courts in Achieving the 
Transformative Potential of Socio-Economic Rights” (2007) 8 ESR Review 9 11 and part 5 4 
4 below in this chapter where participatory structural interdicts are discussed. 
40 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1406. 
41 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 30. 
42 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 72. 
43 M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission 
to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” (2008) 83 
NYU L Rev 1565 1582. 
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perceived lack of expertise of judges, who are better equipped to deal with questions 
of law.44 The Constitutional Court has stated: 
 
“Important though our review functions are, there are areas where institutional incapacity 
and appropriate constitutional modesty require us to be especially cautious.”45 
 
This concern also includes another aspect which is often neglected in academic 
literature, namely the technical and resource capacity of courts to practically 
implement supervisory orders.46 The supervisory element of structural interdicts 
creates a unique challenge for courts that are mostly equipped to grant “once-off” 
remedies which do not require ongoing judicial supervision and involvement.47 This 
concern is exacerbated where remedies are granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and Constitutional Court, as these courts do not have different branches and are thus 
solely responsible for all cases to be heard by them. These courts can thus be easily 
over-burdened where a managerial role is assumed.48  
The second dimension of the institutional capacity concern relates to the “many 
complex and unpredictable social and economic repercussions” which might arise 
                                            
44 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 3 BCLR 239 (CC) para 60. Hirsch similarly states 
that courts are experts at determining legal questions such as fact and causation. However, 
structural interdict remedies demand of courts to “discover and address the political, economic 
and social factors” that led to the systemic rights violation. D E Hirsch “A Defense of Structural 
Injunctive Remedies in South African Law” (2007) 9 Or Rev Int'l L 1 63. 
45 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 58. 
46 See part 5 4 4 3 2 in this chapter where suggestions are made as to how courts can retain 
supervisory jurisdiction without overburdening themselves. 
47 Bishop supports this position in stating that the granting of a structural interdict might place 
a court in a position where it does not have adequate resources to fulfil its obligations. M 
Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-36. 
48 Ebadolahi argues that the granting of structural interdicts may lead to prohibitive 
enforcement costs and resource diversion for courts and so the author suggests involving the 
South African Human Rights Commission to assist courts with their supervisory functions. M 
Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission to 
Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” (2008) 83 NYU 
L Rev 1565 1597. See part 5 4 4 3 2 in this chapter where this suggestion is discussed. 
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when judges decide on disputes of a polycentric nature.49 Polycentric disputes are 
disputes which will typically give rise to a diverse set of unforeseeable 
consequences.50 A judicial decision on such a dispute might result in unforeseen 
consequences for rights and parties who are not before the court in a specific case, 
because the court suffers from an information deficit and will thus be unable to predict 
all possible outcomes. Fuller argues that problems like these can possibly be solved 
by parliamentary processes where all interested parties can come together to 
negotiate a solution to a problem.51 
Sturm argues that this concern is overstated in the public law remedial context since 
proponents of this concern fail to take innovative developments in terms of the 
remedial process into account.52 She refers in this regard to the participatory 
processes which have been developed and incorporated into the remedial process in 
the United States. The court’s deficient knowledge and inability to foresee all the 
possible repercussions of its orders can to a large extent be solved by incorporating 
as many different interests and perspectives into the remedial design phase as 
possible. A court should thus allow all different parties who will be affected by its 
remedy to participate.53 Another innovative remedial development which can help 
alleviate the institutional capacity concern is the retention of supervision by the court 
over the implementation of the remedy.54 Van der Berg states that this development 
allows for revisable judgments in order to accommodate changed circumstances or 
                                            
49 M Pieterse “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2004) 
20 SAJHR 383 392. 
50 72. See also L Fuller “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv LR 353 394. 
51 Fuller refers to this as a political contract. L Fuller “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” 
(1978) 92 Harv LR 353 400. See C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: 
A Choice Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 46 where the author argues that 
legislative processes might be inadequate to deal with polycentric issues since parties with an 
interest in policy formulation might be poor and politically unorganised and thus not adequately 
represented. 
52 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1408. 
53 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 235. See also S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the 
Judicial Review of Resource Allocation Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD 
dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2015) 298. 
54 See chapter four part 4 2 3 where this is discussed as one of the peculiar features of the 
structural interdict remedy. 
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new information that might not have been available at the time when the remedy was 
initially granted.55  
Sturm further rejects arguments against the courts’ remedial role in public law cases 
based on capacity concerns by referring to the judiciary’s “insolation from narrow 
political pressures”, the ability to collect information through non-bureaucratic 
structures and the potential ability to facilitate diverse participation.56 It is these 
qualities which lead to Mbazira arguing that a court’s capacity to grant remedies in 
cases where socio-economic rights have been systemically violated should not only 
be assessed in terms of the court’s institutional limitations, but also in terms of its 
advantages.57 
Another argument against the court’s incapacity to order structural interdicts in 
socio-economic rights cases is based on the fact that this role does not significantly 
differ from a court’s usual obligations relating to complex matters. Hirsch states in this 
regard that “[r]emedial orders in institutional litigation are similar to, and no more 
complex than, the traditional duties of a judge”.58 For example, judges are often called 
upon to evaluate complex evidence in certain medical, financial, and criminal law 
cases without their competency being questioned.  
 
5 2 4 Conclusion 
 
It emerges from the above discussion that the concerns regarding the separation of 
powers doctrine and the democratic legitimacy are not insurmountable.59 Critique 
                                            
55 S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation 
Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 303–304. See also C F Sabel & W H Simon “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 117 Harv LR 1016 1080. 
56 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1407. 
57 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 193. 
58 D E Hirsch “A Defense of Structural Injunctive Remedies in South African Law” (2007) 9 Or 
Rev Int'l L 1 64. 
59 32. See also M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights 
Commission to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” 
(2008) 83 NYU L Rev 1565 1580 where the author states that “the legitimacy objection has 
fallen out of favor”. 
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relating to these perceived shortcomings of the judiciary is valid in many respects, yet 
does not fully account for the nature and peculiar features of the structural interdict. 
Structural interdict remedies should not be ordered in a way which would amount to 
“democracy by decree”.60 Judges should not formulate budgets or policies as part of 
a structural interdict, but should merely direct the State to fulfil its constitutional 
obligations under court supervision.61 
Concerns relating to the institutional capacity of courts to grant structural interdicts 
in cases where socio-economic rights have been systemically violated are especially 
prominent. Ignoring these concerns will affect the efficacy of the remedy since courts 
self-admittedly do not always possess the necessary knowledge or skills to remedy 
these violations. It was argued that including diverse interests into the remedial 
enquiry, while granting sufficient leeway to the State to devise detailed remedial plans, 
will largely alleviate these concerns.62 This study will further propose a participatory 
form of the structural interdict which mitigates both separation of powers- and 
competency-based concerns.63  
 
5 3 Deficient models of the structural interdict 
 
The flexibility inherent in structural interdicts has led to courts developing different 
forms or models of the structural interdict in order to provide effective and appropriate 
relief to litigants.64 This part of the study will briefly consider the different models as 
identified by Sturm and identify both the strengths and weaknesses of each model in 
                                            
60 D Davis “Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record of the Constitutional Court 
after Ten Years” (2004) 5 ESR Review 3 6. The concept “democracy by decree” comes from 
Sandler and Schoenbrod’s famous work critiquing structural interdict remedies in the United 
States context. See R Sandler & D Schoenbrod Democracy by Decree: What Happens when 
Courts run Government (2003). 
61 See chapter four part 4 2 for a discussion of the nature of structural interdicts. 
62 See part 5 4 1 in this chapter where the advantages of participatory remedial models are 
discussed. 
63 See part 5 4 4 below in this chapter. 
64 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 180. 
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terms of the remedial norms for public law remedies as well as the ability of each 
model to address the concerns discussed above.65  
 
5 3 1 Report-back-to-court model 
 
Ling states that the “reporting-back model” is the most common model of the 
structural interdict used by South African courts.66 This model will typically consist of 
five elements. Firstly, there must be government conduct that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and the court must declare it as such.67 Secondly, the court must order 
government to comply with its constitutional obligations.68 Thirdly, government will be 
ordered to provide the court with a report. This report must be produced within a period 
of time specified by the court.69 It can also be ordered that the report must, in addition 
to being given to the court, be provided to people who are not parties to the litigation.70 
Fourthly, the applicant should be granted an opportunity to comment on the report 
lodged by government.71 The court can also issue further guidelines when the reports 
are submitted in order to regulate “further engagement between the parties” so as to 
                                            
65 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1365. 
See also chapter two part 2 3 1 for a discussion of these norms. 
66 E Ling “From Paper Promises to Real Remedies: The Need for the South African 
Constitutional Court to Adopt Structural Interdicts in Socioeconomic Rights Cases” (2015) 9 H 
K J Legal Stud 51 62. It is important to distinguish between a reporting back order which is not 
a structural interdict as discussed in chapter four part 4 2 2 and the report-back-to-court model 
of the structural interdict as discussed here. 
67 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 199. 
68 199. 
69 199. This period of time can be extended by the court if it is in the interest of justice to do 
so. 
70 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 424. See also M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human 
Rights Commission to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South 
Africa” (2008) 83 NYU L Rev 1565 1590. 
71 Mbazira argues that the fact that the other parties can inspect the plan promotes the 
remediation norm, see C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice 
Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 190. 
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ultimately ensure successful compliance with the court order.72 Finally, the matter will 
be heard by the court and the report can then be made an order of court.73 
Sturm states that this model is congruent with the overarching remedial norms of 
respect for the separation of powers doctrine and judicial impartiality, since the court 
does not impose a court-designed remedy on the parties.74 However, this deferential 
approach to remedial design does compromise the legitimacy of the remedy.75 This 
approach will limit the participation of diverse stakeholders in the remedial process 
and this will ultimately “bear on the development of an appropriate remedy”.76 She 
supports this argument by stating that remedies designed by way of the report-back-
to-court model do not integrate diverse interests and will thus often not “redress the 
underlying legal violation”.77 This can lead to inadequate compliance with the norm of 
remediation. 
The lack of diverse participation will inevitably have implications for the court’s 
capacity to anticipate and possibly pre-empt polycentric consequences, since a lack 
of participation results in an information deficit for the adjudicating court. This model 
of the structural interdict will thus not be able to adequately address concerns relating 
to the court’s institutional capacity. However, the deferential nature of this model will 
contribute to the alleviation of concerns relating to separation of powers and 
democratic legitimacy. 
  
                                            
72 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 424. 
73 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 199. 
74 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1412. 
See also C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between 
Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 184. 
75 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1412. 
76 1412.  
77 1412. Mbazira argues that the bargaining process will allow parties to consider information 
and other interests which were not before the court but that might still affect the successful 
implementation of the remedy, see C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa: A Choice Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 184. 
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5 3 2 The bargaining model 
 
The bargaining model is aimed at overcoming some of the difficulties associated 
with the traditional, adversarial mode of adjudication when applied to cases dealing 
with systemic rights infringements. This model requires parties to find a remedial 
solution themselves.78 The court will consider the remedial suggestion if the parties 
come to an agreement and this suggestion will then be made an order of court if 
appropriate.79 The court can also follow a more indirect approach by ordering the 
parties to submit proposals as to how the infringement can be remedied. This will be 
enforced by penalising one or more parties with an unfavourable order if no agreement 
is reached.80 In addition, the court can order that negotiations be mediated by a third 
party or that the parties should reach an agreement on how a specific remedy should 
be implemented.81 
Sturm highlights certain deficiencies that are discernible from this model. She 
argues that the bargaining process will often take place at the expense of diverse 
participation since parties who are interested in achieving agreement will try to exclude 
those who might have conflicting interests.82 This includes those who must ultimately 
live with the remedy, thus negatively affecting both the remediation norm and the 
participation norm since the consent remedy will not represent their interests.83  
The bargaining model further does not make provision for any accountability 
mechanisms. Parties are mostly represented by lawyers and will thus often not be 
directly involved in the process. The interests of represented parties might thus be 
                                            
78 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1368. 
79 This promotes the norm of remediation since the court will evaluate the proposed remedy 
before making it an order of court. 
80 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-3. 
81 Such an agreement must still be presented to the court so that it can be made a final order 
of the court if appropriate. N Swanepoel “Die Aanwending van die Gestruktureerde Interdik in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Konstitusionele Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige Beregtingsproses” (2015) 
12 LitNet Akademies 374 380. 
82 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1415. 
83 1416. 
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diminished in favour of reaching consensus.84 This drive to reach consensus will also 
have a negative impact on the reasoned decision making norm since parties do not 
have to consider all possible remedial solutions when conducting negotiations.85 
This model of the structural interdict is furthermore deficient because of its inability 
to adequately address the concerns as identified in the beginning of this chapter. 
Concerns relating to institutional capacity and polycentricity will be present when this 
model is employed by a court, since this model does not ensure that participation will 
be diverse. However, this model does adequately address the concerns relating to 
separation of powers and democratic legitimacy given that the ensuing remedy will not 
be court-imposed. 
 
5 3 3 The legislative or administrative hearing model 
 
The legislative or administrative hearing model of adjudication requires the court to 
conduct informal hearings where a wide range of parties can participate.86 The 
purpose of these hearings is to allow a diverse set of interests to enter the enquiry as 
to what the most appropriate and effective remedy will be. The court will thus allow 
parties who were not before the court during the liability determination stage of 
adjudication to also participate in the informal hearings.87 This model will be especially 
effective in dealing with polycentric issues as information will be before the court that 
                                            
84 1415. Sturm states that the representative lawyers will mostly “conform to the adversary 
model of representation” which will negatively affect the participation norm. 
85 1416. See also C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice 
Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 185 where the author discusses the 
bargaining model and its impact on the norm of reasoned decision making. 
86 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1370. 
The word “informal” is used to describe these hearings as courts often conduct these hearings 
with relaxed rules of evidence. M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-3. 
87 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 187. Mbazira argues (188) that the informal nature of the 
hearings renders them more accessible to poor and vulnerable people than formal processes, 
thus promoting the participation norm. 
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would not have been presented in the liability stage, thereby ameliorating the 
information deficit that courts often face in cases of systemic rights violations.88  
However, this model also suffers from some deficiencies. Sturm states that diverse 
participation is possible under this model, but that it comes at a cost. She argues that 
the norms of remediation and reasoned decision making are neglected since the focus 
is primarily on wide participation and not on the quality of the participation.89 She 
further states that the participation under this model might result in a process of “airing 
differences” rather than “developing solutions”.90 This will force the court to eventually 
either impose a court ordered remedy or to coerce the parties into an agreement. Both 
these options will in turn negatively impact both the impartiality and separation of 
powers norms and will thus exacerbate concerns relating to the democratic legitimacy 
of the court.91 
 
5 3 4 The expert remedial formulation model 
 
The expert remedial formulation model of adjudication entails that a court will 
appoint an expert or panel of experts to help in the formulation of the remedy.92 The 
court can alternatively also appoint a master who will then be responsible for 
coordinating the panel of experts and their operations.93 Mbazira draws a distinction 
between experts appointed in cases dealing with systemic issues and those appointed 
in cases dealing with other types of issues.94 He states that the role of experts in cases 
dealing with other issues will usually be limited to fact-finding exercises whereas 
experts in systemic cases will be tasked with formulating and proposing a remedy.95 
                                            
88 187. 
89 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1418. 
She states that it is unclear if participants will influence the eventual remedy. 
90 1418. 
91 1419. 
92 1371. See also N Swanepoel “Die Aanwending van die Gestruktureerde Interdik in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Konstitusionele Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige Beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 LitNet 
Akademies 374 381. 
93 381. 
94 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 188. 
95 188. 
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This model is similar to the administrative hearing model in that it aims to deal 
effectively with matters of a polycentric nature and to ensure that parties who are not 
before the court will also accept the remedy.96 
Sturm states that reasoned decision making is an “obvious strength” of the expert 
remedial formulation model.97 She also states that the appointed expert or experts can 
easily consult affected stakeholders which means that diverse participation is 
possible.98 However, she cautions that the form of participation under this model might 
not be meaningful since the expert decides who is and who is not allowed to 
participate. She further states that it is the expert who will use all the gathered evidence 
to design the remedy which contributes to the participation not being meaningful.99 
This model will furthermore satisfy the norm of judicial impartiality since the court can 
remain neutral during the remedial design phase.100  
This model is only partially effective in alleviating the concerns related to the 
granting of structural interdicts in socio-economic rights cases. The polycentricity 
concern will only be alleviated if the expert(s) allows diverse parties to participate. 
Furthermore, concerns relating to the separation of powers doctrine and democratic 
legitimacy might persist since it is not the parties themselves who actually design the 
remedy. The remedy will thus still be court imposed. 
 
5 3 5 Consensual remedial formulation model 
 
The consensual remedial formulation model demands that the parties to a case are 
mutually responsible for further fact-finding and that they must subsequently mutually 
design an appropriate remedy.101 The parties must be assisted by a third party during 
this process, and this model has thus been described by Swanepoel as akin to a 
                                            
96 188. 
97 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1419. 
98 1419. 
99 Mbazira similarly argues that participation under the expert remedial formulation model will 
be diverse, but limited in nature. C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: 
A Choice Between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 188. 
100 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1419. 
101 1374. 
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mediation process.102 Sturm notes that “[c]ollaborative remedial processes need not 
follow judicial determinations of liability” since parties can initiate such a process of 
their own accord.103 
The norm of respect for the separation of powers doctrine is sufficiently served by 
the consensual remedial formulation model since the relevant organs of state can 
participate in the formulation of the remedy.104 Government is moreover more likely to 
effectively implement a remedy which is the result of a process in which it participated, 
meaning that the norm of remediation is also satisfied by this model.105  
This model furthermore meets the norm of judicial impartiality since the judge is 
insulated from the negotiation process.106 However, this insulation is also the model’s 
greatest weakness. Sturm states: 
 
“The court’s minimal role in evaluating the adequacy of the process and outcome of 
remedial development poses the risk that the remedy will be rubber stamped, even if it was 
reached unfairly or fails to effectuate the underlying norm”.107 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the consensual remedial formulation model 
can be effective in alleviating the concerns related to structural interdict remedies in 
socio-economic rights cases. The fact that parties directly contribute to the formulation 
of the remedy mitigates the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy concerns. 
This collaborative effort by the parties in formulating the remedy will also contribute to 
the alleviation of the concerns relating to institutional capacity and polycentricity, since 
the parties most affected by the remedy and responsible for the implementation 
thereof will use their expert knowledge to formulate an appropriate remedy. 
                                            
102 N Swanepoel “Die Aanwending van die Gestruktureerde Interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Konstitusionele Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige Beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 LitNet Akademies 
374 381. 
103 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1375. 
See part 5 4 4 1 2 below in this chapter where it is argued that negotiations should only 
commence after the judicial determination of liability in order for the remedial process to fully 
adhere to the remedial norms as discussed in chapter two. 
104 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1425. 
105 1425. 
106 1426. 
107 1427. 
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5 3 6 Conclusion 
 
It emerges from the above discussion that all of the structural interdict models as 
discussed above have both strengths and deficiencies. The models are deficient in the 
sense that they only partially adhere to the norms for public law remedies as identified 
by Sturm and they do not satisfactory address the legitimacy and competence related 
concerns. However, it is also clear from the above discussion that all of these models 
do have potential to constitute effective relief, especially those models that are 
designed to allow diverse parties to participate in the remedial stage. The next part of 
this chapter will discuss and propose a model of the structural interdict which contains 
elements of the models discussed above, but which is largely based on Sturm’s 
deliberative model and the meaningful engagement model of the South African 
Constitutional Court. 
 
5 4 Designing an effective structural interdict model 
 
An effective structural interdict model in the context of this study must have two 
main goals. The first aim of the model is to provide effective relief to litigants and those 
similarly placed in systemic socio-economic rights cases by adhering to the norms for 
public law remedies108 and the factors that should be considered during the design 
phase as espoused in chapter two of this study.109 This model must thus allow for 
diverse participation by affected stakeholders and not unduly infringe on the terrain of 
the legislature or the executive branches of government. It must further ensure judicial 
impartiality and the subsequent remedy must be based on reasoned decision making. 
The model must also lastly adhere to the norm of remediation by ensuring that the 
violated right is adequately vindicated. 
This model must secondly be structured in a manner that will alleviate the concerns 
relating to the separation of powers doctrine, democratic legitimacy of the courts, and 
                                            
108 See chapter two part 2 3 1 for a discussion of the overarching norms for public law remedies 
as identified by Sturm. See also S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” 
(1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1410. 
109 See chapter two part 2 3 2 in this regard. 
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the institutional capacity of the judiciary. This can be accomplished by incorporating a 
participatory element into the structural interdict. 
 
5 4 1 Participatory adjudication as mitigating factor 
 
Liebenberg argues that the concerns regarding the court’s institutional legitimacy 
and competence can to a large extent be alleviated through employing participatory 
models of adjudication.110 Participation in the adjudication process can be enhanced 
in two different ways. It can firstly be enhanced by incorporating diverse interests into 
the adjudicatory process from the outset. Liebenberg suggests that this can be 
accomplished by broadening access to the courts, allowing amici curiae interventions, 
or joining stakeholders who are not parties to the case in the litigation.111 Another 
strategy, which is relevant to this study, is to employ participatory remedies.112 
There are three main advantages to employing participatory remedies in cases 
where socio-economic rights have been systemically violated. The first advantage is 
that it mitigates democratic legitimacy concerns by “decentring the judicial role” in the 
remedial design phase.113 This will be the effect if the court orders the State to consult 
other stakeholders and to then formulate a plan stipulating how it is going to comply 
with its constitutional obligations. Rodríguez-Garavito states: 
 
                                            
110 S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative 
Lessons from South African Evictions Law” (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 
317. 
111 317. See also S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource 
Allocation Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch 
University (2015) 298 and G Muller & S Liebenberg “Developing the Law of Joinder in the 
Context of Evictions of People from their Homes” (2013) 29 SAJHR 554. 
112 S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative 
Lessons from South African Evictions Law” (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 
318. 
113 319. See B Ray Engaging with Social Rights: Procedure, Participation and Democracy in 
South Africa's Second Wave (2016) 278 where the author states that “a participatory remedial 
process like engagement” gives the court access to much more information which will help the 
court in choosing the most effective remedy. 
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“[D]ialogic judgments tend to outline procedures and broad goals and, in line with the 
principle of separation of powers, place the burden on government agencies to design and 
implement policies.”114 
 
The second advantage of granting participatory remedies in socio-economic rights 
cases is that it will lessen institutional competence and polycentricity concerns.115 
Participatory remedies allow diverse interests to enter the remedial enquiry, thus 
broadening the information available to the court. Liebenberg suggests that 
information can be gathered “through the involvement of experts, human rights 
commissions/ombuds, and the convening of public hearings”.116  
Courts can further formulate the mandatory component of the structural interdict in 
general terms if it is unclear as to how the State should comply with its constitutional 
obligations due to a lack of information or polycentric consequences, thus avoiding 
institutional competency concerns.117 The State will then have sufficient leeway to 
decide how best to comply with its obligations. The government can subsequently 
report back to the court and other stakeholders to present its plan for evaluation.118 
Roach and Budlender explain the benefits of this approach as follows: 
                                            
114 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669 1691. 
115 S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative 
Lessons from South African Evictions Law” (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 
319. See also S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource 
Allocation Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch 
University (2015) 300–304. 
116 S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative 
Lessons from South African Evictions Law” (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 
319. 
117 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 334. See also S van der Berg A 
Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation Decisions Impacting on 
Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2015) 300. See further 
chapter four part 4 2 3 where flexibility as a quality of structural interdicts is discussed. It is 
this flexibility which makes a gradual approach as discussed here possible. This approach 
alone will, however, not be effective in urgent cases where there is a threat of irremediable 
harm, see chapter four part 4 3 3 in this regard. 
118 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 334. 
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“This approach to structural relief has some benefits to governments. It may provide 
governments with a timeline to follow. The approval of a plan by the court can allow the 
government to move forward with the implementation of its plan secure in the knowledge 
that implementation will constitute compliance with its obligations. The court can make an 
order which is as non-intrusive as possible on the choices which the elected government 
makes, because it can be secure in the knowledge that this will not be an invitation to non-
compliance but rather an invitation to the government to formulate a plan in order to achieve 
compliance with the Constitution.”119 
 
The third advantage is that participatory remedies are deemed to be more legitimate 
than those emanating from “unilateral legislative, executive or judicial action”.120 This 
is significant since the perceived legitimacy of a remedy will influence the efficacy of 
the implementation of the remedy. Liebenberg explains this by stating that 
participatory remedies will firstly decrease the possibility of “direct conflict” between 
the courts and the other two branches of government because of the leeway granted 
to the State, and secondly increase the “popular legitimacy” of the judiciary.121  
From the above discussion it thus appears that participatory adjudication models 
can contribute to alleviating the concerns traditionally associated with socio-economic 
rights adjudication. Furthermore, this chapter will investigate the meaningful 
engagement doctrine as developed by the Constitutional Court and consider how this 
can be incorporated into a structural interdict. Sturm’s deliberative model will be used 
to supplement this in order to ensure that the participatory structural interdict does not 
only alleviate the concerns as discussed above, but that it also amounts to effective 
relief. 
 
5 4 2 Contours of Sturm’s deliberative model 
 
Sturm’s deliberative structural remedy has been designed to specifically adhere to 
the overarching norms for public law remedies and can be used as a “template for 
                                            
119 334. 
120 S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative 
Lessons from South African Evictions Law” (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 
319. 
121 319. 
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structuring and evaluating the adequacy of the remedial process” in cases dealing with 
the violation of constitutional rights.122 This model is based on collaborative decision-
making and the aim is to include all parties with an interest in the case in the remedial 
stage of adjudication.123 The aim of this model is to allow the participants to “develop 
a consensual remedial solution” themselves whilst still adhering to the norms of 
participation, respect for separation of powers, impartiality, reasoned decision making 
and remediation.124 This model consists of three distinct stages, namely the pre-
negotiation stage,125 the negotiation stage126 and the implementation stage.127 Sturm 
states that the deliberative model is based on the consensual remedial formulation 
model in terms of the different stages of the remedial process and roles of the parties, 
but that a more significant role is envisioned for the court during all stages of the 
participatory process.128 The more comprehensive role envisaged for the court aims 
to address the shortcomings of the consensual remedial formulation model in order to 
ensure that the relief is effective.129 The structural interdict model proposed by this 
study incorporates this comprehensive judicial role and is thus largely based on 
Sturm’s deliberative model. This proposed model is furthermore based on the 
meaningful engagement jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court because of the 
potential of this development in South African constitutional law to be incorporated into 
structural interdict remedies. 
 
                                            
122 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1428. 
123 1427. 
124 1427. 
125 1428. The participatory process is endorsed and set up during this stage of Sturm’s model. 
This requires, among other things, the identification of all the role players and the 
establishment of the normative parameters of the remedy. See part 5 4 4 1 below where this 
is discussed in the context of the remedial model proposed by this study. 
126 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1422. 
127 1428. The implementation process requires that the consensual remedial solution must be 
incorporated into formal governmental processes. Furthermore, this stage requires the 
establishment of monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure successful implementation of the 
remedial solution (1423). See part 5 4 4 3 2 where different monitoring mechanisms are 
discussed. 
128 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1427. 
129 1428. See part 5 3 5 above in this chapter where the consensual remedial formulation 
model and its deficiencies are discussed. 
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5 4 3 Meaningful engagement 
 
Liebenberg states that “there is much untapped potential in the structural interdict 
remedy to facilitate engagement” in order to remedy violations as determined during 
the liability stage of the adjudication.130 This part will thus consider how participation 
can be incorporated into the structural interdict. 
The Constitutional Court has developed a participatory adjudicatory model of 
meaningful engagement, originally situated within the context of evictions law.131 This 
doctrine has been developed as both a requirement for reasonable State action and 
policy with regard to socio-economic rights as well as a remedial model. A significant 
case which led to the development of this doctrine is Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers.132 This case concerned an eviction application by the local 
municipality against unlawful occupiers of private land. The Court discussed the 
complexities inherent in eviction cases and how it is difficult to reconcile property rights 
with housing rights. In considering how these complexities can be overcome, the Court 
stated:  
 
“The managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative ways. Thus 
one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the 
different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with each 
other in a pro-active and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions. Wherever 
possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third party should 
replace arms-length combat by intransigent opponents.”133 
                                            
130 S Liebenberg “Engaging the Paradoxes of the Universal and Particular in Human Rights 
Adjudication: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of ‘Meaningful Engagement’” (2012) 12 AHRLJ 1 
27. 
131 The Constitutional Court has since also employed the meaningful engagement doctrine to 
remedy other rights violations. See Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State 
Province v Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 7 for an example of where this had 
been extended to education rights disputes. See also S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches 
to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative Lessons from South African Evictions Law” 
(2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 313 and S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles 
and Meaningful Engagement in Education Rights Disputes” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 1 1. 
132 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC). 
133 Paras 39–41. See also Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 
BCLR 1169 (CC) para 87 where the Court, in describing how the unlawful occupation which 
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Meaningful engagement can be incorporated into the remedial process in one of 
two possible ways.134 Meaningful engagement can firstly be employed as a 
mechanism to democratise the implementation of the remedy. The Court will in such 
an instance still design the remedy but will order the parties to engage with regard to 
the implementation of the court’s remedy. Meaningful engagement as remedial 
mechanism can also be employed during the remedial design stage and thus 
contribute to the democratisation of the remedial enquiry process.135 
 
5 4 3 1  Participation at the design stage 
 
The Court utilised meaningful engagement as a remedy for the first time in 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg (“Olivia Road”).136 This case came 
before the Constitutional Court by way of appeal against an eviction order granted by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal against 400 occupiers.137 The eviction proceedings 
commenced after the City of Johannesburg issued notices that it would evict people 
from the so-called “bad buildings” in the inner city because of health and safety risks 
                                            
led to this case started, expressed its disappointment in the lack of engagement that took 
place prior to the litigation. The Court stated that it “would have expected officials of the 
municipality responsible for housing to engage with” the occupiers in order to try and solve the 
problem before turning to the courts for an eviction order. The subsequent judgment of Minister 
of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 2001 3 SA 1151 (CC) which dealt 
with the government’s plan to provide temporary housing to people who had been displaced 
by floods is also important in this context. The Court stated (para 111) that it would have been 
preferable and congruent with the “principles of good government” if the State first engaged 
with the concerned group of citizens before the commencement of the project. However, the 
Court found that the government’s conduct in this specific case was reasonable despite the 
lack of engagement. 
134 See L Chenwi “Democratizing the Socio-Economic Rights-Enforcement Process” in G H 
Alviar, K Klare & L A Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: 
Critical Inquiries (2014) 178 184 where the author discusses meaningful engagement with 
reference to the different stages of rights-enforcement. 
135 185. 
136 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). 
137 The eviction order was granted in City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 
6 SA 417 (SCA) after the City appealed an order by the High Court in City of Johannesburg v 
Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) interdicting the eviction of the occupiers. 
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in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. 
The evictions in this case were part of the Johannesburg Inner City Regeneration 
Strategy according to which 67 000 poor people stood to be evicted.138 The applicants 
opposed the eviction on two main grounds. They firstly argued that the evictions as 
sought by the City would violate their right to housing as protected by section 26(3). 
Secondly, they argued that the City failed to progressively realise the right to housing 
as mandated by section 26(2) of the Constitution.139 
The Court granted an interim order in the form of a structural interdict just two days 
after hearing oral argument. This interim order required the parties to “engage with 
each other meaningfully… in an effort to resolve the differences and difficulties aired 
in this application in the light of the values of the Constitution, the constitutional and 
statutory duties of the municipality and the rights and duties of the citizens 
concerned”.140 The parties were ordered to “file affidavits… reporting on the results of 
the engagement”.141 The Court retained jurisdiction, stating that the affidavits would 
be taken into account in granting a final order. The Court concluded by stating that 
“further directions” could be issued by the Court if necessary.142 
The Court justified the meaningful engagement order, stating that the City must 
have foreseen the possibility that their Inner City Regeneration Strategy would have 
led to people being left homeless. The Court further stated that the City should have 
engaged with the occupiers with regard to the probable evictions.143 The Court 
supported this statement with reference to Government of the Republic of South Africa 
v Grootboom and PE Municipality, in which the Court had stated that occupiers should 
be engaged before an eviction application is made.144 Meaningful engagement can 
                                            
138 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 19. 
139 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 10–15. 
140 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 5. 
141 Para 5. 
142 Para 5. 
143 Para 13. 
144 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) 
para 87 and Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 
39. 
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thus be seen as a factor that should be considered by a court in order to establish 
whether the government’s conduct is reasonable before an eviction order is granted.145 
An agreement was accordingly reached between the City and the occupiers, which 
was subsequently made an order of Court.146 The agreement included interim 
measures to be taken by the City which were aimed at making the building safer and 
more habitable.147 Agreement was also reached with regard to the City’s eviction 
application. This agreement required the City to provide alternative temporary housing 
to the occupiers in buildings identified as per the agreement.148 The agreement further 
specified how the rent for the temporary housing should be calculated, that permanent 
housing solutions were to be developed by the City, and that the occupiers should also 
be consulted in this regard.149 
What makes this case particularly significant is that the Court elaborated on what 
meaningful engagement is and how it should take place.150 The Court stated that it is 
a “two-way process” in which all parties should “act reasonably and in good faith” and 
that parties should thus resist from making “non-negotiable, unreasonable demands” 
                                            
145 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 22. The 
Court stated that the lack of meaningful engagement before litigation should negatively affect 
the eviction application. See also K Mclean “Meaningful Engagement: One Step Forward or 
Two Back? Some Thoughts on Joe Slovo” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 223 236 and 
G Muller “Conceptualising ‘Meaningful Engagement’ as a Deliberative Democratic 
Partnership” (2011) 22 Stell LR 742 743 in this regard. 
146 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 27. 
147 Para 25. These measures included “the installation of chemical toilets, the cleaning and 
sanitation of the buildings, the delivery of refuse bags, the closing of a certain lift shaft and the 
installation of fire extinguishers”. 
148 Para 26. 
149 Para 26. 
150 These directives were given in the context of eviction cases, but could also where 
appropriate be applied in cases dealing with the violation of other socio-economic rights. See 
G Muller “Conceptualising ‘Meaningful Engagement’ as a Deliberative Democratic 
Partnership” (2011) 22 Stell LR 742 756 where the author states that meaningful engagement 
can be used to enforce socio-economic rights in general. See also B Ray “Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg: Enforcing the Right to Adequate Housing Through 
‘Engagement’” (2008) 8 HRLR 703 712 where the author states that meaningful engagement 
as developed by the Constitutional Court can easily be extended to other contexts. 
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during the engagement process.151 The Court further stated that the engagement 
process should be transparent and that a “complete and accurate account of the 
[engagement] process” should be provided.152 Importantly, the Court also stated with 
regard to engagement in eviction cases that “[p]eople about to be evicted may be so 
vulnerable that they may not be able to understand the importance of engagement 
and may refuse to take part in the process. If this happens, a municipality cannot walk 
away without more”.153 
The Court furthermore commented on the crucial role that context will play in 
determining the contours of a meaningful engagement process in a given case: 
 
“[T]he larger the number of people potentially to be affected by eviction, the greater the 
need for structured, consistent and careful engagement. Ad hoc engagement may be 
appropriate in a small municipality where an eviction or two might occur each year, but is 
entirely inappropriate in the circumstances prevalent in the City.”154 
 
The form and structure of meaningful engagement will thus depend on the specific 
circumstances of the case and can be done on both an individual and collective 
level.155 The Court further stated that people such as council workers should manage 
                                            
151 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 14-20. See 
also G Muller “Conceptualising ‘Meaningful Engagement’ as a Deliberative Democratic 
Partnership” (2011) 22 Stell LR 742 755-756 in this regard. 
152 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 21. This 
requirement is congruent with Sturm’s reasoned decision making norm since a detailed 
account of the engagement process will help the court to establish whether the chosen remedy 
is based on “reliable factual foundations” and “identified, persuasive norms”. S P Sturm “A 
Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1411. 
153 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 15. 
154 Para 19. 
155 L Chenwi “’Meaningful Engagement' in the Realisation of Socio-Economic Rights: The 
South African Experience” (2011) 26 SAPL 128 143. See also B Ray “Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road v City of Johannesburg: Enforcing the Right to Adequate Housing Through 
‘Engagement’” (2008) 8 HRLR 703 711 and G Muller “Conceptualising ‘Meaningful 
Engagement’ as a Deliberative Democratic Partnership” (2011) 22 Stell LR 742 744. 
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the engagement process since special skills are needed to facilitate engagement 
between a powerful city and people who are “poor, vulnerable or illiterate”.156 
The meaningful engagement remedy which resulted in a court approved remedy as 
granted in this case can be considered to have been largely successful. It led to the 
successful resolution of the conflict between the parties since it “forced the 
government to encompass opinions of those affected by the decisions”.157 Liebenberg 
notes in this regard that the engagement process led to “concrete benefits” for the 
poor and marginalised occupiers.158 
 
5 4 3 2 Participation at the implementation stage 
 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes (“Joe 
Slove”) serves as an example of an instance where the parties were ordered to engage 
only after the remedy was designed by the court.159 The Constitutional Court had to 
decide whether or not to grant leave to appeal against an eviction order granted by 
the Western Cape High Court.160 A large community consisting of 20 000 people stood 
to be evicted from the Joe Slovo informal settlement and relocated fifteen kilometers 
away to Delft in order for the N2 Gateway Project development to commence.161 
A string of broken promises by the State led to a breakdown of trust between the 
Joe Slovo community and the authorities. The residents thus resisted their eviction 
and relocation.162 The authorities accordingly applied for an eviction order in terms of 
                                            
156 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 19. See part 
5 4 4 1 3 below where the role of the facilitator in participatory remedies is discussed and part 
5 4 4 2 where deliberative inequalities are addressed. 
157 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-12. 
158 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 420. 
159 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). 
160 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants WC 10-3-2008 case no 13189/07. 
161 This development formed part of a government programme which was aimed at replacing 
informal settlements with formal housing in terms of the Breaking New Ground Policy. See S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
304. 
162 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 
(CC) paras 30–34. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
167 
 
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(“PIE”). O’Regan J stated that the Court must consider “whether the N2 Gateway 
Project is reasonable” in terms of section 26 of the Constitution and “whether the 
processes to implement the plan have been reasonable”.163 
With regard to the implementation, O’Regan J stated that the most important 
enquiry was whether or not the parties had meaningfully engaged with each other.164 
It was common cause that no adequate and meaningful engagement took place 
between the parties.165 However, she concluded that the failure of the municipality to 
meaningfully engage with the residents did not render the implementation of the plan 
unreasonable. This conclusion was reached based on the fact that many residents 
had already co-operated with the municipality and were thus eagerly waiting for their 
houses to be built while staying in temporary housing.166 The judge further cited 
reasons relating to the desperate need for better and formal housing solutions and the 
fact that some, albeit inadequate, engagement did take place.167 
However, the Court did order the applicants and the respondents to meaningfully 
engage with each other with regard to how the eviction order should be 
implemented.168 The Court further ordered that the results of the engagement process 
had to be placed before the Court and that it could subsequently be made an order of 
court if appropriate.169 The parties were also instructed to engage with each other with 
regard to the allocation of permanent housing to those who had been moved to 
temporary housing and the processes necessary for the relocation.170 
Liebenberg refers to this incorporation of meaningful engagement into the remedy 
as an attempt “to remedy some elements of the defects in the engagement process” 
                                            
163 Para 294. See also para 353 where Sachs J discussed reasonableness. 
164 Para 297. 
165 Para 301. 
166 Para 303. 
167 Para 302. 
168 Para 7. The Court specified that the parties should engage about the date of the relocation, 
timetable of the relocation process, and any other matter to which the parties agree to engage 
on. 
169 Para 7. 
170 Para 7. 
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that had taken place prior to litigation.171 The failure by the Court to find that the 
inadequate engagement process did not render the eviction and relocation of the 
residents unjust is regrettable since this indicates a departure from the normative 
principle that was established in Olivia Road.172 It is also clear from the subsequent 
discharge of the remedy that the remedy as granted by the Court in this case was 
inappropriate and ineffective.173 Both the Court and the State assumed in Joe Slovo 
that in situ upgrading was not possible. Engagement prior to the design stage would 
have allowed more diverse interests to enter the remedial enquiry and both the Court 
and the State would have been made aware of the fact that in situ upgrading was in 
fact possible. The Court would further also have been made aware of the financial 
implications of the temporary relocation units and the State’s inability to comply with 
this part of the order.174 The Court should thus have ordered the parties to engage 
with each other in order to resolve the issue. The Court could then have retained 
jurisdiction in order to ensure that the resultant agreement was appropriate in the 
circumstances.175  
                                            
171 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 309. 
172 S Liebenberg “Engaging the Paradoxes of the Universal and Particular in Human Rights 
Adjudication: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of ‘Meaningful Engagement’” (2012) 12 AHRLJ 1 
23. This approach by the Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) is often criticised by academics for diluting the 
normative principle of meaningful engagement as developed in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road 
v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). See K Mclean “Meaningful Engagement: One 
Step Forward or Two Back? Some Thoughts on Joe Slovo” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court 
Review 223 and S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 303–311. 
173 Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR 723 (CC) para 6. 
The Court stated that there were “second thoughts about whether the relocation order of this 
Court was appropriate and effective, and whether it could be complied with”. See also K 
Mclean “Meaningful Engagement: One Step Forward or Two Back? Some Thoughts on Joe 
Slovo” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 223 231 where the author discusses the impact 
of political events in the Western Cape which saw the African National Congress being 
unseated as ruling party in the province on the subsequent happenings of this case. 
174 Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR 723 (CC) para 6. 
175 It is important to note that the engagement component of the remedy in Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) did have a positive 
impact. Liebenberg notes that meaningful engagement, although in a diluted form, still 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
169 
 
5 4 4 Participatory structural interdicts  
 
In order to effectively mitigate traditional concerns as discussed above, meaningful 
engagement should be incorporated into structural interdict remedies in order to 
contribute to the design of the remedy, and not merely to contribute to the 
implementation of the remedy.176 During this process, the court should still play a 
significant role in order to ensure that the remedial design process and the subsequent 
remedy adhere to the norms for public law remedies.177 This part of the chapter will 
propose a participatory structural interdict model which is based on a combination of 
the meaningful engagement doctrine and Sturm’s deliberative model.  
 
5 4 4 1 Pre-negotiation phase 
 
The Court has several functions to fulfil during the pre-negotiation stage of remedial 
design which are crucial to the success of the participatory structural interdict. The 
court must firstly determine what would constitute the most effective relief in the 
specific circumstances of the case. The court must secondly determine the normative 
parameters of the remedial process in order to provide guidance to the participating 
parties. The third function of the court in this phase is to facilitate the identification of 
the different stakeholders and the independent third party facilitator. 
  
                                            
contributed to the “resolution of the dispute” between the parties in this case since it did 
eventually result in a just outcome which did not require the eviction and relocation of the 
residents. S Liebenberg “Engaging the Paradoxes of the Universal and Particular in Human 
Rights Adjudication: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of ‘Meaningful Engagement’” (2012) 12 
AHRLJ 1 26. See Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR 723 
(CC) para 11 where the Court discusses the agreement that had been reached between the 
Western Cape MEC for Human Settlements, the residents of the Joe Slovo community and 
the developer according to which in situ upgrading would take place and that all of the housing 
forming part of the new development would be allocated to Joe Slovo residents. 
176 See part 5 2 above in this chapter where the concerns are discussed. This submission is 
congruent with the consensual remedial formulation model as discussed in part 5 3 5 above. 
177 See chapter two part 2 3 1 for a discussion of the overarching norms for public law 
remedies. 
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5 4 4 1 1 Determination of remedial options 
 
Sturm states that the court must firstly endorse the participatory model as the most 
effective model in the circumstances.178 The court should do this with reference to the 
factors as identified in chapter two of this study. The court must thus firstly consider 
the nature of the right and the nature of the rights infringement.179 The court must 
secondly balance all relevant interests against each other.180 The court must thirdly 
consider the reason for the rights violation since this will also point towards the 
appropriateness of a structural interdict.181 The last two factors to be considered by 
the court are the practicability of the remedy182 and the deterrent effect of the 
remedy.183  
Consideration of all of the above-mentioned factors will aid the court in deciding 
whether or not a participatory structural interdict will be the most appropriate and 
effective relief in the circumstances. Endorsement of the participatory structural 
interdict with reference to these factors will also contribute to the court’s adherence to 
the norm of reasoned decision making which will further contribute to the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the consequent remedy.184 
It is important to note that a participatory structural interdict as proposed in this study 
will not be a “quick-fix” solution to systemic socio-economic rights violations.185 This 
means that a pure participatory structural interdict might not always be the most 
effective remedy in systemic cases. For example, a court might conclude, after 
considering the above-mentioned factors, that the underlying interests in a case are 
urgent and that immediate relief is required in order to prevent irremediable harm from 
                                            
178 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1429. 
179 See chapter two part 2 3 2 1 and chapter three parts 3 2 1 and 3 2 2. 
180 See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 and chapter three part 3 2 3. 
181 See chapter two part 2 3 2 3 and chapter three part 3 2 4. 
182 See chapter two part 2 3 2 4 and chapter three part 3 2 5. 
183 See chapter two part 2 3 2 5 and chapter three part 3 2 6. 
184 See chapter two part 2 3 1 4 for a discussion of the norm of reasoned decision making. 
185 See chapter four part 4 3 3 where it is argued that detailed interim relief as part of a 
structural interdict order are warranted in cases where immediate relief is necessary in order 
to prevent irremediable harm from ensuing. 
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ensuing.186 The court can in such a case endorse a participatory structural interdict 
remedy coupled with a detailed interim interdict component. A detailed and managerial 
interim order as part of a participatory structural interdict will be justified in urgent cases 
since it will be aimed at preventing irremediable harm from occurring. A participatory 
process as proposed by this study can then still proceed in order to rectify the systemic 
issues which threaten the urgent interests.  
 
5 4 4 1 2 Determination of normative parameters 
 
Before granting a participatory remedy such as meaningful engagement, a court 
should secondly “articulate the normative parameters of the remedial enterprise”.187 
Van der Berg notes that a mere participatory remedy will not constitute effective 
relief.188 A participatory process will only be effective if the parties partaking in it are 
provided with normative guidelines since this will indicate to the State what its duties 
are and it will indicate to the victims what their entitlements are.189 A court granting a 
participatory structural interdict must thus provide a normative interpretation of the 
infringed right.190 A lack of normative guidance from the courts will result in the victims 
of systemic socio-economic rights violations not obtaining all the benefits which the 
constitutional right is meant to bestow on them.191 The court does not only inform the 
parties of their obligations and entitlements when articulating the normative 
parameters of the remedy in a specific case, but it also lessens the concerns relating 
                                            
186 See chapter three part 3 2 1 2 where urgency of underlying interests is discussed in the 
context of socio-economic rights violations. 
187 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1428. 
188 S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation 
Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 320. 
189 320. 
190 S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in Education Rights 
Disputes” (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 11. 
191 S van der Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-Economic Rights Further 
or Infusing Administrative Law with Substance?” (2013) 29 SAJHR 376 386.  
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to deliberative inequalities between the parties.192 This will also contribute to the 
overall efficacy of the remedy since the victims will be better positioned during the 
negotiations to vindicate their rights effectively, thus meeting Sturm’s remediation 
norm. 
The normative parameters are established with reference to the liability norms that 
have been violated.193 Sturm states that the normative parameters are established by 
“defining the targets of the remedial process”.194 For example, if a court finds that 
prison conditions violate prisoners’ socio-economic rights, then the court can specify 
aspects of the imprisonment that need to be remedied through engagement. Remedial 
targets in this example might include aspects such as nutrition, health care, sanitation 
and overcrowding.195 The deliberations should thus be aimed at solving specifically 
these issues. Failure to do so might result in a less effective remedy. 
Chenwi argues that remedies produced through engagement before a liability 
judgment is given by the court will result in the parties negotiating without any 
“normative parameters or knowledge of their legitimate entitlements”.196 Liebenberg 
agrees that the failure to establish normative parameters and remedial targets will 
render meaningful engagement less effective. She argues that this is the case since it 
will be difficult to assess the efficacy of the engagement process and the resultant 
                                            
192 S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative 
Lessons from South African Evictions Law” (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 
329. 
193 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1428. It 
is important to note here that the deliberative process only begins after the court’s finding of 
liability. This was not the case in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 
SA 208 (CC) since the Court granted the interim structural interdict compelling the parties to 
meaningfully engage before handing down any form of judgment. 
194 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1429. 
195 1429. 
196 See L Chenwi “Democratizing the Socio-Economic Rights-Enforcement Process” in G H 
Alviar, K Klare & L A Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: 
Critical Inquiries (2014) 178 186. See also L Chenwi “A New Approach to Remedies in Socio-
Economic Rights Adjudication: Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others” (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 371 384. 
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remedy if there is not an “evaluative framework” against which the engagement 
outcomes can be assessed.197  
Mamba v Minister of Social Development (“Mamba”) serves as an example of where 
a failure by the Court to articulate the remedial normative parameters led to an 
unsuccessful engagement order.198 This case concerned the closure of camps which 
provided accommodation to refugees who were victims of xenophobic violence which 
erupted in South Africa in 2008. The Court ordered meaningful engagement, stating 
that the parties must “engage with each other meaningfully and with all other 
stakeholders as soon as it is possible… in order to resolve the differences” in this 
case.199 The State refused to engage despite the order and went ahead with the 
closure. Liebenberg argues that it was the failure of the Court to provide guidance as 
to what the normative parameters of this case were which rendered this engagement 
order ineffective.200 This failure by the Court resulted in the State not knowing what its 
obligations were and the applicants not knowing what they were entitled to. 
It is clear from the above discussion that a failure by courts to determine the 
normative parameters prior to the engagement process will negatively impact the 
remediation norm as seen in Mamba where the victims of the rights violations did not 
receive any relief at all. Such a failure will also possibly negatively affect the norm of 
                                            
197 S Liebenberg “Engaging the Paradoxes of the Universal and Particular in Human Rights 
Adjudication: The Possibilities and Pitfalls of ‘Meaningful Engagement’” (2012) 12 AHRLJ 1 
23. See also D Brand Courts, Socio-Economic Rights and Transformative Politics LLD 
dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2009) 162–164 where the author similarly argues that 
engagement should only be ordered after the court has issued the normative parameters. See 
part 5 4 4 3 1 below in this chapter where the evaluative role of the court in participatory 
remedial processes is discussed. 
198 Case no CCT 65/08. 
199 Para 1. 
200 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights - Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 422. This is congruent with Sturm’s position, as she argues that normative parameters 
and defined remedial targets as provided by the court are the “driving force” for the deliberation 
process. A lack thereof could thus potentially mean that no engagement will take place. S P 
Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1429. See also 
S van der Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-Economic Rights Further or 
Infusing Administrative Law with Substance?” (2013) 29 SAJHR 376 384-385 where the 
author criticises the engagement order as granted in this case. 
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reasoned decision making since courts effectively fail to engage with the substantive 
issues at play.201 
 
5 4 4 1 3 Identification of stakeholders and third party facilitator 
 
The court must thirdly identify all the relevant stakeholders whose participation is 
needed in the engagement process in order to ensure that the norm of participation is 
adhered to.202 Sturm states that participation should already start at this stage since 
the parties should be allowed to participate in the identification process.203 With regard 
to who should all be allowed to participate, Sturm states: 
 
“Under the deliberative model, the net is cast broadly to include the range of individuals 
directly affected by, responsible for, or in a position to block implementation of a remedy.”204 
 
Sturm’s deliberative model requires the involvement of an independent third party 
who will fulfil a facilitative role during the negotiations.205 The court is responsible for 
supervising the process through which the participants appoint the facilitator.206 The 
appointment of an independent facilitator will contribute to the overall efficacy of the 
remedial process due to several reasons. Firstly, the adversarial determination of 
liability is an inherently hostile exercise and this conflict between the parties might 
affect the negotiations negatively.207 Secondly, the points of contention and parties 
involved in public interest litigation are often vast and the parties might need 
assistance with such a complex situation, especially since many participants will be 
                                            
201 L Chenwi “Democratizing the Socio-Economic Rights-Enforcement Process” in G H Alviar, 
K Klare & L A Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical 
Inquiries (2014) 178 188. 
202 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1429. 
203 1429. 
204 1429. This is congruent with the factor identified in chapter two which requires the entry of 
diverse interests in the remedial enquiry. See chapter two part 2 3 2 2. 
205 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1430. 
206 1430. The involvement of a third party facilitator is congruent with the consensual remedial 
formulation model as discussed in part 5 3 5 above. 
207 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1430. 
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unfamiliar with deliberative processes aimed at problem solving.208 Thirdly, a facilitator 
is needed in order to ensure that the deliberative process complies with the procedural 
requirements of the court.209 Lastly, the independent facilitator can also help to ensure 
that the deliberative process is fair and equal.210 
 
5 4 4 2 Negotiation phase: ensuring a fair and equal participatory process 
 
Court supervision during the negotiation phase is necessary to ensure that the 
process is fair.211 The principal threat to a fair participatory process and effective 
remedy is the unequal bargaining power which is an inherent feature of systemic 
socio-economic rights cases.212 Applicants in cases where socio-economic rights have 
been systemically violated will often be poor and marginalised members of society. 
Negotiations between these applicants and a powerful State might thus not be fair, 
even if negotiations are in good faith and normative parameters have been set by the 
court prior to engagement.213 A remedy which is the product of such an unequal 
deliberative process might not adhere to the remediation norm and will in such a case 
not constitute effective relief. 
                                            
208 1430. 
209 1430. 
210 1432. Sturm states that the facilitator must ensure that every participant gets an opportunity 
to make his or her case and that the negotiations are based on reasoned decision making. 
These functions of the third party facilitator will contribute to the elimination of unequal 
bargaining powers. 
211 1433. 
212 See L Chenwi “A New Approach to Remedies in Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others” (2009) 2 
Constitutional Court Review 371 384 where the author discusses this concern in the specific 
context of meaningful engagement. 
213 See S Liebenberg & K Young “Adjudicating Social and Economic Rights: Can Democratic 
Experimentalism Help?” in G H Alviar, K Klare & L A Williams (eds) Social and Economic 
Rights in Theory and Practice: Critical Inquiries (2014) 237 251 where the authors discuss 
deliberative inequalities which arise when poor and marginalised people are parties to the 
negotiations. Their discussion is a response to the seminal scholarship of Dorf and Sabel, see 
M C Dorf & C F Sabel “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism” (1998) 98 Colum L Rev 
267 in this regard. 
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In addressing the bargaining inequalities which accompany participatory remedies 
in systemic socio-economic rights cases, Liebenberg states: 
 
“One way of diminishing the impact of bargaining inequalities is for a court to set firm 
procedural and normative parameters within which engagement processes must occur in 
a particular case and to maintain on-going supervisory oversight of the engagement 
process.”214 
 
Judicial supervision thus places the court in a position to monitor the engagement 
process. Parties can approach the court whenever they believe that the negotiations 
are not taking place in good faith or if one of the parties decides to not engage at all.215 
The independent third party facilitator can also play a significant role in this regard 
since he or she will be involved in the engagement process and will thus be in a good 
position to identify mala fide negotiations or other deliberative inequalities.216 The 
facilitator can, upon such identification, approach the court for further directions.217  
  
                                            
214 S Liebenberg “Participatory Approaches to Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Tentative 
Lessons from South African Evictions Law” (2014) 32 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 312 
329. This is congruent with Sturm who states that deliberative inequalities can be curtailed by 
situating informal deliberations within a formal framework where the decisions and negotiated 
conclusions must be based on reason. See S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law 
Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1436. See also part 5 4 4 1 2 above in this chapter where 
the determination of normative parameters is discussed as one of the court’s functions in a 
participatory adjudication process. 
215 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 15. 
216 An independent third party facilitator might have contributed to a more equal and fair 
negotiation process between the Mayfield community and the municipality who were ordered 
to meaningfully engage in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 4 BCLR 388 
(CC) para 53. See chapter four part 4 3 1 2 where this case is discussed. 
217 See S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1433 
where the author states that the facilitator must report to the court.  
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5 4 4 3 Post-negotiation phase 
 
5 4 4 3 1 Evaluation of proposed remedy 
 
The Constitutional Court has stated that “[i]t will not always be appropriate for a 
court to approve all agreements entered into consequent upon engagement”.218 The 
mere fact that the remedy was designed through a participatory process will thus not 
be enough to ensure that it adheres to the norms and factors for effective relief.219 The 
court must accordingly evaluate the appropriateness of the proposed remedy before 
making it an order of court.220 The evaluation will require the court to determine 
whether or not the engagement process complied with the normative requirements as 
formulated before the participatory process commenced and whether or not the 
resultant remedy sufficiently addresses the violation in question.221 This will ensure 
that the remediation norm is met. A detailed record or minutes should be kept of the 
engagement proceedings for the court to consult when evaluating the appropriateness 
of the proposed remedy.222 The keeping of such a record as a basis for evaluation 
means that the norm of reasoned decision making is adhered to since participants and 
the court must base their decisions with regard to what the most appropriate remedy 
is, on merits and not mere preference.223 
The remedy should not only be evaluated against the normative requirements as 
articulated by the court at the start of the process, but should also be evaluated against 
the factors for effective relief since there is a correlation between the norms and the 
                                            
218 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 30. 
219 See chapter two part 2 3 1 for a discussion on the norms of participation, respect for 
separation of powers, impartiality, reasoned decision making and remediation and chapter two 
part 2 3 2 for a discussion on the factors that should be considered when designing an effective 
remedy. 
220 The evaluative function of the court under this model is congruent with the role of the court 
under the bargaining model as discussed in part 5 3 2 above. 
221 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1431. 
222 1435. Sturm states (1433) that “[t]he minutes are not verbatim transcripts of the 
discussions” but must “reflect the interests, values, factual information, proposed solutions, 
and justifications for particular decisions”. 
223 1435. 
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factors.224 The court must thus make sure that the remedy as designed by the parties 
is capable of addressing the underlying values and interests of the violated right and 
that it is sufficient to deal with the nature of and reason for the violation. The remedy 
must furthermore be capable of extending relief to similarly situated people and it must 
serve as a deterrent for future violations. Lastly, the court must be satisfied that the 
remedy is capable of being successfully implemented. 
The court can refer the remedy back to the participants if there is a problem with 
either the remedy itself or the participatory process which resulted in the remedy.225 
The court can also impose a remedy on the parties if the participants are unable to 
design a remedy through engagement which adheres to the normative parameters as 
provided by the court.226 The parties should then submit reports to the court indicating 
whether consensus had been reached with regard the some of the remedial targets. 
The court will then formulate a remedy aimed at achieving any remaining targets. This 
court imposed remedy will, however, be based on information gathered during the 
participatory process.227 Such a remedy will thus still mitigate the institutional 
legitimacy and institutional capacity concerns since it is based on information gathered 
during a diverse participatory process. 
 
5 4 4 3 2 Securing effective implementation of the approved remedy 
 
Courts have to retain jurisdiction over a case to secure implementation of the 
remedy, even if the remedial plan was designed through a participatory process.228 
This is because systemic socio-economic rights violations are complex and difficult to 
remedy and even bona fide parties might be guilty of non-compliance. Retained 
jurisdiction will thus enable the court to supervise the process and intervene if 
                                            
224 See chapter two part 2 3 3 where this correlation is discussed. 
225 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1431. 
226 1431. 
227 1431. 
228 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 178. 
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necessary, thus making the remedy more effective. This intervention will be done by 
issuing further directives aimed at rectifying the unsatisfactory implementation.229 
One of the concerns relating to structural interdict remedies, as noted above in this 
chapter, is that courts lack the necessary technical and resource capacity to supervise 
the implementation of remedies.230 However, a court does not necessarily have to 
perform the supervisory function itself.231 There are several alternative possibilities 
that should be considered. Courts can potentially instruct the South African Human 
Rights Commission (“SAHRC”) to assist with monitoring the implementation of a 
remedy.232 Ebadolahi argues that the SAHRC has the necessary “institutional 
resources and expertise needed to aid courts in implementing structural interdicts”.233 
She proposes that the SAHRC should take on a new role. This role will require the 
SAHRC to work together with State departments against which a structural interdict 
remedy has been granted. The Commission should be one of the participants involved 
in designing an appropriate and effective remedy.234 The most important function 
under this new role would be for the Commission to monitor the implementation of the 
                                            
229 S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation 
Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 299. 
230 See part 5 2 3 above in this chapter where this concern is discussed. 
231 See D Brand Courts, Socio-Economic Rights and Transformative Politics LLD dissertation, 
Stellenbosch University (2009) 135 where the author states, with reference to Government of 
the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC), that the Constitutional 
Court would have run the risk of “simply… becom[ing] bogged down in debilitating detail” if it 
chose to supervise the implementation of its remedy. 
232 M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission 
to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” (2008) 83 
NYU L Rev 1565 1568. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 
11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 97 where the Court discussed the SAHRC’s agreement to monitor 
the implementation of the remedy. 
233 M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission 
to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” (2008) 83 
NYU L Rev 1565 1598. See J Klaaren “A Second Look at the South African Human Rights 
Commission, Access to Information, and the Promotion of Socioeconomic Rights” (2005) 27 
Human Rights Quarterly 539 for a discussion of the role of the SAHRC. 
234 M Ebadolahi “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission 
to Achieve Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” (2008) 83 
NYU L Rev 1565 1602. 
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approved remedy.235 However, the feasibility of this proposal is questionable since the 
SAHRC would have to radically broaden its already wide mandate, alter its structures 
and processes, and additional funding would have to be sourced.236 
The Court could also possibly appoint special masters to supervise the 
implementation of the structural interdict in cases where socio-economic rights have 
been systemically violated, as is done in the American context.237 Erasmus and 
Hornigold state that these masters could supervise “the transformation of the public 
institution until such time as the non-compliance [with the constitutional obligation] has 
been appropriately resolved”.238 The authors argue that there is precedent in South 
Africa for the appointment of court officers whose role is similar to that of a special 
master. They refer in this regard to the role of the supervising attorney in an Anton 
Piller order,239 the Family Advocate,240 and the role of the business rescue 
                                            
235 1603. 
236 1604. See also Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 9 BCLR 1039 
(GP) para 78 where the Court rejected the applicant’s proposal to order the SAHRC to monitor 
implementation due to the SAHRC’s lack of capacity. See also S van der Berg A Capabilities 
Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource Allocation Decisions Impacting on Socio-
Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2015) 342 where the author 
states that a court ordering an institution such as the SAHRC to supervise the implementation 
of a remedy “must explicitly define [its] roles and functions” in order to prevent the ineffective 
monitoring that followed after the Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) judgment. 
237 It is argued in D Erasmus & A Hornigold “Court Supervised Institutional Transformation in 
South Africa” (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2457 that the American concept 
of a special master to monitor compliance can easily be introduced to public interest litigation 
in South Africa. 
238 2460. 
239 2478. An Anton Piller order is a “civil search, seizure and preservation of evidence 
procedure” which is carried out by the sheriff of the court in cases where there is a possibility 
that evidence might be destroyed. The role of the supervising attorney in such a procedure is 
to make sure that the order is properly executed and he or she must subsequently file a report 
with the court stating how the order was carried out and what evidence have been collected. 
240 D Erasmus & A Hornigold “Court Supervised Institutional Transformation in South Africa” 
(2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2457 2478. The Family Advocate is 
empowered in terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 24 of 1987 to conduct an 
investigation in any case involving a minor child and to subsequently furnish the court with a 
report stipulating what the best interest of the child is. 
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practitioner.241 The authors acknowledge that there is no explicit provision for the 
appointment of a special master in South African law. However, they submit that the 
remedial powers of the courts in terms of sections 38 and 172(1)(b) are wide enough 
to grant courts the power to appoint such masters.242 
Another closely related possibility is for the court to appoint an expert or committee 
of experts to supervise the implementation of the approved remedy.243 Bhagwati, 
writing in the Indian context, states that Indian courts had to develop a methodology 
for the effective enforcement of orders in social justice cases.244 This methodology 
entails the appointment of people such as judicial officers, members of the executive 
or independent third parties to supervise the implementation phase.245 The 
Constitutional Court has recently set precedent within the South African context for 
this methodology in Black Sash v Minister of Social Development.246 The Court 
ordered that “independent legal practitioners and technical experts” be appointed to 
                                            
241 D Erasmus & A Hornigold “Court Supervised Institutional Transformation in South Africa” 
(2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2457 2479. The Court can in terms of 
s128(1)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 appoint a business rescue practitioner for the 
“temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of its affairs, business and 
property”.  
242 D Erasmus & A Hornigold “Court Supervised Institutional Transformation in South Africa” 
(2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 2457 2482. 
243 See s19bis of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 and the corresponding s38 of the Superior 
Courts Act 10 of 2013 which might provide a mechanism for courts to do this. These provisions 
state that courts can, with the permission of the parties, appoint special referees to conduct 
an enquiry and submit a report to the court. See also D Butterworth, J de Oliviera & C de Moor 
“Are South African Administrative Law Procedures Adequate for the Evaluation of Issues 
resting on Scientific Analyses?” (2012) 129 SALJ 461 476.  
244 P N Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 561 577. 
245 577. See also S van der Berg A Capabilities Approach to the Judicial Review of Resource 
Allocation Decisions Impacting on Socio-Economic Rights LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch 
University (2015) 140 and in general J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the Court - Lessons 
on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 27 SAJHR 343. 
246 2017 ZACC 8 (CC). See chapter four part 4 3 3 2 for an analysis and evaluation of this 
judgment. 
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supervise all aspects of the structural interdict and to report back to the Court on the 
implementation thereof.247 
Another possible option is to simply refer the task of supervising the implementation 
of the remedy back to a lower court. The Constitutional Court did this in Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3)248 after various reports were filed in terms 
of the structural interdict order granted in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
(“Pheko 1”).249 These reports gave rise to factual disputes regarding the relocation of 
the communities and the Court held that the High Court was better placed to deal with 
this. The High Court thus had to supervise the relocation of the community to suitable 
land in line with the Pheko 1 order.250 
                                            
247 Black Sash v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 76. Independent 
experts appointed in this case include high ranking individuals with expert knowledge such as 
Gill Marcus (former reserve Bank governor), Tim Masela (head of the National Payment 
System) and Mmamolatelo Mathekga (renowned information technology expert). See K 
Diseko “Uneasiness over SASSA Card Expiry as ConCourt Appoints Panel of Experts” (11-
06-2017) SASSA <http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/newsroom/271-uneasiness-over-
sassa-card-expiry-as-concourt-appoints-panel-of-experts> (accessed 13-06-2017). 
248 2016 10 BCLR 1308 (CC). See chapter four part 4 3 1 2 where all of the judgments in this 
litigation series are discussed. 
249 2012 4 BCLR 388 (CC). 
250 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 2016 10 BCLR 1308 (CC) para 46. 
See also the American case of Brown v Board of Education 349 US 294 (1955) in which the 
United States Supreme Court ordered that American schools had to be desegregated (301). 
The Court further ordered that the cases be returned to the lower courts, which were better 
positioned to supervise the desegregation process. The order effectively required of the 
different school authorities to remedy the situation themselves. However, the Court ordered 
that the lower courts should “consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose” 
in order to bring about transformation in the schooling system by desegregating it and that the 
lower courts would retain jurisdiction over these cases to ensure effective compliance (301). 
Mbazira states that many school authorities did not comply with court orders dealing with 
desegregation, but that the ongoing jurisdiction allowed courts to “intervene more intrusively” 
and to give further directions aimed at ensuring compliance. C Mbazira Litigating Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 
180. See also F I Michelman “Constitutionally Binding Social and Economic Rights as a 
Compelling Idea: Reciprocating Perturbations in Liberal and Democratic Constitutional 
Visions” in H A García, K Klare & L A Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory 
and Practice (2015) 277 288-289 where the author makes the same point. 
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It is clear that there are various options open to South African courts on how to 
supervise the implementation process of structural interdicts. These alternatives will 
not only reduce the concern relating to the court’s capacity to supervise its own orders, 
but will also immensely contribute to the remedy being effective since the court can 
secure implementation of its orders, thus adhering to the norm of remediation and the 
deterrent factor.  
 
5 5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated how a structural interdict can be best designed in order to 
constitute effective relief while remaining sensitive to separation of powers, 
institutional legitimacy and institutional capacity concerns in systemic socio-economic 
rights cases. The chapter commenced with a discussion of the traditional concerns 
which arise in socio-economic rights cases. These concerns are intensified where the 
positive obligations flowing from these rights are enforced through structural interdict 
remedies. However, it was argued that the separation of powers and democratic 
legitimacy concerns are, although valid, overstated since structural interdicts, if 
designed correctly, will contribute to the alleviation of these concerns in socio-
economic rights cases. It was furthermore concluded that the concerns relating to 
institutional capacity are also valid and pressing and need to be taken into account 
during the remedial design process in order to ensure that the consequent remedy is 
effective. This was followed by a discussion and analysis of the existing structural 
interdict models which were all found to be deficient. 
The second part of this chapter proposed a participatory model of the structural 
interdict which is designed to adhere the overarching norms for public law remedies 
as identified by Sturm. This model proposes that the parties should be ordered to 
meaningfully engage with each other and all other relevant stakeholders in order to 
design an effective remedy. The greatest advantage of the deliberative model vis-à-
vis those models that are deficient in certain respects, is that it allows diverse 
stakeholders to meaningfully engage with each other within a formal structure. This 
formal structure is supported by the significant role that is envisioned for the court. The 
court is responsible for facilitating different aspects of the engagement process and 
will furthermore be responsible for supervising both the design stage and the 
implementation stage of the remedy. This active role for the court will ensure that the 
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remedy adheres to the norms of participation, separation of powers, impartiality, 
reasoned decision making and remediation. The court’s active involvement will further 
ensure that the eventual remedy is based on a consideration of the relevant factors 
for effective relief. As a result, a participatory structural interdict combined with judicial 
supervision can constitute effective relief for the systemic violation of socio-economic 
rights.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has sought to emphasise the critical need for effective relief where socio-
economic rights are violated in the context of a highly unequal society plagued by 
poverty. Litigation is one of the tools used by civil society to combat inequality in order 
to realise the transformative ethos of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“Constitution”).1 However, this litigation can only successfully contribute to the 
transformation of South African society if courts grant relief that is effective in cases 
dealing with human rights violations. 
This study, focusing specifically on socio-economic rights because of their 
ostensible potential to transform our society into one based on substantive equality 
and human dignity,2 endeavoured to establish the contours of the concept of effective 
relief and clarify in which circumstances the structural interdict remedy can constitute 
such relief. The primary contribution of this thesis was to propose how a structural 
interdict should be designed so as to ensure that it is as effective as possible in cases 
where socio-economic rights have been systemically violated.  
 
6 2 Findings and recommendations  
 
6 2 1 Defining effective relief for human rights violations in general  
 
Chapter two sought to establish what the concept of “effective relief” entails. This 
enquiry commenced by investigating the remedial powers of South African courts in 
cases dealing with the violation of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. As a point 
of departure, it was noted that the wide remedial powers of the courts, as provided for 
in sections 38 and 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, have been interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court as requiring “effective” relief.3 The study thus proceeded by 
investigating the contours of this judicially recognised concept.  
                                            
1 See chapter one part 1 1 1 for an explanation of transformative constitutionalism. 
2 S1(a) of the Constitution. 
3 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. 
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At an overarching, normative level, reliance was placed on the normative theory for 
public law remedies espoused by Sturm in order to broadly define “effective” relief. It 
was recommended that in order to constitute effective and legitimate relief, the 
remedial process must conform to certain normative standards, as distilled from 
Sturm’s theoretical approach. Accordingly, effective relief must allow for diverse 
participation by interested parties. Furthermore, an effective remedy must ensure that 
the separation of powers doctrine is respected and that judicial impartiality is 
maintained. Moreover, an effective remedy must be based on reasoned decision 
making and must, lastly, sufficiently vindicate the infringed right. 
At a more practical level, it was recommended in chapter two that certain factors be 
considered by a court when designing a remedy in order to ensure that the consequent 
remedy constitutes effective relief.4 It was found that the judicial consideration of these 
factors is essential if the remedy is to adhere to Sturm’s norms and thereby constitute 
effective relief.5 The first factor that should be considered is the nature of the violated 
right and the nature of the violation. Courts must secondly balance the diverse 
interests in a case against each other in order to ensure that the remedy is accepted 
by those who must live with it, implement it and who are in a position to compromise 
it. The court must thirdly also consider the reason for the rights violation since the 
remedy must be capable of addressing this in order to be effective. The last two factors 
that should be considered are the practicability and the deterrent effect of the remedy.  
Chapter two thus concluded that relief will only be effective if it is regarded as 
legitimate by those affected thereby. However, effective relief encompasses more than 
acceptance by those impacted by it, and this study therefore did not propose a single 
definition of this complex concept. Instead, an evaluative framework consisting of 
Sturm’s norms for public law remedies and the factors that should be considered 
during the remedial phase was elucidated and recommended for judicial use. It was 
thus ultimately concluded that a remedy will constitute effective relief where all of the 
enumerated factors are considered and the overarching norms are accordingly 
adhered to.  
 
                                            
4 See chapter two part 2 3 2 for a discussion of these factors. 
5 See chapter two part 2 3 3 where the correlation between Sturm’s norms and the factors that 
should be considered in designing just and equitable relief are discussed. 
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6 2 2 Effective relief for socio-economic rights violations 
 
Chapter three of this study explored the contours of effective relief within the specific 
context of socio-economic rights violations. It was found that socio-economic rights 
have been historically neglected in terms of structural resource allocation. It was 
thereafter demonstrated that violations resulting from non-compliance with the positive 
obligations flowing from socio-economic rights will often be systemic in nature and 
difficult to remedy.6 The study accordingly proceeded by focusing on systemic socio-
economic rights violations. 
Furthermore, the potential of various constitutional law remedies to constitute 
effective relief for systemic socio-economic rights was considered. It was shown that 
declaratory orders and interdicts can constitute effective relief for systemic socio-
economic rights violations in certain circumstances. However, it was additionally found 
that the remedial potential of these remedies is limited to the extent that further 
litigation will be necessary in cases where there is not satisfactory compliance with 
court orders.7 As a result, these remedies may be inappropriate in certain socio-
economic rights cases where litigants are poor and marginalised and might thus not 
have the necessary resources to institute new judicial proceedings.8 Other remedies 
considered were constitutional damages and reading in. It was concluded that the 
limitation of these remedies to constitute effective relief in systemic socio-economic 
rights cases lies in their narrow field of application.  
  
                                            
6 See chapter three part 3 2 2 2 where this is argued. 
7 This study also considered the potential of contempt of court proceedings to aid in the 
alleviation of systemic socio-economic rights violations. It found that this procedure can 
contribute to the effectiveness of interdictory remedies. However, contempt of court 
proceedings also requires further litigation which limits its potential in socio-economic rights 
cases. 
8 W Trengove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 1 ESR 
Review 8 9. 
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6 2 3 Potential of the structural interdict to constitute effective relief 
 
The structural interdict remedy has enormous potential to be effective in cases 
where rights have been systemically violated.9 This study thus proceeded by 
determining in which circumstances in systemic cases it would be appropriate for a 
court to grant a structural interdict remedy. This enquiry proceeded by firstly 
investigating the nature of this unique remedy. The inherent flexibility of the structural 
interdict and the ability of a court to retain its jurisdiction when ordering this remedy 
are the most notable characteristics which make it possible for the structural interdict 
to effectively remedy systemic violations, which are often characterised by complex 
issues and polycentric consequences.10 It was found that structural interdicts will be 
most appropriate in systemic socio-economic rights cases where the violation was a 
result of either government recalcitrance or severe government incompetence.11  
However, it was found that the appropriateness of this remedy in systemic socio-
economic rights cases will not only be determined by the reason for the violation, but 
also by the urgency with which the remedy must be complied with. Roach and 
Budlender convincingly argue in this regard that the structural interdict will also be 
appropriate in cases where non-compliance with a court order will lead to irreparable 
harm.12 However, it must be noted that cases where the underlying interests are urgent 
justify strong and detailed structural interdicts in order to prevent irremediable harm.13 
Case law illustrative of the above-mentioned circumstances under which structural 
interdicts might be appropriate, was critically analysed and evaluated. Three main 
conclusions were consequently drawn: First, the circumstances under which the 
granting of a structural interdict will be appropriate will often overlap. Second, the 
                                            
9 N Swanepoel “Die Aanwending van die Gestruktureerde Interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Konstitusionele Regsbedeling: ’n Eiesoortige Beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 LitNet Akademies 
374 378. 
10 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 180–181. 
11 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 349-350. 
12 333. Urgent cases will require a strongly managerial and detailed structural interdict in order 
to prevent irremediable harm. 
13 See chapter four part 4 3 3 in this regard.  
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analysis confirmed that retained jurisdiction by the court is crucial to ensure effective 
implementation. The retention of supervision is not only required to enable the court 
to provide further directions if necessary, but the mere fact that the court is supervising 
the implementation of the remedy might deter government departments or officials 
who failed to fulfil their positive obligations from doing so again. Third, remedies 
granted in cases where the court facilitated participation by diverse parties were more 
effective since all stakeholders responsible for the implementation of the remedies 
were involved in the remedial process. 
 
6 2 4 Designing an effective structural interdict for systemic socio-economic rights 
violations 
 
The last aim of this study was to determine how structural interdicts can be best 
designed by South African courts in order to ensure that it constitutes effective relief. 
The structural interdict model as proposed by this study is based on two evaluative 
criteria: First, this model must be sensitive to the traditional concerns which arise when 
a structural interdict is granted in a case where socio-economic rights have been 
systemically violated. Second, the remedy must also be effective. 
This study identified three main concerns traditionally raised in connection with the 
structural interdict remedy in socio-economic rights cases. The first two concerns are 
based on the separation of powers doctrine, and the perceived lack of democratic 
legitimacy of the judiciary. It was argued that these concerns are, although valid, 
somewhat overstated since critics of the structural interdict who rely on these concerns 
do not account for the peculiar nature of the structural interdict as well as the form of 
democracy which is envisioned by the Constitution.  
The third main concern identified in this study relates to the institutional capacity of 
the judiciary. This concern is especially pressing since a failure to earnestly consider 
it may negatively affect a court’s ability to grant effective relief.14 In the context of socio-
economic rights adjudication in general, proponents of the institutional capacity 
objection argue that courts are ill-suited to make decisions dealing with social policy 
and public finance because judges lack the necessary expertise to do so. Another 
                                            
14 See chapter five part 5 2 3 where this is argued with reference to Soobramoney v Minister 
of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 58. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
190 
 
dimension of this concern relates to the polycentric nature of matters relating to 
systemic socio-economic rights violations.15 This objection is therefore relevant for the 
remedial phase of adjudication. Judges suffer from an information deficit and can thus 
not foresee all possible consequences of their decisions. It was concluded that a 
model structural interdict remedy would thus have to be designed in a way which 
addresses this information deficit in order to ensure that the remedy is effective. 
Chapter five of this study recommended a participatory structural interdict model 
based on the meaningful engagement doctrine as developed by the Constitutional 
Court16 and the deliberative model as developed by Sturm.17 The participatory model 
was specifically designed to meet the two evaluative criteria, namely effectiveness and 
sensitivity to the identified concerns. It was argued that the participatory component of 
this model can mitigate the identified concerns since parties will participate in every 
phase of the remedial process, especially during the negotiation phase where the 
design of the remedy is largely left to the parties. Diverse participation can help to 
address the concerns enumerated above while contributing to the consequent 
remedy’s effectiveness since the information deficit of the court will be diminished.  
The other remedial innovation which is incorporated into this model is the significant 
facilitative and supervisory role of the court. This study recommends that the court 
should facilitate the participatory process by fulfilling certain functions during the pre-
negotiation phase. The most important function is to set the normative parameters of 
the remedy. This provides guidance to the parties by elucidating both their entitlements 
and responsibilities. Moreover, explicit guidance by the court can help counter 
deliberative inequalities which threaten the efficacy of the remedial process. It is 
important to note that a pure participatory structural interdict as recommended here 
will not constitute effective relief in cases where non-compliance can lead to 
irremediable harm. The court should in such cases couple the participatory structural 
interdict with a detailed mandatory order aimed at addressing the urgent interests in 
order for the remedy to adhere to the remediation norm.18 
                                            
15 M Pieterse “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2004) 
20 SAJHR 383 392. 
16 See chapter five part 5 4 3 where the development of the meaningful engagement doctrine 
is briefly discussed. 
17 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1427. 
18 See chapter five part 5 4 4 1 1 where this is discussed. 
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Based on the conclusions drawn in chapter four, it was further recommended that 
the court assumes a strong supervisory role during the negotiation and post-
negotiation phases. The purpose of this supervisory function during the negotiation 
phase is to further ensure the fairness of the participatory process. The supervisory 
role of the court during the post-negotiation phase has two distinct functions. The 
supervisory role during this phase firstly allows the court to evaluate the proposed 
remedy.19 This can be accomplished by using the evaluative framework as developed 
in chapter two, which consists of the overarching norms for public law remedies as 
identified by Sturm as well as the more concrete factors which should be considered 
by a court when determining what the most appropriate relief will be where 
constitutional rights have been infringed. The court will approve the remedy if satisfied 
that it complies with the evaluative criteria. 
The second function of the court’s supervisory role during the post-negotiation 
phase is to secure the effective implementation of the approved remedy.20 The 
supervisory role of the court during the implementation phase raises practical 
concerns related to the court’s capacity to fulfil this role.21 This study thus proposed a 
number of possible solutions to this problem. The recommendations made in this 
regard entail either the delegation of this function to other institutions, experts or 
committees who must report back to the court for further directions if appropriate, or 
the referral of the case to a lower court if the structural interdict is granted by one of 
the apex courts. It is important to note the recommendations made in this regard may 
require new judicial mechanisms, additional funding or even new legislation in order 
to be effectively implemented. However, these issues do not fall within the scope of 
the present study. They require further advanced research incorporating a 
comparative study of jurisdictions which make use of structural remedies.  
  
                                            
19 S P Sturm “A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies” (1990) 79 Geo LJ 1355 1431. 
20 See chapter five part 5 4 4 3 2. 
21 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 9-36. 
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6 3 Concluding reflections 
 
Systemic socio-economic rights violations have a major impact on people who rely 
on the State for their basic socio-economic necessities. Those who are most 
dependent on reasonable State action are often poor and marginalised. In such cases, 
the need for effective relief is magnified since institutional deficiencies need to be 
rectified in order to deter future violations, confer systemic socio-economic benefits on 
all those who are similarly placed to the litigants, and thus contribute to the 
transformation of the unequal South African society.  
This study has shown that the structural interdict does indeed hold enormous 
potential to effectively remedy systemic socio-economic rights violations. However, 
South African courts have thus far been cautious in granting this remedy since it is 
regarded as an intrusive remedy that should only be used as a “last resort”.22 The 
participatory structural interdict model developed in this study aims to allay these 
concerns, since it is specifically designed to promote a collaborative partnership 
between all branches of government and a wide range of other stakeholders. This 
remedy should thus be granted in cases where it is appropriate and not just as a last 
resort when other remedies have already proven to be ineffective. It is thus clear that 
the courts, the State and civil society must work together to effect the necessary 
structural reform which will lead to the realisation of socio-economic rights and thus 
contribute to the transformation of South African society. 
 
                                            
22 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 166. 
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